the liberal/communitarian controversy and communicative ethics

Philosophy & Social Criticism

Volumn 14, Issue 3-4, 1988, Pages 293-313

  Baynes, Kenneth ^a  

^a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84973178328     PISSN: 01914537     EISSN: 1461734x     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/019145378801400304     Document Type: Article

References (90)

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6. Ronald Dworkin, “The Forum of Principle” in A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press, 1985).
7. Ronald Dworkin, “Liberalism”.
8. Walzer's Spheres of Justice [“What Justice is Not”] in A Matter of Principle.
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26. A. Macintyre, After Virtue (University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), chap. 3.
27. Theory of Justice, chapter 7.
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29. Sandel, “Morality and the Liberal Ideal” The New Republic (May 7, 1984), p. 117.
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31. Rawls, “The Basic Liberties and Their Priority,” esp. p. 50.
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33. “Liberalism and the Art of Separation,” Political Theory 12 (1984), p. 328.
34. Norberto Bobbio, The Future of Democracy (University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 25.
35. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 49.
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37. Macintyre, “How Moral Agents Have Become Ghosts,” Synthese 53 (1982): 295–312.
38. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 179.
39. Taylor, “Self-Interpreting Animals” in Philosophical Papers, V. I, pp. 45–76.
40. Taylor, “Overcoming Epistemology” in After Philosophy K. Baynes, J. Bohman and T. McCarthy (Cambridge: MIT, 1987), pp. 159–63.
41. Taylor, Philosophical Papers, V. I, p. 3.
42. Rawls's “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985), p. 239 n.21.
43. “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980), p. 525.
44. A Theory of Justice, p. 505.
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49. Rawls's A Theory of Justice, pp. 462ff.
50. J. Habermas, “Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln” in Moralbewusstsein und Kommunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983), esp. pp. 130–143.
51. “Justice as Fairness,” pp. 225 and 239 n.21.
52. “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” p. 3.
53. Norman Daniels, “Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1980): 83–103.
54. “The Basic Liberties and Their Priority,” p. 20 n.20.
55. Ripstein, “Foundationalism in Political Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1987): 115–137.
56. “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” p. 4.
57. “The Basic Structure as Subject” in Values and Morals, ed. by A. Goldman and J. Kim (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), p. 54.
58. “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus”: (p. 5 n.8).
59. Rawls's A Theory of Justice, p. 49.
60. “The Independence of Moral Theory,” p. 8.
61. Norman Daniels, “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics,” Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979): 256–82.
62. “Justice as Fairness,” p. 238.
63. David Brink's, “Rawlsian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1987): 71–90.
64. Thomas Scanlon's, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism” in Utilitarianism and Beyond, p. 121.
65. Thomas Nagel's, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy” Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1987), p. 216.
66. “convergence theory” (p. 213).
67. Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge University Press, 1986).
68. “wish to show everyone equal respect” (p. 61).
69. “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” p. 8.
70. T. Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” p. 111.
71. “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” pp. 7–8.
72. “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical,” p. 231.
73. Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (Yale, 1980), p. 9.
74. “What is Neutral About Neutrality” Ethics 93 (1983), p. 375.
75. “a universal norm of rational dialogue”: (p. 53).
76. “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” p. 19.
77. “Justice as Fairness,” p. 241.
78. “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” p. 8.
79. Habermas, “Diskursethik” in Moralbewusstsein und kummunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983), p. 103.
80. “Moralitàt und Sittlichkeit: Hegels Kantkritik im Licht der Diskursethik,” Merkur 12 (1985), p. 1041.
81. Walzer offers a similar criticism in Interpretation and Social Criticism, p. 11, note #9.
82. “The Future of Democracy,” p. 25.
83. “Intermediate Reflections” in The Theory of Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon, 1984).
84. From Contractarian Theories of Justice to Normative Social Criticism, chapter 3.
85. Habermas, “Law and Morality,” trans. by K. Baynes, in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, V. VIII, (University of Utah Press, 1988), pp. 217–79. esp. p. 271ff.
86. Claus Offe, “Legitimation Through Majority Rule?” in Disorganized Capitalism (Cambridge: MIT, 1985), pp. 259–99.
87. Arthur Kuflik, “Majority-Rule Procedure” in Due Process (Nomos V. XVIII), ed. by J.R. Pennock and J. Chapman (New York: NYU Press, 1977), pp. 296–32.
88. Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato in “Civil Society and Social Theory”
89. Jeremy Waldron, “Introduction” to Theories of Rights (Oxford, 1984), p. 20.
90. Habermas, “Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter” in After Philosophy, ed. by K. Baynes, J. Bohman and T. McCarthy (Cambridge: MIT, 1987), p. 314.