The emergence of cooperation: National epistemic communities and the international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control

International Organization

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 1992, Pages 101-145

  Adler, Emanuel ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84972168069     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300001466     Document Type: Article

References (237)

1. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 191.
2. See Wesley W. Posvar, “The New Meaning of Arms Control,” Air Force Magazine, June 1963, p. 38.
3. Roman Kolkowicz, “Intellectuals and the Nuclear Deterrence System,” in Roman Kolkowicz, ed., The Logic of Nuclear Terror (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 15-46.
4. Stephen Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 2.
5. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Nuclear Learning,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 371-402.
6. Robin Ranger, Arms and Politics, 1958-1978: Arms Control in a Changing Political Context (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979).
7. See Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988), p. 434
8. My approach is further developed “Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress,” In Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds., Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 43–88
9. See also Emanuel Adler, The Power of Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987)
10. Judith Goldstein, “Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 179-217
11. John S. Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982);
12. John G. Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in Krasner, International Regimes, pp. 195-231
13. Peter A. Hall,, The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). For key structural realist studies
14. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979
15. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambrige University Press, 1981)
16. Steve Weber, “Realism, Detente and Nuclear Weapons,” International Organization 44 (Winter 1990), p. 77.
17. See Weber, “Realism, Detente and Nuclear Weapons,” p. 77.
18. See Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), p. 350
19. See also Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979
20. Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).
21. Weber, “Realism, Detente and Nuclear Weapons,” p. 69.
22. This framework is partly inspired by Stephen Toulmin's discussion in Human Understanding (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 122–23.
23. J. Rotblat, History of the Pugwash Conferences (London: Taylor & Francis 1962).
24. John G. Ruggie, “Changing Frameworks of International Collective Behavior: On the Complementarity of Contradictory Tendencies,” in Nazli Choucri
25. Thomas W. Robinson, eds., Forecasting in International Relations: Theory, Methods, Problems, Prospects (San Francisco: Freeman, 1978), p. 403.
26. Michael J. Brenner, “The Theorist as Actor, the Actor as Theorist: Strategy in the Nixon Administration,” Stanford Journal of International Studies 7 (Spring 1972), pp. 109–110.
27. See Wesley W. Posvar, “The Impact of Strategy Expertise on the National Security Policy of the United States,” Public Policy, vol. 13, 1964, p. 39
28. See also Margaret Gowing, “An Old and Intimate Relationship,” Vernon Bogdanor, ed., Science and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 68
29. See Posvar, “The Impact of Strategy Expertise on the National Security Policy of the United States,” p. 40
30. See also John Garnett, “Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions,” in John Baylis et al., eds., Contemporary Strategy (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987).
31. Charles Reynolds, The Politics of War: A Study of the Rationality of Violence in International Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 28.
32. I owe this insight to Hayward Alker. On the nonscientific basis of strategy, see Reynolds, The Politics of War
33. Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Science, Technology and American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), p. 110.
34. Aaron Wildavsky, “Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation,” American Political Science Review 81 (March 1987), p. 9.
35. Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization,” in Donald G. Brennan, ed., Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York: Brazillier, 1961), pp. 167–86.
36. Adler, “Cognitive Evolution,” p. 61.
37. See Robert A. Levine, The Arms Debate (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963);
38. Arthur Herzog, The War-Peace Establishment (New York: Harper & Row, 1965);
39. Robert E. Osgood, The Nuclear Dilemma in American Strategic Thought (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988)
40. Milton S. Katz, Ban the Bomb: A History of SANE, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, 1957–1985 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986;
41. See Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon (New York: Hartcourt Brace, 1946), p. 76
42. See also Levine, The Arms Debate, p. 240
43. Robert Jervis, “Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War,” Daedalus 120 (Winter 1991), p. 172.
44. William Borden's There Will Be No Time (New York: Macmillan, 1946
45. See Robert Jervis, “Strategic Theory: What's New and What's True,” in Kolkowicz, The Logic of Nuclear Terror, p. 48
46. Levine, The Arms Debate, p. 240
47. Jervis “Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War,” p. 173.
48. Levine, The Arms Debate, pp. 61 and 89–90.
49. Posvar, “The New Meaning of Arms Control,” pp. 39-40.
50. Thomas Schejling, personal communication.
51. Herzog, The War-Peace Establishment, p. 4.
52. Donald F. Hornig, “Science and Government in the USA” in Harvey Brooks and Chester L. Cooper, eds., Science for Public Policy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1987), p. 20.
53. Posvar, “The Impact of Strategy Expertise on the National Security Policy of the United States,” p. 49.
54. See Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988).
55. Jennifer E. Sims, “The Development of American Arms Control Thought, 1945-1960,” Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., 1985, p. 284.
56. Fred Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 123–24.
57. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. vi.
58. See John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 2d ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1947).
59. Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (New York : Harper & Row, 1964);
60. Ralph Lapp, The New Priesthood: The Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York : Harper & Row, 1965
61. Irving L. Horowitz, The War Game: Studies of the New Civilian Militarists (New York: Ballantine Books, 1963
62. Thomas Schelling, cited by Herzog in The War-Peace Establishment, p. 49.
63. Sims, “The Development of American Arms Control Thought,” p. 286.
64. See Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 61, 63, and 65.
65. See Herken, Counsels of War, pp. 116-121
66. Harold K. Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians: The United States and the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966
67. Business Week, Special Report, 13 July 1963, p. 75.
68. Jerome B. Wiesner, Where Science and Politics Meet (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 176.
69. Sims, “The Development of American Arms Control Thought,” pp. 303-304.
70. see E. Licklider, The Private Nuclear Strategists (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971), chap. 7.
71. On the question of whether nuclear strategy is a profession, see E. Licklider, The Private Nuclear Strategists (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971), chap. 7. See also Wesley Posvar, “Strategy Expertise and National Security,” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1964.
72. Licklider, The Private Nuclear Strategists, pp. 119–22, 130, and 135.
73. See Don K. Price, The Scientific Estate (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1965)
74. See also Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds., Scientists and National Policy Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).
75. Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, especially pp. 51–73.
76. See also Paul Dickson, Think-Tanks (New York: Atheneum, 1971).
77. See Kaplan, Wizards of Artrtageddon pp. 121–22.
78. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 325.
79. Morton Halperin, “The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process,” World Politics 13 (April 1961), especially pp. 382–383.
80. James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977), p. 7.
81. Talbott, The Master of the Game, p. 70.
82. Killian, Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower, pp. 107–217.
83. In Counsels of War, p. 116
84. Spurgeon Keeny, cited by Herken Counsels of War, p. 117
85. Jerome Wiesner, another community member, offered the following view “I first became involved in the disarmament problem as a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee. Prior to that I had been the Staff Director of the Gaither Study
86. Wiesner, Where Science and Politics Meet, p. 174.
87. Saville R. Davis, “Recent Policy Making in the United States Government,” in Brennan, Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, p. 385.
88. See Johan J. Hoist “Strategic Arms Control and Stability: A Retrospective Look,” In Johan J. Hoist and William Schneider, eds., Why ABM: Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy (New York : Pergamon Press, 1969), p. 282
89. Donald A. Strickland Scientists as Negotiators: The 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts 1964, 13 P.372-384
90. Sims, “The Development of American Arms Control Thought,” p. 302.
91. See Hoist “Strategic Arms Control and Stability,” P. 268
92. See Bernard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1961), p. 475.
93. See Bernard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1961), p. 475. See also Holst, “Strategic Arms Control and Stability,” pp. 261 and 282.
94. Sims, “The Development of American Arms Control Thought,” chap. 5.
95. See Marc Trachtenberg, “Strategic Thought in America, 1952-1966,” in Marc Trachtenberg, ed., The Development of American Strategic Thought: Writings on Strategy 1961–1969
96. See Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 197.
97. See Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1961);
98. See Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1961); and Hedley Bull, Hedley Bull on Arms Control, selected and introduced by Robert O'Neill and David N. Schwartz (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).
99. Norman Cousins, “Foreword,” in Helen S. Hawkins, G. Allen Greb, and Gertrud Weiss Szilard, eds., Toward a Livable World: Leo Szilard and the Crusade for Nuclear Arms Control (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), p. xii.
100. See Barton J. Berenstein, “Introduction/' in Hawkins, Greb, and Szilard, Toward a Livable World, pp. xvii-xxiv
101. Leo Szilard, “Shall We Face the Facts? An Appeal for a Truce Not a Peace,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 5 (May 1949), pp. 269–273
102. See also Counsels of War, p. 206, in which Herken discusses the doomsday machine, a fanciful device to ensure peace by blowing up the world as the penalty for aggression.
103. See Edward Shils, “American Policy and the Soviet Policy Ruling Group,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 3 (September 1947), pp.qq 237-239
104. William T. R. Fox, “Atomic Energy and International Control,” William F. Ogburn, ed., Technology and International Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 102–125
105. See also Sims, “The Development of American Arms Control Thought,” pp. 228 308
106. The Acheson-Lilienthal report is cited as U.S. Department of State, Committee on Atomic Energy, A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, March 1946. In Danger and Survival, p. 159
107. See also McGeorge Bundy, “Early Thoughts on Controlling the Nuclear Arms Race A Report to the Secretary of State, January 1953,” International Security 7 (Fall 1982), pp. 3–27
108. See Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), chap. 4
109. See also Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, parts 2 and 3.
110. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978);
111. Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946);
112. Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Illusion of World Government,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 5 (October 1949), p. 289
113. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires (New York: Scribner's, 1959).
114. See David R. Inglis and Donald A. Flanders, “A Deal Before Midnight,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 7 (October 1951), pp. 305–306 and 317
115. James R. Newman, “Toward Atomic Agreement,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 10 (April 1954), pp. 121-122;
116. David R. Inglis, “Ban the H-Bomb and Favor the Defense,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 10 (November 1954), pp. 353-356
117. Hornell Hart, “The Remedies Versus the Menace,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 10 (June 1954), pp. 197–205.
118. See R. L. Meier, “Beyond Atomic Stalemate,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 12 (May 1956), pp. 147-153
119. C. W. Sherwin, “Securing Peace Through Military Technology,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 12 (May 1956), pp. 159-164
120. Warren Amster, “Design for Deterrence,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 12 (May 1956), pp. 164-165
121. Jennifer Sims, “The American Approach to Nuclear Arms Control: A Retrospective,” Daedalus 120 (Winter 1991), p. 258.
122. See Rotblat, History of the Pugwash Conferences
123. Joseph Rotblat, “Movements of Scientists Against the Arms Race,” in Joseph Rotblat, ed., Scientists, the Arms Race and Disarmament (London: Taylor & Francis, 1982), pp. 115–57.
124. Thomas Schelling, cited by Herzog in The War-Peace Establishment, p. 52.
125. Rotblat, History of the Pugwash Conferences, pp. 14–15.
126. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 301.
127. See Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, part 2; and Bundy, Danger and Survival, chap. 4. In June 1946
128. Sims, “The Development of American Arms Control Thought,” p. 244.
129. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, p. 207.
130. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 199.
131. See Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, 2d ed. (New York: Pergamon-Brassey, 1985
132. Brennan, Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security; Bull, The Control of the Arms Race; Louis Henkin,, Arms Control: Issues for the Public (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961
133. David H. Frisch, ed., Arms Reduction: Program and Issues (New York: Twentieth Century, 1961);
134. Ernst W. Lefever,, Arms and Arms Control (New York: Praeger 1962).
135. See also Robin Ranger, “The Four Bibles of Arms Control,” in Susan J. Shepard, ed., Books and the Pursuit of American Foreign Policy, special issue of Book Forum, vol. 6, 1984, pp. 416–432.
136. See Gerald Holton, ed., Arms Control, special issue of Daedalus, published in Fall 1960 and issued as vol. 89, no. 4
137. See Ranger, “The Four Bibles of Arms Control,” pp. 417–418
138. See Thomas C. Schelling, “What Went Wrong with Arms Control,” Foreign Affairs 65 (Winter 1985–86), p. 223
139. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, 91st Congress, 1st sess., March 1969, pp. 123–124
140. Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1982), p. 26.
141. According to Gray, “Contemporary arms-control theory was an invention of the strategic studies community in the period 1958-60.”
142. According to Gray, “Contemporary arms-control theory was an invention of the strategic studies community in the period 1958-60.”., p. 72.
143. See Bernard J. Firestone, The Quest for Nuclear Stability: John F. Kennedy and the Soviet Union (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 76.
144. Licklider, The Private Nuclear Strategists, p. 155.
145. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 104
146. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 104; and William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 1.
147. Firestone, The Quest for Nuclear Stability, p. 153.
148. Gray, Strategic Studies and Public Policy, p. 97.
149. See Steve Weber and Sidney Drelt, “Attempts to Regulate Military Activities in Space,” In Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., US. Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 388
150. see Paul F. Walker, “The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Policy-Making in Strategic Arms Limitations,” Ph.D. diss., MIT, Cambridge, Mass., 1978.
151. Herbert F. York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva (New York: Basic Books, 1987), p. 119.
152. Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 332–33.
153. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p.494.
154. See York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace, pp. 222-226
155. Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 345.
156. Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 82–85.
157. My discussion of the hotline idea is based on William L. Ury's Beyond the Hotline: How Crisis Control Can Prevent Nuclear War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), pp. 142 and 144, and on interviews.
158. See Talbott, The Master of the Game, p. 79;
159. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 475.
160. See Adler, The Power of Ideology
161. William L. Hyland, “Institutional Impediments,” in Richard Burt, ed.,Arms Control and Defense in the 1980s (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982),p 101
162. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 504.
163. John Newhouse, Cold Down: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), p. 69.
164. Ernst J. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955–1972 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977), p. 118.
165. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy
166. Benson D. Adams, Ballistic Missile Defense (New York: American Elsevier, 1971);
167. Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution, 1974;
168. Newhouse, Cold Down; Gerard Smith, The Story of SALT, 2d ed. (New York: Pergamon-Brassey, 1989);
169. Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon; and Herken, Counsels of War.
170. See David N. Schwartz, “Past and Present: The Historical Legacy,” in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 332–33.
171. York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace, pp. 222–223.
172. Herken, Counsels of War, p. 193.
173. See Adams, Ballistic Missile Defense, p. 177.
174. Newhouse, Cold Down, pp. 50 and 115–116.
175. Adams, Ballistic Missile Defense, p. 186.
176. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy, pp. 144–147.
177. Adams, Ballistic Missile Defense p. 193.
178. Herman Kahn, “The Missile Defense Debate in Perspective,” in Hoist and Schneider, Why ABM, p. 285
179. Abram Chayes and Jerome B. Wiesner, ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System (New York: Signet, 1969).
180. See Brenner, “The Theorist as Actor,” pp. 115–116.
181. Sims, “The Development of American Arms Control Thought,” pp. 13–14.
182. Firestone, The Quest for Nuclear Stability, p. 150.
183. See testimony of Marshal Shulman, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs, part 1, 91st Congress, 1st sess., March 1969, p. 154.
184. See also the testimony of Vincent P. Rock, U.S. Congress, Strategy and Science: Hearings p. 224
185. Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Can Russia Change? The USSR Confronts Global Interdependence (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 67.
186. Holst, “Strategic Arms Control and Stability,” pp. 258, 264, and 268.
187. Bruce J. Allyn in “Toward a Common Framework: Avoiding Inadvertent War and Crisis,” in Graham T. Allison and William L. Ury (with Bruce J. Allyn), eds., Windows of Opportunity: From Cold War to Peaceful Competition in US Soviet Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1989), p. 188.
188. Holst, “Strategic Arms Control and Stability,” p. 282.
189. See Allyn, “Toward a Common Framework,” p. 188
190. John L. Gaddis, The Long Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 204.
191. See Peter Stein and Peter Feaver, Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Evolution of Permissive Action Links (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for Science and International Affairs, 1987).
192. See Ranger, Arms and Politics, p. 7
193. See Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Goure, and Thomas W. Wolfe, “Introduction” to the English translation of Soviet Military Strategy, ed. by Soviet marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 7
194. James E. Dougherty, How to Think About Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: Crane, Russak, 1973), p. 7
195. Ranger, Arms and Politics, p. 209.
196. Samuel B. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980), p. 75.
197. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 505.
198. See Michael Mandelbaum, “Western Influence on the Soviet Union,” in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, eds., Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), p. 364
199. Holst, “Strategic Arms Control and Stability,” p. 245;
200. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy, pp. 197–198
201. Frank von Hippel, “Arms Control Physics: The New Soviet Connection,” Physics Today, November 1989, p. 39.
202. See York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace, p. 223
203. J. P. Ruina and M. Gell-Mann, “Ballistic Missile Defense and the Arms Race,” in Proceedings of the Twelfth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Udaipur, India, 27 January to 1 February 1964, pp. 232-235
204. Von Hippel, “Arms Control Physics,” p. 39
205. Paul Doty, “Arms Control: 1960, 1990, 2020,” Daedalus 120 (Winter 1991), p. 40.
206. Newhouse, Cold Down, p. 102.
207. David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, 2d ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 44.
208. See Michael MccGwire, “Why the Soviets Are Serious About Arms Control,” Brookings Review, Spring 1987, p. 11
209. See Christopher Bluth, “The Evolution of Soviet Military Doctrine,” Survival 30 (March-April 1988), p. 149.
210. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT, p. 18.
211. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT, p. 7.
212. Georgi A. Arbatov and William Oltman, Soviet Viewpoint (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1981), p. 130.
213. Andrei Kokoshin, personal communication.
214. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT, pp. 46 and 59.
215. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT, p. 126
216. V. V. Larionov made the statement in “Transformatsiia kontseptsii ‘strategicheskoi dostatochnosti,' “ SShA, November 1971. Gromyko later made this same point, as did the minister of foreign affairs. It was almost an official statement of the Soviet government's position.
217. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT, pp. 40-41, and 76.
218. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT, p. 76.
219. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT, p. 66.
220. See Raymond L. Garthoff, “Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy,” International Security 2 (Summer 1978), p. 126
221. Morton Halperin, “The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration,” World Politics 25 (October 1972), p. 95.
222. See Scott C. James and David A. Lake, “The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846,” International Organization 43 (Winter 1989), p. 4.
223. Herken, Counsels of War, p. 247.
224. Edward L. Warner III, “New Thinking and Old Realities in Soviet Defence Policy,” Survival 31 (January-Februaiy 1989) pp. 18–20.
225. Robert Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation' World Politics 40 (April 1988), p. 325.
226. See Davis, “Recent Policy Making in the United States Government,” pp. 379–380.
227. Walker, “The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,” p. 13.
228. Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, p. 299.
229. See Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 40.
230. Raymond L. Garthoff, “On Mutual Deterrence: A Reply to Donald Brennan,” International Security 3 (Spring 1979), p. 198.
231. Weber, “Realism, Detente and Nuclear Weapons,” p. 72.
232. Terry Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 14.
233. See Craig N. Murphy, “Color It Mitrany: Two Patterns of Progress in International Relations,” working paper, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass., 1989.
234. Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States, p. 9.
235. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, pp. 106–7.
236. See Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” in Krasner, International Regimes, pp. 125–27.
237. See Roger K. Smith, “Explaining the Nonproliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41 (Spring 1987), pp. 253–81.