Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting Over Endogenous Agendas

American Political Science Review

Volumn 81, Issue 4, 1987, Pages 1323-1330

  Austen Smith, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84974151702     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1962591     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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12. Miller Nicholas. 1980. A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting. American Journal of Political Science 24: 68–96.
13. Miller Nicholas. 1985. Competing Agenda Setters with Policy Preferences. University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Typescript.
14. Miller Nicholas, Grofman Bernard, and Feld Scott. 1986. Cycle Avoiding Trajectories in Majority Voting Tourmanents. University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Typescript.
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16. Plott Charles. 1967. A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility under Majority Rule. American Economic Review 57: 787–806.
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