An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics

American Political Science Review

Volumn 79, Issue 3, 1985, Pages 755-774

  Bendor, Jonathan ^a   Moe, Terry M ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84973933590     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1956842     Document Type: Article

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