Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible

American Political Science Review

Volumn 86, Issue 2, 1992, Pages 404-417

  Ostrom, Elinor ^a   Walker, James ^a   Gardner, Roy ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84971768389     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1964229     Document Type: Article

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