Deterrence Theory Revisited

World Politics

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 1979, Pages 289-324

  Jervis, Robert ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84971995788     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: 10863338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2009945     Document Type: Review

References (100)

1. As Schelling has noted in Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), 2–18, the theory deals with the broader category of coercion, which includes compellence as well as deterrence. I have used the term “deterrence theory” because it has such wide currency.
2. In addition to George and Smoke, the main writings I have in mind are Alexander George, David Hall, and William Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown 1971);
3. Bruce Russett, “The Calculus of Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vn (June 1963), 97-109;
4. Clinton Fink, “More Calculations About Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, ix (March 1965), 54-65;
5. Patrick Morgan, Deterrence (Beverly Hills: Sage 1977);
6. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1977);
7. Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1968);
8. Richard Smoke, War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1978).
9. George Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima (New York: Wiley 1966).
10. The following summary draws heavily on James King's “The New Strategy” (unpublished ms.).
11. King (fn. 4) again provides the best analysis.
12. Rapoport, “Systemic and Strategic Conflict,” in Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz, eds., The Strategy of World Order, I (New York: World Law Fund 1966), 281-82.
13. Also see the distinction between “immediate” and “general” deterrence in Morgan (fn. 2), 28–43.
14. George, Hall, and Simons (fn. 2), 29.
15. A better treatment is George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 80–81, 604-10.
16. George, Hall, and Simons (fn. 2), 101–2.
17. Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender (New York: Athenaeum 1964).
18. David A. Baldwin, “The Power of Positive Sanctions,” World Politics, xxiv (October 1974), 19-38
19. Richard Rosecrance, “Reward, Punishment, and the Future,” in Richard Rosecrance, ed., The Future 0/ the International Strategic System (San Francisco: Chandler 1972), 175-84;
20. Ernst Haas, “Multilateral Incentives for Limiting International Violence,”, 151–74.
21. George Kistiakowsky, A Scientist in the White House (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1976), 243.
22. The most important exception to this generalization is Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press 1953).
23. George Quester, “On the Identification of Real and Pretended Communist Military Doctrine,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, x (June 1966), 173-79;
24. Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970), 23236-
25. Daniel Ellsberg, “Theory of the Reluctant Duelist,” American Economic Review, XLVI (December 1956), 909–23.
26. Quoted in King (fn. 4).
27. Ole Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1972), 7-25;
28. Holsti and Alexander George, “The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy-Makers,” in Cornelius Cotter, ed., Political Science Annual, VI (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1975), 255-319;
29. Holsti, “Theories of Crisis Decision-Making,” in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History, and Policy (New York: Free Press, forthcoming 1979).
30. Morgan (fn. 2), 121.
31. Of course Schelling (fn. 1) points out that it can be rational to pretend to be, or to be, irrational.
32. Jervis, “Bargaining and Bargaining Tactics,” in J. Roland Pennock and John Chapman, Coercion, NOMOS, xiv (Chicago: Aldine 1972), 272-88.
33. Also see Glenn Snyder, ” ‘Prisoner's Dilemma’ and ‘Chicken’ Models in International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, xv (March 1971), 66-103.
34. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1960), 366.
35. The source is Sidney Fay, The Origins of the World War, II (New York: Macmillan 1929), 472-73-
36. For a preliminary discussion of these questions, see Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976), 58-102.
37. Young (fn. 2), 217–20.
38. Bundy, “To Cap the Volcano,” Foreign Affairs, XLVIII (October 1969), 9–12.
39. Morgan (fn. 2), 101–24.
40. Snyder and Diesing (fn. 2), 489–93;
41. George, Hall, and Simons (fn. 2), 100–103, 238-44.
42. Also see Eugenia Nomikos and Robert North, International Crisis (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1976), 270-71.
43. George, Hall, and Simons (fn. 2), 56, 64-65, 74-75, 217.
44. For related arguments, see Morgan (fn. 2), 54–57;
45. Trevor Salmon, “Rationality and Politics: The Case of Strategic Theory,” British Journal of International Studies, 11 (October 1976), 298-304;
46. Robert Mandel, “Political Gaming and Foreign Policy Making during Crises,” World Politics, xxix (July 1977), 610-25;
47. Wallace Thies, “Coercion and Diplomacy: Force and Foreign Policy in the Vietnam Conflict,” Ph.D. diss. (Yale University 1977);
48. Smoke (fn. 2).
49. Allan Millet, The Politics of Intervention (Columbus: Ohio State University Press 1968), 68-69, 73-75. 7778.
50. New Yor\ Times, January 11, 1940. I am grateful to Abraham Ben-Zvi for this citation.
51. Jervis, Perception and Misperception (fn. 22), 70–71, 354-55;
52. Jack Schick, The Berlin Crisis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1971), 185-86.
53. John Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (New York: Norton 1965), 97;
54. Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1960), 151.
55. Schelling (fn. 1), 44.
56. Holsti (fn. 17), 143–68.
57. Snyder and Diesing (fn. 2).
58. Also see George Poteat, “The Intelligence Gap: Hypotheses on the Process of Surprise,” International Studies Notes, in (Fall 1976).
59. George and Smoke argue that this influence was also at work in the period preceding the Berlin blockade (pp. 12830).
60. For similar arguments in other cases, see Roberta Wohlstetter, “Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight,” Foreign Affairs, XLIII (July 1965), 691–707;
61. Arthur Marder, Operation Menace (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1976), 44-45;
62. and Richard Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 1977).
63. Jervis (fn. 22), 356–72.
64. Harold Nicolson, Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart., First Lord Carnock (London: Constable 1930), 40.
65. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Econometrica (forthcoming).
66. Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper 1965), 705.
67. Jervis (fn. 22), 128–43.
68. Jack Snyder, in “Rationality at the Brink,” World Politics, xxx (April 1978), 345-65, argues that statesmen avoid making tradeoffs during crises. Although generally successful, this line of reasoning is marred by the fact that several of the dimensions he considers are not actually independent of each other.
69. George, Hall, and Simons (fn. 2), 112–14.
70. The best treatments are Irvine Anderson, Jr., The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933-1941 (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975) 168–92;
71. and Jonathan Utley, “Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom: Oil Exports and Japan, 1940-41,” Prologue, vm (Spring 1978), 17-28.
72. This was the case with some aspects of American policy in Vietnam. See Thies (fn. 28). For a general statement, see George Kennan, The Cloud of Danger (Boston: Little, Brown 1977), 3-26.
73. For a related distinction, see Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1961), 30-40.
74. Also see Thomas Schelling's distinction between threats and warnings in The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1960), 123–24.
75. Snyder (fn. 45) is one of the few second-wave theorists to recognize the importance of intrinsic interest.
76. Young (fn. 2), 33–216, 387, 391;
77. Steven Rosen, “A Model of War and Alliance,” in Julian Freedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen, Alliance in International Politics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon 1970), 215-37
78. and Rosen, “War Power and Willingness to Suffer,” in Bruce Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills: Sage 1972), 167-83;
79. Snyder and Diesing (fn. 2), 498;
80. George, Hall, and Simons (fn. 2), 21528;
81. Russett (fn. 2), 103–5.
82. Also see George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 552–53, 558-61.
83. Quotes from Roger Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale (London: Athlone 1974), 13, 104;
84. W. E. Mosse, The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System, 1855-ji (London: Macmillan 1963), 51;
85. Foreign Relations of the U.S.: Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1955), 679-80.
86. Snyder and Diesing (fn. 2), 498–500.
87. David Baldwin, “Bargaining with Airline Hijackers,” in I. William Zartman, ed., The 50% Solution (Garden City: Anchor Books 1976), 416-21.
88. Quoted in Michael Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door (New Haven: Yale Universty Press 1973), 221.
89. John Snepp, Decent Interval (New York: Random House 1977), 143-44, 149, 17576, quote at 237-38;
90. J.T. Emerson, The Rhineland Crisis (London: Maurice Temple Smith 1977), 242.
91. For a further discussion of the interconnectedness of the international system, see Jervis, “Systems Theories and Diplomatic History,” in Lauren (fn. 17).
92. Maxwell, Rationality in Deterrence, Adelphi Paper No. 50 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies 1968), 19.
93. Kahn (fn. 21), 532.
94. The importance of keeping means and ends in proper alignment is stressed by Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan 1973); see esp. chap. 1.
95. Also see George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 57
96. George, Hall, and Simons (fn. 2), 15.
97. Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1966), passim.
98. Brodie (fn. 56), 380 (emphases in original);
99. Richard Rosecrance, Strategic Deterrence Reconsidered, Adelphi Paper No. 116 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies 1975), 35-36.
100. Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt Brace 1946), 52.