Interest Groups, Representation and Conflict Management in the Standing Committees of the House of Commons

Canadian Journal of Political Science

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 1985, Pages 739-772

  Skogstad, Grace ^a  

^a CARLETON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84974186272     PISSN: 00084239     EISSN: 17449324     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0008423900059564     Document Type: Article

References (74)

1. Donald V. Smiley, “Territorialism and Canadian Political Institutions,” Canadian Public Policy 3 (1977), 449-57; Richard Simeon, “Regionalism and Canadian Political Institutions,” in J. Peter Meekison (ed.), Canadian Federalism (3rd ed.; Toronto: Methuen, 1977), 292-304; Roger Gibbins, Regionalism: Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982), 78.
2. Smiley, “Territorialism,” 453; Robert Jackson and Michael Atkinson, The Canadian Legislative System (2nd ed.; Toronto: Macmillan, 1980).
3. Gerhard Lowenberg and Samuel C. Patterson, Comparative Legislatures (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 78-85; H. F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 209-10; Thomas A. Hockin, “Adversary Politics and Some Functions of the Canadian House of Commons,” in Richard Schultz et al., The Canadian Political Process (3rd ed.; Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), 314-29; Eric A. Nordlinger, “Representation, Stability and Decisional Effectiveness,” in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds.), Representation (New York: Atherton, 1968), 108–27.
4. Nordlinger, “Representation,” 109.
5. Heinz Eulau and Katherine Hinchley, “Legislative Institutions and Processes,” in James A. Robinson (ed.), Political Science Annual 1 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), 85–86.
6. Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), 35.
7. Nordlinger, “Representation,” 122.
8. Heinz Eulau and Paul D. Karps, “The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 2 (1977), 233–54.
9. A. Paul Pross, “Pressure Groups: Adaptive Instruments of Political Communication,” In A. Paul Pross (ed.), Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975), 1–26. David Kwavnick argues that one of the major objectives of interest groups is to eliminate or discredit competing groups which claim to speak on behalf of their constituency (“Pressure Group Demands and the Struggle for Organizational Status: The Case of Organized Labour in Canada,” this Journal 3 [1970], 56–72).
10. Hockin, “Adversary Politics,” 324.
11. Ibid., 326.
12. Lowenberg and Patterson, Comparative Legislatures, 57–58.
13. Paul Thomas, “The Influence of Standing Committees of Parliament on Government Legislation,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 3 (1978), 683.
14. Harold D. Clarke and Richard G. Price, “Parliamentary Experience and Representational Role Orientations in Canada,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 6 (1981), 373–90.
15. Gibbins, Regionalism, 137: “The interests of any one region can be promoted only to the extent that the party is not hurt electorally in other regions, although the degree of constraint here is proportionate to the population size of the affected regions.”
16. Hockin, “Adversary Politics,” 326–27.
17. John B. Stewart, The Canadian House of Commons: Procedure and Reform (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977), 30.
18. Hockin, “Adversary Politics,” 314, 326–27, respectively.
19. Stewart, The Canadian House of Commons, 168.
20. Donald C. MacDonald, former MPP In Ontario, in William A. W. Neilson and James C. MacPherson (eds.), The Legislative Process in Canada: The Need for Reform (Toronto: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1978), 152.
21. Fred Thompson and W. T. Stanbury, The Political Economy of Interest Groups in the Legislative Process in Canada (Montreal:-Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1979), 36.
22. Bruce Macnaughton, “Canadian Parliamentarians and Interest Group Effectiveness,” in Jean-Pierre Gaboury and James Ross Hurley (eds.), The Canadian House of Commons Observed (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1979), 349. A. Paul Pross (“Parliamentary Influence and the Diffusion of Power,” this Journal 18 [1985], 261) concurs that groups’ recognition of “the legitimating capacity of Parliament” and its “ability to focus public debate, now makes interaction with parliament highly desirable in the eyes of many groups and a necessity in the eyes of others.”
23. Thompson and Stanbury, The Political Economy of Interest Groups, 37.
24. Thomas, “The Influence of Standing Committees,” 687.
25. Ibid., 683; Jackson and Atkinson, The Canadian Legislative System. 94;. Michael Rush, “Committees in the Canadian House of Commons,” in John D. Lees and Malcolm Shaw (eds.), Committees in Legislatures (Durham: Duke University Press. 1979), 226.
26. Thomas, “The Influence of Standing Committees,” 687.
27. Ibid., 683.
28. Paul G. Thomas, “The Backbencher,” in Neilson and MacPherson (eds.), The Legislative Process in Canada, 159.
29. J. R. Mallory and B. A. Smith, “The Legislative Role of Parliamentary Committees in Canada: The Case of the Joint Committee on the Public Service Bills,” Canadian Public Administration 15 (1972), 1–23.
30. John A. Fraser In Neilson and Macpherson (eds.), The Legislative Process in Canada, 148.
31. John M. Reid, “The Backbencher and the Discharge of Legislative Responsibilities,” in Neilson and MacPherson (eds.), The Legislative Process in Canada, 142.
32. Hockin, “Adversary Politics,” 319.
33. Rush, “Committees in the Canadian House of Commons,” 222.
34. David E. Smith, The Regional Decline of a National Party (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), chap. 6.
35. This description of the various groups’ beliefs draws upon a weekly reading of The Western Producer; Barry Wilson, Beyond the Harvest (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1981), 245; Don Mitchell, The Politics of Food (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1975), 18 and chap. 5; and the Canadian Cattlemen's Association, Policy Directions for the Canadian Beef Producer (1977).
36. Their lobby in 1970–1971 to secure exemption from the Farm Products Marketing Agencies Act, was highly successful. See Grace Skogstad, “The Farm Products Marketing Agencies Act,” Canadian Public Policy 6 (1980), 89–100.
37. Alan C. Cairns, “The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965,“ this Journal 1 (1968), 55–80.
38. Hockin, “Adversary Politics,” 324.
39. John B. Stewart explains why opposition committee members may be more knowledgeable than government members: “First, since ministers no longer are appointed as members of the standing committee, while most members of the shadow cabinet are,. second, unless the ministerial majority in the House is very great—about 165 to 97—by the time the ministers, the deputy speakers, and the assistant deputy speaker, as well as the parliamentary secretaries. and the chairmen of the committees have been subtracted, the opposition will enjoy also the advantage of having a relatively large number of members available to fill its places on the committees” (The Canadian House of Commons, 169).
40. Jackson and Atkinson, The Canadian Legislative System, 142.
41. Ibid.
42. Rush, “Committees in the Canadian House of Commons,” 234.
43. Nordlinger, “Representation,” 116.
44. Conservative MP Charles Mayer: “I know the present bill is basically the same as we would have brought forward had we remained the government” (Minutes, Standing Committee on Agriculture, November 5, 1981, 45:19).
45. Ibid., June 17, 1982, 38:8-9, and November 5, 1981, 45:9 when Eugene Whelan acknowledged that the formula change was the same as the CCA had proposed.
46. To illustrate, PC member Bert Hargrave invited the CCA to delineate the dangers of interfering with the North American continental flow of live beef, while the NDP members queried whether the Meat Import Act was only a stop-gap measure that fell short of the appropriate remedy to ensure beef producers an adequate return—a national meat marketing agency (Minutes, Standing Committee on Agriculture, June 16, 1981; June 23, 1981).
47. Ibid., June 16, 1981, 40:22-24. On November 5, 1981, Conservative member Mayer argued that there was “no more democratic body” than the CCA (45:20).
48. Ibid., June 16, 1981, 45:17.
49. Ibid., June 10, 1982, 81:28-29 (Eugene Whelan).
50. The full title is “An Act to Establish a Corporation called Canagrex to Promote. Facilitate and Engage in the Export of Agricultural and Food Products from Canada.”
51. Eugene Whelan (Minutes, Standing Committee on Agriculture, June 10,1982, 81:24) lists the groups for and against the bill. See also the editorial, “Foes of Canagrex,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), January 26, 1983, 6.
52. Minutes, Standing Committee on Agriculture, July 8, 1982, 87:31.
53. Ibid., June 29, 1982, 83:34.
54. In its June 1,1982, presentation, the Consumers Association of Canada talked about “excessive government intervention” and claimed Canagrex “contravenes a competitive market place” (76:5). See also Barry Wilson, “Canagrex Still a Hot Potato,” The Western Producer, November 25, 1982, 1.
55. See Yvon Pinard's justification of S.O. 75(c) during Question Period, December 14, 1982 (House of Commons, Debates, 21565–21566).
56. Paul McLoughlin, “Canagrex Finds Some Support,” The Western Producer, January 13, 1983, 5, quoting Whelan's use of the word “substantial.” The NDP did not succeed in making co-operative credit societies, along with authorized banks, as eligible to maintain Canagrex accounts (Minutes, Standing Committee on Agriculture, July 15, 89:6). The Conservatives succeeded in procuring an amendment to Clause 13 that would prevent a conflict of interest on the part of directors of Canagrex. Two other amendments were also in response to Conservative suggestions. The annual report of Canagrex would be referred to the agriculture committee (Clause 40) and the minister of agriculture and Canagrex's board of directors would have more authority to preaudit Canagrex's three-year corporate plan (Clause 31). Another amendment met the NDP request that the auditor general's annual audit of Canagrex be extended to include “a comprehensive audit of the affairs of the Corporation” when he deemed it necessary (Clause 29). See also Barry Wilson, “Canagrex: Once More to the Well.” The Western Producer, July 15, 1982, 26.
57. Minutes, Standing Committee on Agriculture, July 7, 1982, 86:24 and 86:23 (Liberal MPs Claude Tessier and Marcel Dionne, respectively).
58. See especially Liberal MP M. Dubois, ibid., April 29, 1982, 63:23.
59. Gordon Taylor, ibid., June 29, 1982, 84:44-45. As late as January 1983, two CFA affiliates, the Manitoba Farm Bureau and Alberta Unifarm, broke with the CFA to oppose Canagrex. See Barry Wilson, “Canagrex touchy CFA issue,” The Western Producer, February 3, 1983.
60. Minutes, Standing Committee on Agriculture, May 18, 1982, 60:51.
61. The NDP pointed to the fact that membership in the CCA is not necessarily voluntary in either Alberta or British Columbia. Alberta cattlemen belong “because they pay a check-off’ and BC cattlemen because membership is required in order for eligibility in BC's commodity stabilization scheme (Gary Jones, President of the Canadian Cattlemen's Association, ibid., 69:51).
62. Ibid., May 20, 1982, 70:43 (Conservative MP, Stan Korchinski).
63. A story in the Globe and Mail (January 26, 1983, 6) spoke of massive producer opposition to Canagrex. This erroneous impression was impart created by the political nature of the selection of witnesses invited to appear: the result was that the number of groups opposing Canagrex rivalled and perhaps exceeded the number supporting it. In actual fact, the number of producers supporting Canagrex probably exceeded those opposing it.
64. Minutes, Standing Committee on Agriculture, June 23, 1982, 83:10-11.
65. Ibid., July 8, 1982, 87:41 (Conservative MP Art Malone).
66. Ibid., April 29, 1982, 63:10-12. Conservative MP Doug Neil questioned the Canadian Pork Council along similar lines on May 18, 1982, 69:12.
67. Ibid., June 23, 1982, 83:14 and June 29, 1982, 84:82, respectively.
68. House of Commons, Debates, December 11, 1981, 13972–73.
69. See, for example, Minutes, Standing Committee on Transport, August 10, 1983, 115:102.
70. Ibid., August 10, 1983, 115:98.
71. House of Commons, Debates, June 21, 1983, 2638.
72. C. E. S. Franks, “The Dilemma of the Standing Committee of the Canadian House of Commons,” this Journal 4 (1971), 471. An alternative perspective, 14 years after Franks's prediction, is that of A. Paul Pross (“Parliamentary Influence and the Diffusion of Power,” 263), which suggests that groups’ focus on parliament has enhanced the latter's role in the policy process. The findings reported here are consistent with Pross's claim.
73. J. R. Mallory, The Structure of Canadian Government (rev. ed.; Toronto: Macmillan, 1984), 302.
74. Helen Jones Dawson, “National Pressure Groups and the Federal Government,” in Pross (ed.), Pressure Group Behaviour, 34.