U.S.-soviet-chinese relations: Routine, reciprocity, or rational expectations?

American Political Science Review

Volumn 85, Issue 1, 1991, Pages 17-35

  Goldstein, Joshua S ^a   Freeman, John R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84971738623     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1962876     Document Type: Article

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