I. Legal Scholarship And Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism

Law and History Review

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 1985, Pages 293-331

  Benedict, Michael Les ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84974137946     PISSN: 07382480     EISSN: 19399022     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/743631     Document Type: Article

References (167)

1. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2. Herbert Wechsler, 'Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law', 73 Harvard Law Review 1–35 (1959).
3. Robert McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (Chicago, 1960) 105.
4. Arthur S. Miller, 'Toward a Definition of “the” Constitution', 8 University of Dayton Law Review 633, 647 (1983).
5. Max Lemer, 'The Supreme Court and American Capitalism', 42 Yale Law Journal 669–701, 672 (1933). See Arthur S. Miller and Ronald F. Howell, 'The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication', 27 University of Chicago Law Review 661–95, 672; Arthur S. Miller, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism (New York, 1968) 58, 60-61; John P. Roche, 'Entrepreneurial Liberty and the Commerce Power: Expansion, Contraction and Casuistry in the Age of Enterprise', 30 University of Chicago Law Review 680–703 (1963); William F. Swindler, Court and Constitution in the Twentieth Century: The Old Legality, 1889–1932 (Indianapolis and New York, 1968) 18–38.
6. John P. Frank, 'Review and Basic Liberties', in Edmond Cahn, ed., Supreme Court and Supreme Law (New York, 1954) 109, 110.
7. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
8. Walton H. Hamilton, 'The Path of Due Process of Law', International Journal of Ethics xlviii (1938) 269-96; Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development, 5th ed. (New York, 1976) 468-91; Loren Beth, The Development of the American Constitution, 1877–1917 (New York, 1971); Charles Grove Haines, 'Judicial Review of Legislation in the United States and the Doctrine of Vested Rights', 3 Texas Law Review 1–43 (1924); Edward S. Corwin, 'The Doctrine of Due Process before the Civil War', 24 Harvard Law Review 366–85, 460–79 (1911); Arnold Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law: Attitudes of Bar and Bench, 1887–1895 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1960) 1–18.
9. Until recently the traditional interpretation has not been much questioned. The stardard American constitutional history textbook accepted it. Kelly and Harbison, The American Constitution, supra note 8 at 468–91. Likewise leading constitutional law casebooks, such as Wallace Mendelson, The Constitution and the Supreme Court, 2d ed. (New York, 1965) 239-40; Alpheus T. Mason and William M. Beaney, American Constitutional Law: Introductory Essays and Selected Cases, 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1978) 356-59; John E. Nowak et al., Handbook on Constitutional Law (St. Paul, Minn., 1978) 394–97. And standard histories of the Supreme Court, for example McCloskey, American Supreme Court, supra note 3 at 115-35; Fred Rodell, Nine Men: A Political History of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1790–1955 (New York, 1955) 145-51; Bernard Schwartz, A Basic History of the Supreme Court (New York, 1968) 50-53; Swindler, Court and Constitution, supra note 5 at 28–29. Also the standard treatment of the rise and fall of laissez-faire notions of American government, Sidney Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1956) 126–64, and some of the most influential recent work in general American legal history (as distinct from constitutional history), for example Morton J. Horwitz, 'The Rise of Legal Formalism', American Journal of Legal History 19 (1975) 251–64. Even Mary Cornelia Porter's recent, seminal re-evaluation of laissez-faire constitutionalism fails to note any connection between the Supreme Court's decisions and liberty. Porter, 'That Commerce Shall Be Free: A New Look at the Old Laissez-Faire Court', 1979 Supreme Court Review 135–59.
10. U.S. 45 (1905).
11. William H. Rehnquist, 'Observation—The Notion of a Living Constitution', 54 Texas Law Review 693–706, at 700–704 (1976).
12. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass., 1980) 14. For other examples of the use of laissez-faire constitutionalism to condemn active judicial promotion of 'fundamental values', see the classic Wechsler, 'Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law', supra note 2 at 24–26 (1959) and such arguments as Robert H. Bork, 'Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems', 47 Indiana Law Journal 1–35, 11 (1971); Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Cambridge, Mass., 1977) 265-69; Berger, 'Michael Perry's Functional Justification for Judicial Review', 8 University of Dayton Law Review 465–532, 475–76 (1983); Joseph D. Grano, 'Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic Society', 28 Wayne Law Review 1–75, 21–24 (1981); 'Symposium—Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory', 56 New York University Law Review 259–582, 533 (1981); Earl M. Maltz, 'Murder in the Cathedral—The Supreme Court as Moral Prophet', 8 University of Dayton Law Review 623–31, 625–26 (1983). Even those who defend active judicial protection of 'fundamental values' not specifically identified in the constitutional text quaver before 'the terror of Lochner'. Thomas Gerety, 'Doing Without Privacy', 42 Ohio State Law Journal 143–65, 159–60 (1981). See Paul Brest, 'The Fundamental Rights Controversy; The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship', 90 Yale Law Journal 1063–1109, 1086 (1981): 'Lochner remains an embarrassment for proponents of fundamental rights adjudication and a cause for skepticism about the practice'. A few scholars, such as Perry, are now reluctantly conceding that the laissez-faire decisions are part of the heritage of judicial activism. Michael Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (New Haven, Conn., 1982) 115-117; Thomas C. Grey, 'Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?' 27 Stanford Law Review 703–18, 706–10 (1975); Burton Caine, 'Judicial Review—Democracy Versus Constitutionality', 56 Temple Law Quarterly 297–350 (1983). They are forced to argue that such evidence of judicial 'fallability' should be weighed against the greater benefits of 'noninterpretivist' review. Perry, ibid. at 115–17, 125; Laurence H. Tribe, 'Seven Pluralist Fallacies: In Defense of the Adversary Process—A Reply to Justice Rehnquist', 33 University of Miami Law Review 43–57, 55–56 (1978). For the discomfort with Lochner defenders of judicial activism manifest by trying to distinguish the new judicial activism from the old, see J. Skelly Wright, 'The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society—Judicial Activism or Restraint?' 54 Cornell Law Review 1–28, 3–4 (1968); Paul A. Freund, 'The Supreme Court and Fundamental Freedoms', in Leonard Levy, ed., Judicial Review and the Supreme Court (New York, 1967) 124-40; Harry H. Wellington, 'Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication', 83 Yale Law Journal 221–311, 270–311 (1973). As one critic has observed, '[T]he maintainability of a… line between Roe v. Wade [410 U.S. 113 (1973)] and Lochner… seems critical to thoughtful acceptance of the role they are espousing for the Court'. Samuel Estreicher, 'Platonic Guardians of Democracy: John Hart Ely's Role for the Supreme Court in the Constitution's Open Texture', 56 New York University Law Review 547–82, 550, n.12 (1981).
13. Calvin Woodard, 'Reality and Social Reform: The Transition from Laissez-Faire to the Welfare State', 72 Yale Law Journal 286–328, 288 (1962).
14. R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford, England, 1946) 218–219.
15. For the best general discussions of post-Civil War American laissez-faire economic theory, see Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization: Volume Three, 1865–1918 (New York, 1959) and Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State, supra note 9 at 3–95.
16. Francis Wayland, The Elements of Political Economy, recast by Aaron L. Chapin (New York, 1878) 3–7, 11–14, 163-74; Wayland, Elements of Political Economy (Boston, 1856) 15–22, 25; Arthur L. Perry, Elements of Political Economy (New York, 1876) 56- 117; Simon Newcomb, Principles of Political Economy (New York, 1886) 3–7, 57- 65, 199–226, 248-56; Amasa Walker, The Science of Wealth: A Manual of Political Economy Embracing the Laws of Trade, Currency and Finance (Boston, 1874) 8–17, 77–102. Julian M. Sturtevant, Economics, or The Science of Wealth: A Treatise on Political Economy (New York, 1877) 53–56.
17. Francis Bowen, American Political Economy (New York, 1870) 173–204, 125-50; Perry, Elements of Political Economy, supra note 18 at 138-58; Wayland, Elements of Political Economy, supra note 18 at 291–314 (1878); Wayland, Elements of Political Economy, supra note 18, at 166–90 (1856); Walker, Science of Wealth, supra note 18 at 254-63; Francis Walker, The Wages Question: A Treatise on Wages and the Wages Class (London, 1884), 101–108, 128–73. For the classical economists on Malthus, see also Archer Jones, 'Social Darwinism and Classical Economics: An Untested Hypothesis', North Dakota Quarterly xlvi (1978) 19–31, 22–23.
18. Wayland, Elements of Political Economy, supra note 18 at 282–95 (1878); Perry, Elements of Political Economy, supra note 18 at 249-311; Bowen, American Political Economy, supra note 19 at 237-72; Walker, Science of Wealth, supra note 18 at 126–131; Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era: A Social and Political History of American Finance, 1865–1879 (Princeton, N.J., 1964) 126–131.
19. Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State, supra note 9 at 32–46, has a full discussion of Spencer's views. Fine may have been accurate in calling him 'the most influential opponent of the state in America' (p. 32), but that does not tell us just how influential opponents of the state really were. The answer is, not very. Spencer was read widely in America, as are many intellectuals who carry commonly held ideas to logical but absurd conclusions. As R. Jackson Wilson has pointed out, American social scientists—although laissez-faire in outlook—read Spencer mainly to dispute him. Wilson, In Quest of Community: Social Philosophy in the United States, 1860–1920 (New York, 1968) 155. See also Thomas L. Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority (Urbana, II. 1977) and Jones, 'Social Darwinism and Classical Economics', supra note 19.
20. For the position of laissez-faire activists on these issues, see John G. Sproat, 'The Best Men': Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age (New York, 1968); Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State, supra note 9 at 47–91 passim: Dorfman, The Economic Mind, supra note 17 at 49–82 passim.
21. F.W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, 8th rev. ed. (New York, 1931) 155–283.
22. John Bell Sanborn, Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Railways (Madison, Wis., 1899); Lloyd J. Mercer, Railroads and Land Grant Policy: A Study in Government Intervention (New York, 1982) 32–67 and passim.
23. Marshall Henry Cushing, The Story of Our Post Office: The Greatest Government Department in All its Phases (Boston, 1893) 34–35, 137-51; D.D.T. Leech, The Post Office Department of the United States of America: Its History, Organization, and Working (Washington, D.C., 1879) 24–25, 30–33, 69.
24. Margaret G. Myers, A Financial History of the United States (New York & London, 1970) 148-222; Unger, Greenback Era, supra note 20.
25. Bland-Allison Silver Purchase Act, 20 Stat. 25 (1878).
26. Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
27. Stat. 290 (1890).
28. Eight-Hour Day Law, 51 Stat. 77 (1868); Eight-Hour Day Proclamation, 17 Stat. 955 (1872).
29. Kelly and Harbison, The American Constitution, supra note 8, at 513. The most recent edition, prepared by Herman Belz, has eliminated the words but not the perception. Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, The American Constitution, supra note 16 at 380–389.
30. Carter Goodrich, Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800–1890 (New York, 1960), 230-62; George H. Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws (Madison, Wis., 1971).
31. See the presidents' annual addresses in volumes 2–12 of the Reports of the American Bar Association (1878–1899).
32. Lively, 'The American System', supra note 15 at 86. See also Gerald D. Nash, State Government and Economic Development: A History of Administrative Policies in California, 1849–1933 (Berkeley, Cal., 1964) 139–224.
33. 'The Butler Canvass', North American Review civ (1872) 155-156.
34. William Graham Sumner, 'State Interference', in Albert G. Keller and Maurice R. Davie, eds., Essays of William Graham Sumner (New Haven, Conn., 1934) ii, 149 (originally published in 1887) (hereinafter Sumner, Essays). For laissez-faire reformers' general gloom over the direction of politics and legislation see Sproat, The Best Men', supra note 22 at 273–81 and passim.
35. Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws, supra note 32 at 19–23, 96, 107, 115, 125–31, 154–55, 164-68; C. Peter Magrath, 'The Case of the Unscrupulous Warehouseman', in John A. Garraty, ed., Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution (New York, 1966), 109; Lee Benson, Merchants, Farmers, and Railroads: Railroad Regulation and New York Politics, 1850–1887 (Cambridge, Mass., 1955); Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877–1916 (Princeton, N.J., 1965) 20-44; Ari and Olive Hoogenboom, A History of the ICC: From Panacea to Pallative (New York, 1976) 8–17.
36. Unger, Greenback Era, supra note 20 at 44–67, 220–25, 324–27, 403; Unger, 'Business Men and Specie Resumption', Political Science Quarterly lxxiv (1959) 46-70; Jack P. Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party: An Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstruction (Baltimore, 1967) 141-71; Allen Weinstein, Prelude to Populism: Origins of the Silver Issue (New Haven, Conn., 1970) 47–52, 55, 125–29, 263–300 passim; Dorfman, The Economic Mind, supra note 17 at 116–117.
37. See Edward C. Kirkland, Dream and Thought in the American Business Community, 1860–1900 (Chicago, 1964) 1–28.
38. Thomas C. Cochran, Railroad Leaders, 1845-1890: The Business Mind in Action (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 181.
39. Munn v. Ill., 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
40. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Paul, 173 U.S. 404 (1899); Minnesota Iron Co. v. Kline, 199 U.S. 593 (1905); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); McLean v. Ark., 211 U.S. 539 (1909).
41. Juillard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
42. Stone v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307, 329–30 (1886); Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minn., 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
43. See, for example, Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which overturned a state regulation of bakery workers' hours on the grounds that it could not be justified as a protection of health or safety. The majority of the justices sustained similar regulation of other industries in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) when such a justification could be made out.
44. Lochner V.N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
45. Herbert Spencer, Social Statics; or, The Conditions of Human Happiness Specified, and the First of Them Developed (New York, 1890) 13, 121.
46. Sumner, 'State Interference', supra note 36 at 146. See also Francis Parkman, 'The Failure of Universal Suffrage', North American Review cxxvi (1878) 1-20; Sproat, 'The Best Men' supra note 22 at 205–242.
47. Sumner, 'The Challenge of Facts', in Sumner, Essays, supra note 36 at ii, 117; William Graham Sumner, What Social Classes Owe Each Other (New Haven, Conn., 1925); 11–12 (originally published in 1883).
48. Francis A. Walker, 'Socialism', in Francis A. Walker, Discussions in Economics and Statistics (New York, 1899) 2, 250 (originally published in 1887).
49. Sumner, 'State Interference', supra note 36 at 146; Parkman, 'The Failure of Universal Suffrage', supra note 48 at 20.
50. Garfield to Burke A. Hinsdale, Jan. 21, 1875, in Mary L. Hinsdale, ed., Garfield-Hinsdale Letters: Correspondence Between James Abram Garfield and Burke Aaron Hinsdale (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1949) 314.
51. Richard H. Dana to George P. Marsh, Apr. 23, 1871, Dana Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass.; J. Francis Fisher, quoted in Simon Sterne, On Representative Government and Personal Reputation (Philadelphia, 1871) 74. See Alexander B. Callow, The Tweed Ring (New York, 1966) 261–68.
52. Simon Sterne, Suffrage in the Cities (New York, 1878) 26.
53. On both issues, see Sproat, 'The Best Men', supra note 22 at 29–44, 244–71, and the laissez-faire organs—the Nation, Harper's Weekly, and the North American Review generally.
54. Perry, Elements of Political Economy, supra note 18 at 158-67; Bowen, American Political Economy, supra note 19 at 110-16; Walker, Wages Question, supra note 19 at 385–408 passim; Francis Walker, 'Legal Interference with the Hours of Labor', Lippincott's Monthly Magazine ii (1868) 527–33, esp. 530; W.A. Croffut, 'What Rights Have Laborers?' Forum i (1886) 294-96; Sumner, What Social Classes Owe Each Other, supra note 49 at 129-30; Samuel Johnson, Labor Parties and Labor Reform (Boston, 1871); D. McGregor Means, 'Labor Unions Under Democratic Government', Journal of Social Science xxi (1886) 73-74; The (New York) Nation, May 11, 1866, 594 (1866). See Sproat, 'The Best Men', supra note 22 at 228–229.
55. A.L. Chapin, 'The Relations of Labor and Capital', Transactions of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters i (1870–1872) 60; Johnson, Labor Parties, supra note 56 at 4-5; Means, 'Labor Unions', supra note 56; Wayland, Elements of Political Economy (1878), supra note 18 at 110–111.
56. David A. Wells, 'Rational Principles of Taxation', Journal of Social Science, vi (1875), 120–33, at 123. See also Wells, 'The Communism of a Discriminating Income-Tax', North American Review 80 (1880) 236-46; Elmer Ellis, 'Public Opinion and the Income Tax, 1860-1900', Mississippi Valley Historical Review xxvii (1940) 225–42.
57. Senator Justin S. Morrill in the Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2783 (1866).
58. New York Tribune, quoted in Public Opinion, July 25, 1891, 372–373.
59. The Nation (New York), January 27, 1876, 58; Wells, quoted ibid., October 29, 1874, 282-84; Charles Francis Adams, Jr. 'The Granger Movement', North American Review, xx (1875) 394–424, esp. 406–12. See also W.A. Russ, 'Godkin Looks at Western Agrarianism: A Case Study', Argicultural History xix (1945) 233-42; Sproat, 'The Best Men', supra note 22 at 223–24.
60. Horace Greeley, The Tariff Question: Protection and Free Trade Considered (New York, 1856); William D. Kelley, Speeches, Letters, and Addresses on Industrial and Financial Questions (Philadelphia, 1872) 9–84, 322-91; James G. Blaine, 'olitical Discussions, Legislative, Diplomatic, and Popular (Norwich, Conn., 1887) 426–28, 443; Peter Cooper, Letters on the Necessity of a Wise Discriminating Tariff to Protect American Labor… (1866); Timothy Otis Howe, The Tariff: Farmers, Iron Workers, and Laborers—The Trinity of the Nation's Strength (Milwaukee, 1881) (speech originally delivered in 1866).
61. Sumner in his preface to Abraham L. Earle, Our Revenue System and the Civil Service: Shall They Be Reformed? (New York, 1878) 7.
62. Francis Lieber, Notes on Fallacies of American Protectionists (New York, 1870) 11–15, 17; Edward Atkinson, Revenue Reform: An Essay (Boston, 1871) 29.
63. Earle, Our Revenue System, supra note 63, at 11; Atkinson, Revenue Reform, supra note 64 at 18; See also The (New York) Nation, January 21, 1869, 44; April 28, 1870, 263; December 12, 1872, 374; Perry, Elements of Political Economy, supra note 18 at 380; David A. Wells, 'The Meaning of Revenue Reform', North American Review cxiii (1871) 104–53, esp. 148; Wells, 'Rational Principles of Taxation', supra note 58 at 122; William Graham Sumner, Protectionism: The Ism Which Teaches that Waste Makes Wealth (New York, 1885); Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State, supra note 9 at 64–67.
64. Sturtevant, Economics, supra note 18 at 83; Atkinson to Henry L. Dawes, February 2, 1874, Dawes Mss., Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
65. The (New York) Nation, February 17, 1870, 100.
66. Adams to Carl Schurz, December 3, 1875, Schurz Mss., Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
67. See Sproat, 'The Best Men', supra note 22 at 169-203; Unger, Greenback Era, supra note 23 at 120–144.
68. Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State, supra note 9 at 31.
69. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution (New York, 1955) 21n, 203–27. See also Robert Green McCloskey, American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass., 1951) 1-21; Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America, 2d ed. (New York, 1955) 128–32, 153–154.
70. Quoted in Dorfman, The Economic Mind, supra note 17 at 23–24.
71. Sumner, 'Democracy and Plutocracy', in Sumner, Essays ii, 213-19; Sumner, 'Definitions of Democracy and Plutocracy', ibid. at 220–25.
72. Sturtevant, Economics, supra note 18 at 242.
73. Adams, 'Oppressive Taxation and Its Remedy', Atlantic Monthly xlii (1878) 765.
74. William Grahamn Sumner, 'Shall Americans Own Ships?' North American Review 82 (1881) 559.
75. Edward Atkinson, 'The Inefficiency of Economic Legislation', Journal of Social Science iv 123; Earle, Our Revenue System, supra note 63 at 12–13.
76. Ibid. 11; Sumner, Protectionism, supra note 65 passim and esp. 111; Lieber, Fallacies of Protectionists, supra note 64 at 6; Perry, Elements of Political Economy, supra note 18 at 379-81; Parke Godwin, 'Our Political Degeneracy', Putnam's Monthly v (new series) (1870) 602-603; David A. Wells, The Creed of Free Trade (Boston, 1875) 17; Lawrence Laughlin, 'Protection and Socialism', International Review vii (1879) 427; Atkinson, Revenue Reform, supra note 64 at 18.
77. Atkinson, 'The Inefficiency of Economic Legislation', supra note 77 at 129.
78. Laughlin, 'Protection and Socialism', supra note 78 at 427; Earle, Our Revenue System, supra note 63 at 22.
79. Sumner preface to ibid. at x.
80. Sumner, 'The Challenge of Facts', supra note 49 at 117. See also Simon Newcomb, 'The Let-Alone Principle', North American Review cx (1870) 1–33.
81. Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State, supra note 9 at 29–31, 32–164 passim; Rossiter, Conservatism, supra note 71 at 146-51; Ralph Gabriel, The Course of Democratic Thought, 2d ed. (New York, 1956) 162–163.
82. As J.E. A. Jolliffee described in his classic Constitutional History of Medieval England from the English Settlement to 1485 (New York, 1961; originally published 1927) 183: '[T]he crown of England was honorial and its lands and rights were the demesne of the king'. For the personal origins of royal government in England, see ibid. at 139-201; Austin Lane Poole, From Domesday Book to Magna Carta, 1087–1216 (Oxford, England, 1951) 8–10. A reading of W. Cunningham, The Growth of English Commerce and Industry During the Early and Middle Ages, 4th ed. (Cambridge, England, 1905) 148–237 indicates how closely taxation, supervision, and economic promotion were related to the king's feudal rights. See also Frank Barlow, The Feudal Kingdom of England, 1042–1216 (London, 1955) 107–13 and passim.
83. See E. Lipson, An Introduction to the Economic History of England (London, 1920) 238–60, 1270-1390; Edward P. Cheyney, An Introduction to the Industrial and Social History of England (London, 1901) 59–71, 154-58; J. LeRossignol, Monopolies Past and Present (New York, 1901) 41-64; Cunningham, Growth of English Commerce, supra note 84, at 206–11, 341–43, 445-47; George Unwin, The Gilds and Companies of London, 4th ed. (London, 1963); Cecil T. Carr. ed., Select Charters of Trading Companies, A.D. 1530–1707 (London, 1913) xiv-xvii, Iv-Ixii; on fairs and markets: Franklin D. Jones, 'Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition', 35 Yale Law Journal 905–38 (1926); Lipson, Economic History of England, supra at 201-12; Cheyney, Industrial and Social History of England, supra note at 75–79.
84. Unwin, Gilds and Companies of London, supra note 85, at 293-328; W. Cunningham, The Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times: The Mercantile System (Cambridge, England, 1903) 214–49 passim, 285-94; Godfrey Davies, The Early Stuarts, 1603–1660, 2d ed. (Oxford, England, 1959) 331-35; Select Charters, supra note 85 at lxii-lxxi.
85. Margaret Judson, The Crisis of the Constitution: An Essay in Constitutional and Political Thought in England, 1603–1645 (New York, 1964; originally published in 1949) 37.
86. John R. Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (Madison, Wis., 1968; originally published 1924) 183–84.
87. Quoted in Judson, Crisis of the Constitution, supra note 87 at 291. On the idea of 'commonwealth', see ibid. at 274-300; Whitney R.D. Jones, The Tudor Commonwealth, 1529–1559 (London, 1970) passim and esp. 13–23.
88. Judson, Crisis of the Constitution, supra note 87 at 278, 290-92; Davies, The Early Stuarts, supra note 86 at 24-25; Elizabeth Read Foster, 'The Procedure of the House of Commons Against Patents and Monopolies', in William Appleman Aiken, ed., Conflict in Stuart England: Essays in Honor of Wallace Notestein (New York, 1960) 57; Unwin, Gilds and Companies of London, supra note 85 at 293-343; Cunningham, Growth of English Commerce, supra note 86 at 218; Select Charters, supra note 85, at lxii-lxxi. Stephen D. White, Sir Edward Coke and 'The Grievances of the Commonwealth', 1621–1628 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979) 95–141.
89. Davenant v. Hurdis, Trin. 41 Eliz., Moor, 72 Eng. Rep. 576 (K.B. 1599); Darcy v. Allen, 11 Coke 84 (K.B. 1602); Case of Monopolies, 11 ibid. 86, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602); Case of the Tailors of Ipswich, 11 Coke 53, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1614). For a brief discussion, see Michael Conant, 'The Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughterhouse Cases Re-Examined', 31 Emory Law Journal 785–831, 792–97 (1982).
90. Case of the Tailors of Ipswich, 11 Coke 53, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1614). Godfrey Davies, 'Further Light on the Case of Monopolies', 48 Law Quarterly Review 394–414 (1932); Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism, supra note 88 at 225–31.
91. Richard Martin, A Speech Delivered to the King's Most Excellent Majestie, quoted in Judson, Crisis of the Constitution, supra note 87 at 41. Of course with the emergence of parliamentary supremacy at the end of the seventheenth century, Parliament was able to grant monopolies, and it did so regularly to promote trade. Nonetheless this had to be justified on the grounds that the public received a benefit and therefore the grant increased rather than diminished the commonwealth. Cunningham, Growth of English Commerce, supra note 86 at 214–18 passim.
92. See generally Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman: Studies in the Transmission, Development and Circumstance of English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies (New York, 1968; originally published 1959); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, N.Y. 1978) 21–69.
93. Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (New York, 1972; originally published in 1969) 53-65; Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, supra note 94, passim; Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug Handlin, Commonwealth—A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774–1861, rev. ed. (Boston, 1969) 28–31.
94. Theodore J. Lowi, 'American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory', World Politics xvi (1964) 677-715; Richard L. McCormick, 'The Party Period and Public Policy: An Exploratory Hypothesis', Journal of American History lxvi (1979) 279-98; Lively, 'The American System', supra note 15; Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth, supra note 95 at 28-31,51-181; Harry N. Scheiber, Ohio Canal Era: A Case Study of Government and the Economy, 1820–1861 (Athens, Ohio, 1969) 88–94, 355.
95. Ibid. at 92.
96. Paul Goodman, 'The First American Party System', in William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, eds., The American Party System: Stages of Political Development (New York, 1967) 56–89, 69.
97. James Madison, 'A Candid State of Parties', in Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison (New York, 1900–1910) vi, 176–79. Recent studies of the Jeffersonian Republican party at the state level suggest that it was 'a diverse coalition… against entrenched interests… who thwarted the desires of newcomers and outsiders, rising merchants and ambitious office seekers, religious dissenters and landless yeomen eager to share access to authority and to broaden social opportunities'. They perceived the Federalists to stand 'for monopoly of local office, charter privileges… and the religious, institutional and professional life of the community'. Paul Goodman, The Democratic-Republicans of Massachusetts: Politics in a Young Republic (Cambridge, Mass., 1964) xi, 76. Thus their opposition to special privileges secured through legislation was part of a general attack upon 'aristocracy'. See ibid. at 70-127; Richard Buel, Jr., Securing the Revolution: Ideology in American Politics, 1789–1815 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1972) 77–90. This understanding is implicit, I think, in Lance Banning's notion that the Jeffersonian Republicans were a 'country party' opposing what they saw as a 'court party'. Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion, supra note 95.
98. Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought (New York, 1917) 1, 347–362.
99. See William D. Grampp, 'A Re-Examination of Jeffersonian Economics', Southern Economic Journal xii (1946) 263-82; Stuart Bruchey, The Roots of American Economic Growth (New York, 1965) 114-22; William Appleman Williams, The Contours of American History (Cleveland, 1961) 181-91; Charles M. Wiltse, The Jeffersonian Tradition in American Democracy (New York, 1960; first published in 1935) 145–50.
100. James D. Richards, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1896–1899) ii, 590.
101. Stephen J. Field read law in the office of his brother, David Dudley Field. Carl Bent Swisher, Stephen J. Field, Craftsman of the Law (Chicago, 1969; originally published in 1930) 21. For the influence of Leggett and other radical Democrats on Cooley, see Jones, 'Cooley and “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism'”, supra note 16 at 753; Jones, 'The Constitutional Conservatism of Thomas McIntyre Cooley: A Study in the History of Ideas' (Unpublished dissertation, University of Michigan, 1960) 20–26.
102. Jones, 'Cooley and “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism'”, supra note 16 at 755.
103. Theodore Sedgwick, ed., Political Writings of William Leggett (New York, 1840), 1, 66–67.
104. Ibid. 145.
105. Parke Godwin, The Life of William Cullen Bryant (New York, 1883) 1, 253–254.
106. Messages and Papers of the Presidents, supra note 102 at ii, 590. For Jacksonian hostility to privilege and commitment to equal rights, see Marvin Meyers The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief (New York, 1960) 185-233; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston, 1945) 306–321. However, Schlesinger's argument that Jacksonism was a working-class movement is untenable. Jacksonians opposed class legislation of any sort, not only that which benefitted the wealthy.
107. For the principles and influence of the 'locofoco' wing of the Democratic party, see William Trimble, 'The Social Philosophy of the Loco-Foco Democracy', American Journal of Sociology xxvi (1921) 705-15; Richard Hofstadter, 'William Leggett: Spokesman of Jacksonian Democracy', Political Science Quarterly lviii (1943) 581-94; Joseph G. Rayback, A History of American Labor (New York, 1959) 75-92; Schlesinger, Age of Jackson, supra note 108, at 190–209.
108. Joshua F. Cox, quoted in Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776–1860 (Cambridge, Mass., 1948) 77.
109. Ibid. For political controversies in which competitors used the rhetoric of 'equal rights' and 'special privileges', see Glyndon G. Van Deusen, 'Some Aspects of Whig Thought and Theory in the Jacksonian Period', American Historical Review lxiii (1958) 305-22; Lee Benson, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case (Princeton, N.J., 1961) 86-109; Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth, supra note 95, at 182–228 (the Handlins do not discuss the relationship of the breakdown in commonwealth ideas to parties but recognize the consequent drive against 'special privilege'); James R. Sharp, The Jacksonian versus the Banks: Politics in the State After the Panic of 1837 (New York, 1970); Peter D. Levine, Behavior of State Legislative Parties in the Jacksonian Era: New Jersey, 1829–1844 (Rutherford, N.J., 1977) 112–178.
110. For studies indicating that early nineteenth-century voters divided along religious and cultural lines, see Robert Kelley, The Cultural Pattern of American Politics: The First Century (New York, 1979) 109–40, 160-84; Ronald P. Formisano, The Birth of Mass Political Parties: Michigan, 1827–61 (Princeton, N.J., 1972); Benson, Concept of Jacksonian Democracy, supra note 111; William G. Shade, Banks or No Banks: The Money Issue in Western Politics, 1832–1865 (Detroit, 1972) passim. That political parties themselves became 'positive references'—sources of attitudes and values—for voters is generally accepted in the political science literature. See Robert E. Lane, Political Life: Why and How People Get Involved in Politics (New York, 1965) 299-303; Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York, 1960) 128–136.
111. Va. Const, (1776), Bill of Rights, sec. 4; N. C. Const. (1776), Dec. of Rights, sec. 3; Ky. Const. (1792), art. XII; Miss. Const. (1817), art. I, sec. 1; Ala. Const. (1819), art. I, sec. 1; Tex. Const. (1845), art. I, sec. 2.
112. N.H. Const. (1784), art. I, sec. 10. See also Pa. Const. (1776), Dec. of Rights, art. V; Vt. Const. (1777), Dec. of Rights, art. VI.
113. N.C. Const. (1776), Dec. of Rights, sec. 22; S.C. Const. (1776), art. IX, sec. 5; N.H. Const. (1784), art. I, sec. 9; Pa. Const. (1790), art. IX, sec. 24; Ky. Const. (1792), art. XII; Del. Const. (1792), art. I, sec. 19; Tenn. Const. (1796), art. XI, sec. 30; Ohio Const. (1802), art. VII, sec. 24; Ind. Const. (1816), art. I, sec. 22; Miss. Const. (1817), art. I, sec. 26; Conn. Const. (1818), art. I, sec. 20; Ala. Const. (1819), art. I, sec. 26; Me. Const. (1820), art. I, sec. 23; Mo. Const. (1820), art. XIII, sec. 20; Fla. Const. (1838), art. I, sec. 25; Md. Const. (1851), art. I, sec. 40; Kan. Const. (1859), art. I, sec. 19.
114. N.C. Const. (1776), Dec. of Rights, sec. 23; Tenn. Const. (1796), art. XI, sec. 23; Ark. Const. (1836), art. II, sec. 19; Fla. Const. (1838), art. I, sec. 24; Tex. Const. (1845), art. I, sec. 18; Md. Const. (1851), art. I, sec. 39.
115. Iowa Const. (1846), art. I, sec. 6; Ind. Const. (1851), art. XXIII; Ore. Const. (1857), art. I (Bill of Rights), sec. 21.
116. La. Const. (1845), art. CXXIII; N.Y. Const. (1846), art. VIII, sec. 1,4; III. Const. (1848), art. X, sec. 1, (permitted exceptions at legislative discretion); Mich. Const. (1850), art. XV, sec. 1; Md. Const. (1851), art. III, sec. 47: Ohio Const. (1851), art. XIII (Corporations), sec. 1,2; Minn. Const. (1857), art. X, sec. 2; Ore. Const (1857), art. XI (Corporations), sec. 2; Nev. Const. (1864), art. VIII, sec. 1; Mo. Const. (1865), art. VIII, sec. 4; Neb. Const. (1866), art. II (Corporations), sec. 1, 2; Ark. Const. (1868), art. I, sec. 48; S.C. Const. (1868), art. XII (Corporations), sec. 1; Tenn. Const. (1870), art. XI, sec. 8; W. Va. Const. (1872), art. XI, sec. 1.
117. III. Const. (1848), art. III sec. 38; Pa. Const. (amended 1857), art. XI, sec. 5-7; Fla. Const. (1868), art. XIII, sec. 8; Ga. Const. (1868), art. III, sec. 6; Va. Const. (1870), art. X, sec. 12–15.
118. N.J. Const. (1844), art. VI, sec. 6(3); La. Const. (1845), art. CXXI; Ky. Const. (1850), art. II, sec. 33; Mich. Const. (1850), art. XIV, sec. 6, 8; Ohio Const. (1851), art. VIII, sec. 4; Minn. Const. (1857), art. IX, sec. 10; Mo. Const. (1865), art. XI, sec. 13; Miss. Const. (1868), art. XII, sec. 5.
119. Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19 (1856); California State Telegraph Co. v. Alta Telegraph Co., 22 Cal. 398 (1863); City of Memphis v. Memphis Water Co., 5 Heisk. (52 Tenn.) 1495 (1871); State v. Milwaukee Gaslight Co., 29 Wis. 454 (1872); Grant v. City of Davenport, 36 Iowa 396 (1873).
120. Beekman v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige 45 (N.Y. Ch. 1831); Raleigh & Gaston R.R. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & Batt. 451 (N.C. 1837). See Harry N. Scheiber, 'The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts', in Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, eds., Law in American History (Cambridge, Mass., 1971) 362–373.
121. Iowa ex rel. Burlington & Mo. R.R. Co. v. County of Wapello, 13 Iowa 388 (1862); People v. Twp. Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (1870).
122. Edward S. Corwin, 'The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law', 12 Michigan Law Review 247–76. Besides Corwin's essays, the best discussions of the doctrine of vested rights are Charles Grove Haines, 'Judicial Review of Legislation and the Doctrine of Vested Rights and of Implied Limitations on Legislatures', 2 Texas Law Review 257–90 (1924); Wallace Mendelson, 'A Missing Link in the Evolution of Due Process', 10 Vanderbilt Law Review 125–137 (1956).
123. U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, at 388 (1798).
124. For example, Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199 (1818); Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 272 (1804); Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477 (N.Y. 1811).
125. Corwin, 'Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law', supra note 124, at 248–255.
126. Johns. 447, 500–512.
127. Ibid. at 493.
128. Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Denio 128 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).
129. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
130. Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 169 (1853). In a powerful dissent, one of Black's colleagues denied that a railroad subsidy was a “public use' of tax money, arguing it was an unconstitutional instance of special legislation, in violation of the constitutional guarantee that one's property could be taken only by the judgment of one's peers or by the law of the land. The dissent, not recorded in the report, may be found in 2 American Law Register 85–112 (1853–1854). The citation to the 'law of the land' clause of the Pennsylvania state constitution is ibid. at 105.
131. Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 73 (N.Y. Ch. 1831). See the cases cited in Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union, 3d ed. (Boston, 1874) 622.
132. People ex rel. Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklin, 9 Barb. 535, 548 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850). See Stephen Diamond, 'The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation: Special Assessments in Nineteenth-Century America', 12 Journal of Legal Studies 201–40, 214–18 (1983), for a discussion of opposition to special assessments in New York in the 1830s and 1840s.
133. For the incorporation of the doctrine of vested rights into the concept of 'due process of law' before the Civil War, see especially Mendelson, 'Missing Link', supra note 124; Corwin, 'Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law', supra note 124 and Corwin, 'The Doctrine of Due Process', supra note 8 at 460 are very useful for the information they contain, but Corwin dismisses far too casually the degree to which ante-bellum lawyers and jurists had come to accept what we would recognize as a 'substantive' notion of due process.
134. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 557–558.
135. Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202, 212 (1854).
136. This was true of the Dartmouth College case, where the newly elected Republican legislature of New Hampshire sought to replace the old, Congregationalist board of trustees with one drawn from the entire religious community. Richard N. Current, 'The Dartmouth College Case', in Garraty, ed., Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution, supra note 37, at 15-29; Francis W. Stites, Private Interest and Public Gain: The Dartmouth College Case, 1819 (Amherst, Mass., 1972) 12–38. In the famous Charles River Bridge case, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837), Bostonians had sought to undermine the monopoly over bridge traffic between Harvard and Cambridge held by the Charles River Bridge Company, much of the stock of which was owned by Congregationalist Harvard University. Stanley I. Kutler, Privilege and Creative Destruction: The Charles River Bridge Case (Philadelphia, 1971) 18–34. Arthur B. Darling, 'Jacksonian Democracy in Massachusetts, 1824-1848', American Historical Review xxix (1924) 271–87. In University v. Foy, 5 N.C. 58 (1805), perhaps the first decision to cite a 'law of the land' clause of a state constitution in overturning special legislation, Jeffersonian Republican legislators had repealed a land grant to the Episcopalian-dominated University of North Carolina. James H. Broussard, The Southern Federalists, 1800–1816 (Baton Rouge, La., 1978) 323–326.
137. By the outbreak of the Civil War the linkage had received judicial articulation in North Carolina, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, New York, and the Supreme Court of the United States. University v. Foy, 5 N.C. 58 (1805); Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. 1 (1833); Vanzant v. Waddell, 10 Tenn. 270 (1829); Sheppard v. Johnson, 21 Tenn. 285 (1841); Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 167 (1853); Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202 (1854); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (24 How.) 539 (1852); Dm/Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1856). It had also been developed in Anonymous, 'The Security of Private Property', 1 American Law Magazine 318–347, 335ff. (1843).
138. See the cases, infra notes 147 and 148.
139. See the cases, infra notes 149 and 150.
140. See the cases, infra notes 155–157.
141. Lowell v. Boston, 110 Mass. 454 (1873).
142. See the cases, infra note 154.
143. See the cases, infra notes 158–160.
144. Toledo, Wabash, & Western Ry. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 67 111. 37 (1873); Munn v. Illinois, 69 111. 80 (1873); Loan Association v. Topeka, 5 F. Cas. 737 (C.C.D. Kans. 1874) (No. 2734); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Iowa, 5 F. Cas. 594 (C.C.D. Iowa 1875) (No. 2666).
145. Wynehamer v. New York, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856); Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855).
146. Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328 (1854); Goddard v. Jacksonville, 15 111. 589 (1854); State v. Gallagher, 4 Gibbs 244 (Mich. 1856); Fisher v. McGuirr, 1 Gray 1 (Mass. 1854); State v. Paul, 5 R.I. 185 (1858).
147. State v. Noyes, 10 Foster 279 (N.H. 1855); Metropolitan Bd. of Health v. Heister, 37 N.Y. 661 (1868); Inhabitants of Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315 (1872).
148. U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
149. Supplemental Brief for Plaintiffs, Fagan v. State of Louisiana [The Slaughterhouse Cases], Philip B. Kurland and Gerhard Casper, eds., Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law (Arlington, Va., 1975) 6, 580.
150. Brief for Plaintiffs, ibid. 537.
151. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 114–116, 118 (1873) (Bradley, dissenting).
152. Thompson v. Inhabitants of Pittston, 59 Me. 545, 556 (1871) (Dickerson concurring). See also Perkins v. Inhabitants of Milford, 59 Me. 315 (1871) and Freeland v. Hastings, 92 Mass. 570 (1865). The New Jersey courts decided that such laws did serve a public purpose and therefore did not amount to special, or class, legislation. But they clearly were troubled by the case and took pains to articulate the principle that 'the power of taking one man's property and vesting it in another, is in no sense a legislative power; and… a law which attempted to do this under the name of a tax would be wholly unauthorized and void'. State, Wagner et al. v. Collector of Delaware, 31 N.J.L. 189, 195 (1865).
153. The Tidewater Co. v. Coster, 18 N.J.Eq. 518 (1866); State v. Mayor of Hoboken, 39 N.J.L. 291 (1873); State, Agens, Pros. v. Newark, 37 ibid. at 415 (1874).
154. People ex rel. Crowell v. Lawrence, 41 N.Y. 137 (1869).
155. Gordon v. Cornes, 47 N.Y. 608 (1872).
156. Opinion of the Justices, 58 Me. 590, 591 (1870).
157. Ibid. at 593–595.
158. Hansen v. Iowa, 27 Iowa 28 (1869). See also Allan v. Jay, 60 Me. 124 (1871); Lowell v. Boston, 110 Mass. 454 (1873); Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 342 (1860)); Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350 (1869); Whiting v. Sheboygan and Fon du Lac R.R. Co., 25 Wis. 167 (1870); People v. Twp. Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (1870).
159. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 133 (1st edition published in 1868).
160. Clyde E. Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts: The Influence of Thomas M. Cooley, Christopher G. Tiedeman, and John F. Dillon Upon American Constitutional Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954) 27; Benjamin R. Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution: How Laissez-Faire Came to the Supreme Court (Princeton, N.J., 1942) passim; Fine, Laissez-Faire and the General-Welfare State, supra note 9 at 128–129.
161. People v. Twp. Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich. at 487.
162. Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution, supra note 162 at 18.
163. People v. Twp. Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich. at 486.
164. Dillion, 'Property—Its Rights and Duties in our Legal and Social Systems', Proceedings of the New York State Bar Association xviii (1895) 33–64, 46.
165. Stone v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307 (1886); Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
166. U.S. 466 (1898).
167. U.S. 578 (1897). For examples of the traditional, Supreme Court-centered account, see Hamilton, 'Path of Due Process', supra note 8; Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, supra note 16 at 397–418.