Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an anarchic world

International Organization

Volumn 36, Issue 2, 1982, Pages 299-324

  Stein, Arthur A ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84971922404     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300018968     Document Type: Article

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