Hugo Grotius and the History of Political Thought

Political Theory

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 1985, Pages 239-265

  Haakonssen, Knud ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

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EID: 84972593769     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: 15527476     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591785013002005     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. Axel Hägerström, Recht, Pflicht, und bindende Kraft des Vertrages nach römischer und naturrechtlicher Anschauung, ed. Karl Olivecrona (Skrifterutgivnaav K. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Uppsala, 44:3, Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell; Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1965); Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact, 2nd ed. (London: Stevens & Sons), 1971, pp. 7-25, 142-46, and especially 275-96; same, “Das Meinige nach der Naturrechtslehre,”Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie 59 (1973) pp. 197-205; and, most importantly, “Die zwei Schichten im naturrechtlichen Denken,” Archiv für Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie 63 (1977), pp. 79-103; Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1979, pp. 58-81.
2. Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis libri tres, trans. F. W. Kelsey et al., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913 and 1925), vol. 2, Book 1, chap. 1, sec. 4. (The book, chapter, section, and paragraph numbering is the same in the Latin and the English texts; in the following I therefore exclude the volume indication. Except in a couple of cases, which are noted, I have followed Kelsey's awkward translation.) Cf. Marcel Thomann: “Pour Aristote, les Romains de l'époque classique et Saint-Thomas le jus est l'égal, la res justa, l'objectum justitiae, l'id quod justum est. Ces autorités ignorent un droit qui soit pouvoir, liberté, volonté ou faculté de l'individu. Dans les relations de la cité, il y a des personnes et des choses: et la jurisprudence, dit Ulpien, est la science des choses divines et humaines, et spécialement du justum et de l'injustum. La justice consiste à accorder à chaque chose sa place dans un monde harmonieux, où règne un juste universel, donne par la nature.” “Christian Wolff et le droit subjectif,” Archives de philosophie du droit 9 (1964), p. 154.
3. See Hägerström, Recht, Pflicht und bindende Kraft, pp. 53-54 and Olivecrona, Law as Fact, pp. 276-77.
4. See my discussion of Smith's theory in The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1981, pp. 99ff. and the references given there.
5. See Olivecrona, “Die zwei Schichten im naturrechtlichen Denken.”
6. For Smith's theory of punishment, see Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator, pp. 114-23.
7. See James Moore, “Locke and the Scottish Jurists” (Conference for the Study of Political Thought, March, 1980, mimeographed), for an excellent discussion of some aspects of this.
8. See James Tully, A Discourse on Property: Locke and His Adversaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
9. See Tuck's important discussion, Natural Rights Theories, p. 172.
10. Tuck Natural Rights Theories, pp. 79-80.
11. I am here indebted to Werner Schneiders, Naturrecht und Liebesethik: Zur Geschichte der praktischen Philosophie im Hinblick auf Christian Thomasius (Hildescheim and New York: Georg Olms, Verlag), 1971, pp. 64-65.
12. See Duncan Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1975, pp.41ff., and his “Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment,” in R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, eds., The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: John Donald), 1982, pp. 192-93.
13. A few very different examples: Johann Sauter, Die philosophischen Grundlagen des Naturrechts. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Rechts-und Staatslehre (Frankfurt A.M.: Verlag Sauer und Auermann, 1966 [1932]), pp. 91ff; A. H. Chroust, “Hugo Grotius and the Scholastic Natural Law Tradition,” The New Scholasticism 17 (1943), pp. 101-33; John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1980, pp. 43-44 and 54. See also the discussion in M. B. Crowe, The Changing Profile of the Natural Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff), 1977, pp. 233-28 and, in A. Nussbaum A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan), 1954, pp. 296-306.
14. There is a huge literature on this topic. Some of it is discussed in the works referred to in note 24. The most recent monograph in English on Grotius does not rise above this; see C. S. Edwards, Hugo Grotius: The Miracle of Holland, A Study in Political and Legal Thought (Chicago: Nelson-Hall), 1981, pp. 48ff.
15. Cf. Schneiders, Naturrecht und Liebesethik, pp. 70-71.
16. Cf. Schneiders, Naturrecht und Liebesethik, pp. 71-72.
17. See Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, pp. 36-48, for a stimulating discussion.
18. See Thomas Mautner, “Divine Will in Modern Natural Law Theory: A Discussion Note,” Bulletin of the Australian Society of Legal Philosophy 26 (1983), pp. 79-84.
19. See Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights.
20. See my The Science of a Legislator, and “What Might Properly Be Called Natural Jurisprudence?” in Campbell and Skinner, eds., Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, pp. 205-25.
21. See the works by Duncan Forbes referred to in note 23, as well as D.N. MacCormick, “Adam Smith on Law,” Valparaiso University Law Review 15 (1981), pp. 243-63 and “Law and enlightenment,” in Campbell and Skinner, eds., Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, pp. 150-66; Hans Medick, Naturzustand und Naturgeschichte der bügerlichen Gesellschaft. Die Ursprünge der bürgerlichen Sozialtheorie als Geschichtsphilosophie und Sozialwissenschaft by Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke und Adam Smith, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973); and James Moore, “Locke and the Scottish Jurists.” For two older Scottish studies of relevance, see W. G. Miller, The Law of Nature and Nations in Scotland (Edinburgh: William Green & Son, 1896); and James Reddie, Inquiries Elementary and Historical
22. in the Science of Law (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1840). For a fuller survey, see my “Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment,” forthcoming in the Proceedings of the Canadian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 4.
23. Aristotle, Nicomachaen Ethics, trans. and introd. by W.D. Ross (London: Oxford University Press), 1959, 1130a8 and 1130b18.
24. See Alf Ross, Kritik der sogenannten praktischen Erkenntnis. Zugleich Prolegomena zu einer Kritik der Rechtswissenschaft (Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard; Leipzig: Felix Meiner), 1933, pp. 231-45.
25. Samuel von Pufendorf, De iure naturae et gentium libri octo, 2 vols., trans. C. H. and W. A. Oldfather (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1935, vol. 2, Book 1, chap. 7, pp. 7-8 (my italics).
26. Tully, Discourse on Property, p. 93; see also Tully's general discussion of natural law theory, pp. 80-94.
27. I here gloss over the translateability of rights language and virtue language. Concerning Smith, see my The Science of a Legislator, pp. 99-100, for brief comment. The short sketch here of Hume and Smith is based on the argument in this book. Its motto could be Hume's dictum about his own endeavors: “This theory concerning the origin of property, and consequently of justice, is, in the main, the same with that hinted at and adopted by Grotius.” (Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch, [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975], p. 307).
28. Francis Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy, 2 vols., London, 1745, in Collected Works of Francis Hutcheson, fascimile ed. prepared by Barnhard Fabian, 7 vols. (Hildescheim: Georg Olms), 1969, vols. 5-6 [I employ the volume numbers of the original edition, i.e., 1 and 2], 1, p. 253; and cf. A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy (Glasgow), 1747, in Collected Works, 4, pp. 118-20, and An Inquiry into
29. the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 4th ed. (London: D. Midwinter et al.), 1738, pp. 277-78. There is now an excellent short sketch of the connections between Hutcheson's moral and political philosophy, T.D. Campbell, “Francis Hutcheson: ‘Father’ of the Scottish Enlightenment,” in Campbell and Skinner, eds. Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, pp. 167-85.
30. Introduction, p. 120; cf. System, 1, pp. 273-74.
31. Concerning the object and method of law: An Essay on the History of Civil Society, Edinburgh, 1767, ed. and introd. D. Forbes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), 1966, pp. 154-67; Institutes of Moral Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh, 1773; facsimile ed. New York and London: Garland Publishing Co.), 1978, pp. 172-73; Principles of Moral and Political Science, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1792; facsimile ed. Hildescheim and New York: Georg Olms Verlag), 1975, 2, pp. 179-83 and 315-16. Concerning the system of rights: Institutes, pp. 174-202; Principles, 2, chap. 3. Concerning negative community: Principles, 2, pp. 192-93.
32. Principles, 2, pp. 257-92, esp. 270-92 (the most central principles are at 284-88); Institutes, pp. 203-208.
33. Principles, 2, pp. 315-20; cf. Institutes, pp. 213-14. One of the cardinal virtues is of course justice, and Ferguson underlines that he has some distinction between law and morality by distinguishing sharply between justice as it is enforced by law and as it is exercised “freely” as a virtue (Principles, 2, pp. 315-20). This also is the reason why he feels free to use “justice” and “benevolence” interchangeably in the classical manner when he discusses the cardinal virtues elsewhere-but it certainly is a confusing usage (see Principles, 2, pp. 43-44 and 108-11).
34. Principles, 2, p. 316.
35. Although he does say that those in dire need and without the ability of self-help “have a claim not only upon the humanity and compassion of the rich, but upon the justice and good policy of their country also.” Principles, 2, p. 372; and cf. Institutes, p. 212.
36. Reid's manuscript lectures on jurisprudence and politics, which J.C. Stewart-Robertson and I are currently preparing for publication, present a dramatic encounter between the two traditions. For Pocock's thoughts on the question, see especially his suggestive essay “Virtues, Rights, and Manners. A Model for Historians of Political Thought,” Political Theory, (August), 1981, pp. 353-68.