Exploring the “myth” of hegemonic stability

International Organization

Volumn 44, Issue 4, 1990, Pages 431-477

  Grunberg, Isabelle ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84975960904     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300035372     Document Type: Article

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