Exogenous Voter Preferences and Parties with State Power: Some Internal Problems of Economic Theories of Party Competition

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 1981, Pages 351-380

  Dunleavy, Patrick ^a   Ward, Hugh ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84971871360     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: 14692112     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123400002684     Document Type: Article

References (76)

1. Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy, rev. edn. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), Preface.
2. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 21.
3. Milton Friedman, ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics', in his Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).
4. W. L. Miller, ‘Social Class and Party Choice in England: a New Analysis', British Journal of Political Science, viii (1978), 257–84.
5. William Riker and Peter Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973).
6. D. C. Mueller, Public Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979)
7. S. Popkin, J. W. Gorman, C. Phillips and J. A. Smith, ‘What Have you Done for Me Lately? Towards an Investment Theory of Voting', American Political Science Review, LXX (1976), 779-805;
8. Donald A. Wittman, ‘Parties as Utility Maximizers', American Political Science Review, LXVII (1973), 490-8;
9. Peter Ordeshook, ‘The Spatial Theory of Elections, a Review and Critique', in Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe and Dennis Farlie, eds., Party Identification and Beyond (London: Wiley, 1976), pp. 285-303;
10. David Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition (London, Wiley, 1976);
11. Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, Voting and Party Competition (London: Wiley, 1977).
12. Martin Hollis and Edward J. Nell, Rational Economic Man (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 53–4.
13. John Plamenatz, Democracy and Illusion (London: Longman, 1973), p. 150.
14. Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy, Preface.
15. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 6–8.
16. Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy pp. 33–4.
17. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy.
18. See Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, Voting and Party Competition (London: Wiley, 1977), Chap. 2.
19. See Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor, ‘Decision Rules and Policy Outcomes', British Journal of Political Science, 1 (1971), 71–90.
20. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 118–22.
21. Spiro J. Latsis, ‘A Research Programme in Economics' in Spiro J. Latsis, ed., Method and Appraisal in Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 1–41.
22. Milton Friedman, Price Theory (Chicago: Aldine, 1962), p. 13.
23. G. J. Stigler and G. S. Becker, ‘ De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum', American Economic Review, LXVII (1977), p. 76.
24. Friedman, Price Theory, p. 13.
25. C. C. von Weizsacker, ‘Notes on Endogenous Change of Tastes', Economic Theory, 111 (1971), 345–72
26. Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979)
27. Herbert Gintis, ‘Consumer Behavior and the Concept of Sovereignty', American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, LXII (1972), 267–78.
28. Stigler and Becker, ‘De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum', p. 76.
29. Stigler and Becker, ‘De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum', p. 88.
30. D. Fowns, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 140.
31. J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1950), p. 263.
32. Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, ‘ Placing Party Identification within a Typology of Representations of Voting and Party Competition and Proposing a Synthesis', in Budge, Farlie and Crewe, Party Identification and Beyond, p. 383.
33. Budge and Farlie, Voting and Party Competition, p. 197.
34. Budge and Farlie, Voting and Party Competition, p. 106.
35. The Changing British Party System, 1945–79 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980).
36. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 130-1.
37. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 140.
38. Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition, pp. 72 and 135.
39. Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition, pp. 135–6.
40. C. Duncan Macrae, ‘A Political Model of the Business Cycle', Journal of Political Economy, LXXXV (1971), 239-63;
41. James Alt and Alec Crystal, Endogenous Government Behaviour (University of Essex, Department of Economics, Discussion Paper No. 108,1977);
42. Douglas A. Hibbs, ‘The Mass Public and Macroeconomic Policy: The Dynamics of Public Opinion towards Inflation and Unemployment' (paper given at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1978).
43. Benjamin I. Page and Calvin C. Jones, ‘Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties and the Vote', American Political Science Review, LXXIII(1979), 1071–89.
44. Page and Jones, ‘Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences', 1084–5.
45. Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power, new edn. (New York; Wiley, 1976).
46. Benjamin Page, Choices and Echoes in American Elections: Rational Man and Electoral Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 7.
47. Page, Choices and Echoes in American Elections Chap. 9.
48. Budge and Farlie, Voting and Party Competition, p. 170.
49. Budge and Farlie, Voting and Party Competition, p. 21.
50. Budge and Farlie, Voting and Party Competition, p, 106.
51. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 22–3.
52. Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition, Chap. 1.
53. Ordeshook, ‘Spatial Theory of Elections', pp. 308–9.
54. Patrick Dunleavy, ‘The Urban Basis of Political Alignment', British Journal of Political Science, IX (1979), 409-43;
55. ‘Some Political Implications of Sectoral Cleavages and the Growth of State Employment', Political Studies, xxviii (1980), 364–83
56. See, for example, Walter Korpi, ‘Conflict, Power and Relative Deprivation', American Political Science Review, Lxviii (1974), 1569–78.
57. Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition, pp. 105–9.
58. Edward Tufte, Political Control of the Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), Chap. 5.
59. Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition, p. 20.
60. Colin Crouch, Politics of Industrial Conflict (London: Fontana, 1979), Chap. 3.
61. Budge and Farlie, Voting and Party Competition, pp. 503–4
62. David Butlet and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of February 1974 (London: Macmillan, 1975), p. 32.
63. Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-three Democracies (forthcoming), Chap. 6.
64. Lindblom, Politics and Markets
65. W. Edwards, ‘Behavioural Decision Theory', pp. 73–4.
66. Vincent Wright, The Government and Politics of France (Hutchinson: London, 1978),pp. 129–32.
67. Ian Mac Allister, The Northern Ireland Social Democratic and Labour Party (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 4.
68. Michael Laver, ‘Strategic Campaign Behaviour for Election and Parties: The Northern Ireland Assembly Election of 1973'
69. Patrick Dunleavy, Urban Political Analysis (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 87–90
70. Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p.73.
71. Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition, pp. 125–37
72. Ivor Crewe and Bo Sarlvik, ‘Popular Attitudes and Electoral Strategy', in Z. Layton-Henry, ed., Conservative Party Politics (London: Macmillan, 1980), particularly on pp. 265-72;
73. W. L. Miller. ‘What Was the Profit in Following the Crowd?', British Journal of Political Science, x (1980), 15-39.
74. Witmann, ‘Parties as Utility Maximizers', which discusses parties' multiple goals.
75. Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition, pp. 31–5.
76. Budge, Farlie and Crewe, ‘Rational Choice, Policy Spaces and Party Identification', in Budge, Farlie and Crewe, eds., Party Identification and Beyond, pp. 279–83.