Cournot oligopoly under strategic uncertainty with optimistic and pessimistic firms

Metroeconomica

Volumn 56, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 318-333

  Fontini, Fulvio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PADOVA   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84973266604     PISSN: 00261386     EISSN: 1467999X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-999X.2005.00219.x     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Dow, J., Werlang, S. D. R. C. (1994): ‘Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: breaking down backward induction’, Journal of Economic Theory, 64, pp. 305–24.
2. Eichberger, J., Kelsey, D. (1700a): ‘Non-additive belief and strategic equilibria’, Games and Economic Behavior, 30, pp. 183–215.
3. Eichberger, J., Kelsey, D. (1700b): ‘Uncertainty and strategic interactions in economics’, University of Birmingham Discussion Paper, No. 99-26, Birmingham.
4. Epstein, L. G., LeBreton, M. (1993): ‘Dynamically consistent beliefs must be Bayesian’, Journal of Economic Theory, 61, pp. 1–22.
5. Epstein, L. G., Schneider, M. (1703): ‘Recursive multiple prior’, Journal of Economic Theory, 113, pp. 1–31.
6. Fox, C., Rogers, B., Twersky, A. (1996): ‘Option traders exhibit subadditive decision weights’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 3, pp. 5–17.
7. Gilboa, I., Schmeidler, D. (1993): ‘Updating ambiguous beliefs’, Journal of Economic Theory, 59, pp. 33–49.
8. Knight, F. H. (1921):Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Houghton Mifflin, Boston. (Reprinted 1985, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.)
9. Luini, G.(ed.) (1999):Decision Under Uncertainty: Theory, Applications, Experimental Evidence, Kluwer Academic Publisher, Dordecht, the Netherland.
10. Marinacci, M. (1700): ‘Ambiguous games’, Games and Economic Behavior, 31, pp. 191–219.
11. Schmeidler, D. (1989): ‘Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity’, Econometrica, 57, pp. 571–87.