Strategic Models of Talk in Political Decision Making

International Political Science Review

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 1992, Pages 45-58

  Austen Smith, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84973731248     PISSN: 01925121     EISSN: 1460373X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/019251219201300104     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. Austen-Smith, D. (1990 a). “Information transmission in debate.” American Journal of Political Science 34: 124-152.
2. Austen-Smith, D. (1990 b). “Interested experts and policy advice.” University of Rochester, mimeo.
3. Austen-Smith, D. and J. Wright, (1990). “Competitive lobbying for legislators' votes.” University of Rochester, mimeo.
4. Banks, J. (1990). “A model of electoral competition with incomplete information.” Journal of Economic Theory 50: 309-325.
5. Banks, J. and R. Calvert (1990). “Communication and efficiency in coordination games.” University of Rochester, mimeo.
6. Crawford, V. and J. Sobel (1982). “Strategic information transmission.” Econometrica 50: 1431-1451.
7. Farrell, J. (1985). “Credible neologisms in games of communication.” MIT WP 500.
8. Farrell, J. (1990). “Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games.” In Mathematical Models in Economics ( M. Dempster, ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9. Harrington, J. (1988). “The revelation of information through the electoral process.” Johns Hopkins University, mimeo.
10. Ledyard, J. (1989). “Information aggregation in two-candidate elections.” In Strategic Models of Choice in Politics ( P. Ordeshook, ed.). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
11. Matthews, S. (1989). “Veto threats: rhetoric in a bargaining game.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104: 347-369.
12. Matthews, S., M. Okuno-Fujiwara and A. Postlewaite (1990). “Refining cheap-talk equilibria.” Northwestern University WP 892.
13. Okuno-Fujiwara, M., A. Postlewaite and K. Suzumura (1990). “Strategic information revelation.” Review of Economic Studies 57: 25-48.
14. Rabin, M. (1990). “Communication between rational agents.” Journal of Economic Theory 51: 144-170.
15. Spence, M. (1973). “Job market signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 348: 355-374.