An evolutionary approach to norms

American Political Science Review

Volumn 80, Issue 4, 1986, Pages 1095-1111

  Axelrod, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84973978032     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055400185016     Document Type: Article

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