Negotiation arithmetic: Adding and subtracting issues and parties

International Organization

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 1983, Pages 281-316

  Sebenius, James K ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84972208063     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S002081830003438X     Document Type: Article

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