Misperception and the causes of war: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems

World Politics

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 1983, Pages 76-99

  Levy, Jack S ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84971744740     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: 10863338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2010176     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954)
2. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967)
3. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).
4. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971);
5. John D. Stein-bruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974);
6. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976);
7. Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making (New York: Free Press, 1977);
8. Ole R. Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1972)
9. Charles F. Hermann, ed., International Crises (New York: Free Press, 1972);
10. Michael Brecher, Decisions in Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980);
11. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981);
12. Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969)
13. L. L. Farrar, Jr., The Short-War Illusion (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1973)
14. see Patrick Morgan, Deterrence (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977), chap. 3
15. Steinbruner, Janis and Mann, Brecher, Hermann, and Allison, cited above (fn. 2). See also Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972)
16. Alexander George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980)
17. Ole R. Holsti and Alexander George, “The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy Makers,” in C. P. Cotter, ed., Political Science Annual, Vol. 6 (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975), 255-271-
18. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962);
19. Barton Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973)
20. Klaus Knorr, “Threat Perception,” in Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976)
21. Avi Shlaim, “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,” World Politics 28 (April 1976), 348-380
22. Michael A. Handel, “The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise,” International Studies Quarterly 21 (September 1977), 461-502
23. Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision; Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics 31 (October 1978), 61-89;
24. Betts, Surprise Attach (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1982).
25. Robert H. White, Nobody Wanted War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday/Anchor, 1968);
26. John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 2d. ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974).
27. Arthur A. Stein, “When Misperception Matters,” World Politics 34 (July 1982), 505–526.
28. Ole R. Holsti, “The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 6 (No. 3, 1962), 244–252.
29. Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).
30. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949).
31. Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 268–277.
32. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973), chap. 4
33. See Klaus Knorr, Military Power and Potential (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1970).
34. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. by Anatol Rapoport (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968);
35. Sun Tsu, The Art of War, trans. by S. B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963);
36. Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), chap. 1.
37. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1959), 1170.
38. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, abridged ed., trans. by Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: Ballantine, 1957), 368.
39. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 238.
40. Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York: Norton, 1967), chap. 3.
41. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), 151, 207–208, 341.
42. see Glenn H. Snyder, “Crisis Bargaining,” in Hermann (fn. 2), chap. 10; also Phil Williams, Crisis Management (New York: Wiley, 1976), 94–96;
43. Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), chap. 1;
44. Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), chap. 5.
45. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), chap. III.
46. Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York: Bantam Books, 1961).
47. B. Fay, The Origins of the World War, 2 vols. (New York: Free Press, 1928): Vol. 1, pp. 42–43, 390, 467
48. Walter L. Dorn, Competition for Empire, 1740–1763 (New York: Harper & Row, 1940), 306.
49. John B. Wolfe, Louis XIV (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), 442–446.
50. Golo Mann, Wallenstein, trans. by C. Kessler (London: André Deutsch, 1976), 532–533.
51. David Jayne Hill, A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe, 3 vols. (London: Longman's Green, 1914), Vol. 3, p. 458.
52. Donald Kagan, The Archidamian War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), 22–23.
53. J. David Singer and Melvin Small, The Wages of War 1816–1965 (New York: Wiley, 1972), 367.
54. Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics 20 (April, 1968), 454–479.
55. Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: Wiley, 1951).
56. see Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 1), 11–18.