Agenda control, committee capture, and the dynamics of institutional politics

American Political Science Review

Volumn 80, Issue 4, 1986, Pages 1187-1207

  Bendor, Jonathan ^a   Moe, Terry M ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84973946527     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055400185065     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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