Rational deterrence: Theory and evidence

World Politics

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 1989, Pages 183-207

  Jervis, Robert ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84974063223     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: 10863338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2010407     Document Type: Article

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