The insoluble problem of the social contract

Dialogue

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 1976, Pages 3-37

  Braybrooke, David ^a  

^a DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84972003530     PISSN: 00122173     EISSN: 17590949     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0012217300021922     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Georg Simmel, “The Web of Group-Affiliations,” tr. Reinhard Bendix, in Conflict; The Web of Group-Affiliations (Glencoe, III.: The Free Press, (1955)); of. Philosophie des Geldes, 5th ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. (1930)), Chap. IV.
2. David Gauthier, “Rational Cooperation,” Nous, Vol. VIII, No. I (March (1974)), pp. 53-65.
3. Also idem, “Reason and Maximisation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. [V. No. 3 (March (1975)), pp. 411-433.
4. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, (1971)).
5. Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Chap. Ill, at the end; Chap. IX, at the beginning.
6. Sobel, Second Treatise of Government, p. 159 (footnote); p. 164.
7. G. Tullock, “The Paradox of Revolution”, in Public Choice, Vol. XI (Fall (1971)), pp. 89-99.
8. This suggestion came up during the discussion in Toronto.
9. A hopeful speculation commonly raised by commentators on Prisoner's Dilemma. There is some favorable experimental evidence. See A. Rapport & C. Orwant, “Experimental Games: A Review”, Martin Shubik, ed. Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior (New York: Wiley, (1964)), pp. 283-310, at pp. 296-297.