Free trade, fair trade, strategic trade, and protectionism in the U.S. Congress. 1987-88

International Organization

Volumn 48, Issue 3, 1994, Pages 491-525

  Nollen, Stanley D ^a   Quinn, Dennis P ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84972074454     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300028277     Document Type: Article

References (72)

1. For a review of various perspectives on why governments adopt trade policies, see John S. Odell, “Understanding International Trade Policies: An Emerging Synthesis,” World Politics 43 (October 1990), pp. 130-67. A fourth explanatory variable reviewed by Odell, global political-economic structure, is not explicitly modeled here.
2. I. M. Destler, American Trade Politics, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1992), pp. 91-97. We include the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act and the 1988 Textile and Apparel Bill in our count. Legislative activity increased from twelve roll call votes on trade matters in the Senate during 1980-84 to fifty-one Senate roll call votes during 1985-89;.
3. similarly, the House held twenty-five and thirty-six votes, respectively, during those periods. These numbers are based on data from Congressional Quarterly Roll Call, various issues, 1980-89.
4. For a review of this tactic as it relates to the steel industry, see Stefanie Ann Lenway and Douglas A. Schuler, “The Determinants of Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection: The Case of the Steel Industry,” in Robert E. Baldwin, ed., Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 75-80.
5. For recent reviews of trade policy, see Robert E. Baldwin, “Are Economists’ Traditional Trade Policy Views Still Valid?” Journal of Economic Literature 30 (June 1992), pp. 804-29;.
6. Winfried Ruigrok, “Paradigm Crisis in Trade Theory,” Journal of World Trade 25 (February 1991), pp. 77-89;.
7. Neil Vousden, The Economics of Trade Protection (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
8. We follow the common practice of regarding any transfer of authority from the President to the U.S. Trade Representative, who answers (at least in part) to Congress, as a move toward trade protection. See Richard J. Whalen and R. Christopher Whalen, Trade Warriors: The Guide to the Politics of Trade and Foreign Investment (Washington, D.C.: Whalen Company, 1990), pp. 26-32.
9. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
10. See, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988).
11. Optimal tariffs are a form of protectionism that might under some circumstances increase the real income of the citizens of large countries like the United States. One estimate suggests that tariffs of 150 percent might be the optimal U.S. tariff. See John Walley, Trade Liberalization Among Major World Trading Areas (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), cited in Baldwin, “Are Economists’ Traditional Trade Policy Views Still Valid?”
12. Alan M. Rugman and Andrew Anderson, Administered Protection in America (New York: Croom Helm, 1987).
13. David Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939 (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988).
14. Destler offers an extraordinarily comprehensive review of all Section 301 investigations from 1 July 1975 to 28 November 1990; see his American Trade Politics, pp. 404-31. See also Stephen D. Krasner, Asyrnmetries in Japanese-American Trade: The Case for Specific Reciprocity, monograph no. 32 (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute for International Studies, 1987).
15. For a discussion of U.S. fair trade policies, see Judith Goldstein, “Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy,” International Organization 43 (Winter 1988), pp. 179-218, especially pp. 197-209.
16. In return for their continued support for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the free trade bloc of Republicans in the House of Representatives extracted a promise from President Clinton that he would not append to NAFTA the Super 301 provision, which House Republicans oppose and which lapsed in 1991. See Ann Devroy and Peter Behr, “Sugar-Producing States Targeted by Clinton in Drive for NAFTA Votes,” The Washington Post, 3 November 1993, p. A4.
17. See Paul Krugman, ed., Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986)
18. J. David Richardson, “The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy,” International Organization 44 (Winter 1990), pp. 107-35
19. Steven Cohen and John Zysman, Manufacturing Matters (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
20. See Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, High-Definition Television and Advanced Video Information Systems (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19 November 1990);.
21. Ellis S. Krauss and Simon Reich, “Ideology, Interests, and the American Executive: Toward a Theory of Foreign Competition and Manufacturing Trade Policy,” International Organization 46 (Autumn 1992), pp. 857-97.
22. U.S. Senate, Defense Authorization Act of 1988, 100th Cong., 1st sess, S.R. 1177.
23. Robert Z. Lawrence and Robert E. Litan, Saving Free Trade: A Pragmatic Approach (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986).
24. Pietro S. Nivola, “More Like Them? The Political Feasibility of Strategic Trade Policy,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 30 August-2 September 1990, p. 2.
25. For doubts by one of the leading theoreticians, see Paul Krugman, “Is Free Trade Passe?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 1 (Fall 1987), pp. 131-44.
26. See Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982);.
27. Stephen P. Magee, William A. Brock, and Leslie Young, Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory: A Political Economy in General Equilibrium (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
28. See Wendy Hansen, “The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism,” American Political Science Review 84 (March 1990), pp. 21-46;.
29. Timothy J. McKeown, “A Liberal Trade Order? The Long-run Pattern of Imports to the Advanced Capitalist States,” International Studies Quarterly 35 (June 1991), pp. 151-72;.
30. Wendy Takacs, “Pressure for Protectionism,” Economic Inquily 19 (October 1981), pp. 687-93.
31. On export employment effects as well as for a general review of the trade vote literature, see John McArthur and Steven V. Marks, “Empirical Analyses of the Determinants of Protection,” in John S. Odell and Thomas D. Willet, eds., International Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange Between Economics and Political Science (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990).
32. See Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989);.
33. Edward Learner, Sources of Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984). Baldwin's analysis differs;.
34. Robert E. Baldwin, “Determinants of the Commodity Structure of U.S. Trade” American Economic Review 61 (March 1971), pp. 126-46.
35. Schattschneider, E. E., Politics, Pressures, and the Tartff (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935).
36. Peter Behr, “Kantor Faces Choice Between Textiles and High-Tech,” The Washington Post, 26 June 1993, p. Cl.
37. For one of the original studies, see Thomas Ferguson, “From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression,” International Organization 38 (Winter 1984), pp. 41-94. Ferguson traces the development of an internationalist group of U.S. companies and links their activities to the free trade policies of the New Deal.
38. I. M. Destler and John Odell, Anti-protection: Changing Forces in U.S. Trade Politics (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1987).
39. Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).
40. Helen Milner and David Yoffte, “Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands,” International Organization 43 (Spring 1989), pp. 239-72.
41. Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy (New York: Free Press, 1980);.
42. Eugene M. Salorio, “Trade Barriers and Corporate Strategies: Why Some Firms Oppose Import Protection for Their Own Industry,” D. B. A. diss., Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1992.
43. See Larry J. Sabato, PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984);.
44. John R. Wright, “Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives,” American Political Science Review 84 (June 1990), pp. 417-38.
45. Janet M. Grenzke, “Shopping in the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency is Complex,” American Journal of Political Science 33 (February 1989), pp. 1-24.
46. Melissa P. Collie, “Voting Behavior in Legislatures,” in G. Loewenberg, S. Patterson, and M. Jewell, eds., Handbook of Legislative Research (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985);.
47. Diana Evans, “PAC Contributions and Roll-Call Voting: Conditional Power,” in Allan Cigler and Burdett Loomis, eds., Interest Group Politics (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1986).
48. See Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman, “Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees,” American Political Science Review 84 (September 1990), pp. 797-820;.
49. Dennis P. Quinn and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Business Political Power: The Case of Taxation,’‘American Political Science Review 85 (September 1991), pp. 851-74.
50. Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
51. Dennis P. Quinn and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Economic Growth Strategies: The Effects of Ideological Partisanship on Interest Rates and Taxation,” American Journal of Political Science 35 (August 1991), pp. 656-85.
52. Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, “Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions,” American Journal of Political Science 28 (February 1984), pp. 49-74.
53. See Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989); and Whalen and Whalen, Trade Warriors.
54. See Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, Congress and Its Members, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1990);.
55. Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little Brown, 1973).
56. Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946-1988 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990).
57. See Raymond Bauer, Ithiel De Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, American Business and Public Policy (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1963);.
58. Robert A. Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929-1976 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980);.
59. Keith T. Poole, “Recent Developments in Analytical Models of Voting in the U.S. Congress,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 13 (February 1988), pp. 117-33;.
60. Stefanie Lenway, The Politics of International Trade (Boston: Pitman, 1985).
61. John McArthur and Steven V. Marks, “Constituent Interest Versus Legislator Ideology: The Role of Political Opportunity Cost,” Economic Inquiry 25 (July 1988), pp. 15-25. Compare Goldstein and Lenway, “Interests or Institutions.”
62. See Stanley D. Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh, “Explanations of Protectionism in International Trade Votes,” Public Choice 67 (August 1990), pp. 137-53;.
63. Stephen V. Marks, “Economic Interests and Voting on the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987,” Department of State Planning and Economic Staff working paper no. 90/18, U.S. Department of State, 1990.
64. See Alan S. Blinder, Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Tough Minded Economics for a Just Society (Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley, 1987);.
65. Arthur M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975). See also the discussion of unidimension-ality below.
66. See Richard L. Hall and Bernard Grofman, “The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias,” American Political Science Review 84 (December 1990), pp. 1149-66
67. Thomas Stratmann, “The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting,” American Economic Review 82 (December 1992), pp. 1162-76.
68. Peter M. VanDoren, “Can We Learn the Causes of Congressional Decisions from Roll Call Data?” Legislative Studies Quarterly 15 (August 1990), pp. 311-40.
69. For a more general discussion of ideology in U.S. politics, see Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, “On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the U.S. Congress: A Controversy,” American Political Science Review 85 (September 1991), pp. 955-60.
70. Jackson and Kingdon, as well as VanDoren, make the theoretical point that using ideology measures drawn from previous roll call votes to explain other roll call votes is biased. See John E. Jackson and John W. Kingdon, “Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes,” American Journal of Political Science 36 (August 1992), pp. 805-23; and VanDoren, “Can We Learn the Causes of Congressional Decisions from Roll Call Data?” We believe that we should not omit this important variable and so continue to use the ideology measure but supplement the measure with a second proxy measure of ideology (see Table 1). An objection to the ADA measure is raised by McArthur and Marks, “Empirical Analyses of the Determinants of Protection.” They offer evidence that the liberalism rating compiled by the National Journal is a (slightly) better predictor of members’ votes on trade and economic issues than is the ADA rating. In their studies the coefficient of the National Journal rating was larger and more significant than that of the ADA rating, and the percentage of votes correctly predicted either did not change or increased by 1 or 2 percent when the National Journal rating was used. We use the ADA rating nevertheless for two reasons. First, we wish to compare our findings to previous studies of trade votes, most of which use the ADA rating as the measure of ideology. Second, we are persuaded by the studies that find unidimensionality of policy space, which suggests that members’ ideological views on economic issues and social issues may not be separated; see Poole and Rosenthal, “On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the U.S. Congress.” If ideology is one construct, then the ADA measure, which is broader than the National Journal measure, is appropriate.
71. Robert Jacobson, “Unobservable Effects and Business Performance,” Marketing Science 9 (Winter 1990), pp, 74-95.
72. For the Senate, we used the bill to forbid the use of imported cement in U.S. federal highway projects and for the House, we used the (contested) rule vote for the Omnibus Trade Bill to calculate this variable. On the stability of congressional voting patterns, see Herbert B. Asher and Herbert F. Weisberg, “Voting Changes in Congress” American Journal of Political Science 22 (May 1978), pp. 391-425.