Pluralism and Social Choice

American Political Science Review

Volumn 77, Issue 3, 1983, Pages 734-747

  Miller, Nicholas R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84974173937     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1957271     Document Type: Article

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