Effectiveness of a pay-for-performance intervention to improve maternal and child health services in Afghanistan: A cluster-randomized trial

International Journal of Epidemiology

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 2016, Pages 451-459

  Engineer, Cyrus Y ^a,b   Dale, Elina ^c   Agarwal, Anubhav ^d   Agarwal, Arunika ^d   Alonge, Olakunle ^b   Edward, Anbrasi ^b   Gupta, Shivam ^b   Schuh, Holly B ^b   Burnham, Gilbert ^b   Peters, David H ^b  

^a TOWSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION   (Switzerland)

^d HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH   (United States)

Author keywords

Cluster randomized trial; Health worker motivation; Incentives; Maternal and child health; Pay for performance; Performance based financing

Indexed keywords

CHILD HEALTH; CLUSTER ANALYSIS; COMMUNITY HEALTH WORKER; HEALTH SERVICES; INCENTIVE; MATERNAL HEALTH; PRIMARY HEALTH CARE; VACCINATION;

AFGHANISTAN; ARTICLE; BIRTH; CHILD; CHILD HEALTH CARE; CONTROLLED STUDY; FEMALE; HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL; HOUSEHOLD; HUMAN; MAJOR CLINICAL STUDY; MATERNAL WELFARE; MEDICAL FEE; MOTIVATION; OUTCOME ASSESSMENT; OUTPATIENT; PATIENT COUNSELING; PATIENT SATISFACTION; PAY FOR PERFORMANCE; PHYSICAL EXAMINATION; POSTNATAL CARE; PRENATAL CARE; PRIMARY MEDICAL CARE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS; TIME; VACCINATION; CLUSTER ANALYSIS; ECONOMICS; HEALTH PERSONNEL ATTITUDE; MATERNAL CHILD HEALTH CARE; PROGRAM EVALUATION; RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL; RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL (TOPIC); REIMBURSEMENT; STANDARDS; TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT;

AFGHANISTAN;

AFGHANISTAN; ATTITUDE OF HEALTH PERSONNEL; CLUSTER ANALYSIS; HUMANS; MATERNAL-CHILD HEALTH SERVICES; PRENATAL CARE; PROGRAM EVALUATION; QUALITY IMPROVEMENT; RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIALS AS TOPIC; REIMBURSEMENT, INCENTIVE;

EID: 84971591991     PISSN: 03005771     EISSN: 14643685     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ije/dyv362     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Meesen B, Soucat A, Sekabaraga C. Performance-based financing: just a donor fad or catalyst towards comprehensive health reform. BullWorld Health Organ 2011;89:153-56.
2. Miller G, Babariaz KS. Pay-for-Performance Incentives in Lowand Middle-Income Country Health Programs. NBER Working Paper No. 18932. Cambridge MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013.
3. Eijkenaar F. Pay for performance in health care: an international overview of initiatives. Med Care ResRev 2012;69:251-76.
4. Belay TA. Building on Early Gains in Afghanistan's Health, Nutrition, and Population Sector: Challenges and Options. Washington DC: World Bank, 2010.
5. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health & Indian Institute of Health Management Research. Afghanistan Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2003: A Re-analysis of Critical Health Service Delivery Indicators. Kabul: Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health, 2005.
6. Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health & Institute of Health Management Research. Afghanistan Health Survey 2006: Estimates ofPpriority Health Indicators for Rural Afghanistan. Kabul: General Directorate of Policy and Planning, Ministry of Public Health, 2008.
7. UNICEF. Afghanistan: Progress of Provinces. Multiple Indicators Clusters Survey 2003. Kabul: UNICEF, 2004.
8. Schwartz JB, Bhushan I. Improving equity in immunization through a public-private partnership in Cambodia. Bull World Health Organ 2004;82:661-67.
9. Basinga P, Gertler PJ, Binagwaho A, Soucat ALB, Sturdy J, Vermeersch CMJ. Effect on maternal and child health services in Rwanda of payment to primary health-care providers for performance: an impact evaluation. Lancet 2011;377:1421-28.
10. Arur A, Peters D, Hansen P, Mashkoor MA, Steinhardt LC, Burnham G. Contracting for health and curative care use in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2005. Health Policy Plan 2010;25: 135-44.
11. Alonge O, Gupta S, Engineer C, Salehi A, Peters DH. Assessing the pro-poor effect of different contracting schemes for health services on health facilities in rural Afghanistan Health Policy Plan. Health Policy Plan 2015;30:1229-42.
12. Peters DH, Noor AA, Singh LP, Kakar FK, Hansen PM, Burnham G. A Balanced Scorecard for Health Services in Afghanistan. BullWorld Health Organ 2007;85:146-51.
13. Edward A, Kumar B, Kakar F, Salehi AS, Burnham G, Peters DH. Configuring Balanced Scorecards for measuring health systems performance: evidence from five years' evaluation in Afghanistan. PLOS Med 2011;8:e1001066.
14. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health & Indian Institute of Health Management Research. Afghanistan Health Sector Balanced Scorecard 2012-13. Kabul: Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health., 2013.
15. Kakwani NC. Income Inequality and Poverty: Methods of Estimation and Policy Applications. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980.
16. Filmer D, Pritchett L. Estimating wealth effects without expenditure data-or tears: an application to educational enrollments in states of India. Demography 2001;38:115-32.
17. Stata Corp. Stata 12 Survey Data Reference Manual. College Station, TX: Stata Press, 2011.
18. Hayes RJ, Moulton LH. Cluster Randomised Trial. Boca Raton, FL: Chapman&Hall/CRC Press, 2009.
19. Cochrane Library. Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of Interventions. Chapter 16.3. http://handbook.cochrane.org/). Version 5.1.0, March 2011. [Accessed June 6, 2014]
20. Eichler R. Can 'Pay for Performance' Increase Utilization by the Poor and Improve the Quality of Health Services. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2004.
21. Regalia F, Castro L. Nicaragua: combining demand-and supplyside incentives. In: Eichler R, Levine R (eds). Performance Incentives for Global Health: Potential and Pitfalls. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2009.
22. Eijkenaar F, Emmert M, Scheppach M, Schöffski O. Effects of pay for performance in health care: a systematic review of systematic reviews. Health Policy 2013;110:115-30.
23. Kohn A. Why incentive plans cannot work. Harvard Business Review 1993; 54-63.
24. Deming W.E. The New Economics for Industry, Government & Education. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Advanced Engineering Study, 1993.
25. Hackman, J.R, Oldham, GR. Motivation through the design of work: Test of a theory. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 1976;16:250-79.
26. Zavier AJ, Santhya KG. How conditional cash transfers to promote institutional delivery can also influence postpartum contraception: evidence from Rajasthan, India. Int J Gynaecol Obstet 2013;123(Suppl 1):e43-46.
27. Ekirapa-Kiracho E, Waiswa PE, Rahman MH et al. Increasing access to institutional deliveries using demand and supply side incentives: Early results from a quasi-experimental study. BMC Int Health Hum Rights 2011;11(Suppl 1):S11.
28. Shei A, Costa F, Reis MG, Ko AI. The impact of Brazil's BolsaFamilia conditional cash transfer program on children's health care utilization and health outcomes. BMC Int Health Hum Rights 2014;14:10.