The advantage of being moderately cooperative

American Political Science Review

Volumn 89, Issue 3, 1995, Pages 601-611

  Morikawa, Tomonori ^a   Orbell, John M ^b   Runde, Audun S ^b  

^a LEWIS CLARK STATE COLLEGE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OREGON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84974112181     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2082976     Document Type: Article

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