On Kripke's and Goodman's Uses of ‘Grue’

Philosophy

Volumn 68, Issue 265, 1993, Pages 269-295

  Hacking, Ian ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84972363406     PISSN: 00318191     EISSN: 1469817X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S003181910004122X     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1982). Henceforth Kripke.
2. Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (1954), chapters 3 and 4. Page references are to the 4th edition, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), henceforth FFF.
3. First given wide currency in S. F. Barker and P. Achinstein, ‘On the New Riddle of Induction’, Philosophical Review 69 (1960), 511–522.
4. Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), 1.
5. Shoemaker, ‘On Projecting the Unprojectible’, Philosophical Review 84 (1975), 178–219, on p. 179.
6. A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell, Principia Mathematica, 2nd edn. (Cambridge University Press, 1925), 1, p. 59.
7. The Fortunes of Inquiry, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), passes from the calibration of instruments to the calibration of ways of assessing theories, an idea that is further generalized in The Scenes of Inquiry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
8. ‘Critical Notice’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1985), 103–109.
9. On the specific question of the ‘social’ nature of language, see Tyler Burge, ‘Wherein is Language Social?’ in Reflections on Chomsky, A. George, (ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 175—191. That vein of Burge’s work goes back to ‘Individualism and the Mental’, in Midwest Studies in Philosophy VI, in P. French et al., (eds) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979). For one recent discussion of that position, with ample references, see ch. 3 of Akeel Bilgrami, Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
10. As represented by papers at the Oxford conference Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, S. H. Holtzman and C. M. Leich, (eds) (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1981), and by later work by contributors to that volume.
11. The example is used to make just this point in J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), on p. 113.
12. ‘No Smoke Without Fire: The Meaning of Grue’, The Philosophical quarters 39 (1989) 166–189, on p. 167
13. Shoemaker, in ‘On Projecting the Unprojectible’, The Philosophical quarters note 8, and Mary Hesse, “Ramifications of Grue”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (1969), 13–25. I discuss both papers in ‘Entrenchment’, op. cit. note 5.
14. Richard Grandy, ‘Reference, Meaning and Belief, The Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973), 443.
15. Barry Allen, ‘Gruesome Arithmetic: Kripke's Sceptic Replies’, Dialogue 28 (1989), 257–264, on p. 262. I am grateful to Professor Allen for comments on an earlier draft of this section, and regret that I am still at some distance from his position.
16. O. K. Bouwsma, ‘Descartes’ Evil Genius’, The Philosophical Review 58 (1949),141–151.
17. André Gombay, Lying Now and Then, forthcoming.
18. See my ‘Rules, Scepticism, Proof, Wittgenstein’ in Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy, I. Hacking, (ed.) (Cambridge University Press, 1985), 113–124.
19. See my ‘How, Why, When and Where did Language go Public?’, Common Knowledge 1, no. 2, (Fall, 1992), 74-91, on p. 89.