Models in legal history: The case of biblical law

Journal of Law and Religion

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 1-30

  Jackson, Bernard S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 84971547733     PISSN: 07480814     EISSN: 21633088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1051492     Document Type: Article

References (164)

1. On Maine, see Bernard S. Jackson, Law and Language: A Metaphor for Maine, A Model for His Successors?, in The Victorian Achievement of Sir Henry Maine 256 (Alan Diamond ed., Cambridge U. Press 1991)
2. in the context of the views of Raymond Westbrook, What is the Covenant Code?, in Theory and Method in Biblical and Cuneiform Law 15 (Bernard M. Levinson ed., Sheffield Academic Press 1994)
3. see Bernard S. Jackson, Modelling Biblical Law: The Covenant Code, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1745, 1750–1754 (1995).
4. See Bernard S. Jackson, Essays in Jewish and Comparative Legal History 8–12 (E.J. Brill 1975)
5. for my developed view, see Bernard S. Jackson, Making Sense in Law: Linguistic, Psychological and Semiotic Perspectives chs. 7–8 (Deborah Charles Publications 1995)
6. Bernard S. Jackson, Making Sense in Jurisprudence ch. 3 (Deborah Charles Publications 1996).
7. Sir Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection With the Early History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas 17–18 (10th ed., Sir Frederick Pollock ed., Henry Holt & Co. 1906).
8. Moshe Greenberg, Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law, in Yehezkel Kaufmann Jubilee Volume: Studies in Bible and Jewish Religion Dedicated to Yehezkel Kaufmann on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday 5 (Menahem Haran ed., Magnes Press 1960)
9. repr. in his Studies in the Bible and Jewish Thought 25 (Jewish Publication Socy. 1995).
10. See Bernard S. Jackson, Studies in the Semiotics of Biblical Law 177–180 (Sheffield Academic Press 2000), where I note the tension within Hoebel's own work between “postulates felt” at an unconscious level (the conception of the German Historical School) and the rational articulation of postulates (more akin, I suggest, to Dworkinian “principles”).
11. Commencing with his Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Scottish Academic Press 1974).
12. Anne Fitzpatrick-McKinley, The Transformation of Torah from Scribal Advice to Law 20 (Sheffield Academic Press 1999).
13. Cf. id. at 112.
14. See Bernard S. Jackson, Review in J. Semitic Stud. (forthcoming).
15. Maine, Review in J. Semitic Stud., at 15 (emphasis supplied).
16. Sir Henry Sumner Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom: Chiefly Selected from Lectures Delivered at Oxford 5 (Henry Holt & Co. 1886).
17. Arthur Sigismund Diamond, Primitive Law: Past and Present 47–48 (Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1971)
18. Geoffrey Sawer, Law in Society 62 (Clarendon Press 1965).
19. L.U. (Laws of Ur-Namma) §§18–22, commencing: “If [a man] cuts off the foot of [another man with …], he shall weigh and deliver 10 shekels of silver” (§18); similar provisions follow in respect of the “bone” (§19), “nose” (§20), “??” (text damaged) (§21), and “tooth” (§22). See Martha T. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor 19 (Scholars Press 1995).
20. L.E. (Laws of Eshnunna) §42: “If a man bit and severed the nose of a man,-1 mina of silver he shall weigh out. An eye-1 mina; a tooth-1/2 mina; an ear-1/2 mina. A slap in the face-10 shekels silver he shall weigh out” {cf. L.E. 43–46).
21. See Reuven Yaron, The Laws of Eshnunna 69 (2d ed., Magnes Press 1988).
22. Arthur Sigismund Diamond, An Eye for an Eye, 19 Iraq 151 (1957)
23. Diamond, Primitive Law, An Eye for an Eye, at 98–101, 398–399.
24. Cf. Jay W. Marshall, Israel and the Book of the Covenant: An Anthropological Approach to Biblical Law 133 (Scholars Press 1993).
25. Compare e.g. the provisions on goring oxen in Laws of Eshnunna §§53–55 (see Yaron, Israel and the Book of the Covenant: An Anthropological Approach to Biblical Law, at 77), Laws of Hammurabi §§250–252
26. see Roth, Israel and the Book of the Covenant: An Anthropological Approach to Biblical Law, at 128
27. Exod. 21:28–32, 35–36 [Biblical quotes are from the R.S.V., but citations are to M.T. where that differs].
28. For debate within linguistics and the philosophy of language on “literal meaning,” see Jackson, Mating Sense in Law, Exod, at 42–45.
29. The title of ch. 4 of Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1982)
30. see also Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind (Cambridge U. Press 1977)
31. Jackson, Mating Sense in Law, The Domestication of the Savage Mind, at 79–83.
32. Basil Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control (Volume 1): Theoretical Studies Towards a Sociology of Language chs. 5–7, especially 108–109,123–137 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1971).
33. For the interdisciplinary narrative theory, deriving from Greimassian semiotics, psychology (Bartlett, Bruner) and the later Wittgensteinian philosophy of language, which provides the theoretical foundations of this conception of meaning, see Jackson, Making Sense in Law, Theoretical Studies Towards a Sociology of Language, at ch. 5 and §§6.4,10.2–3
34. Jackson, Making Sense in Jurisprudence, Theoretical Studies Towards a Sociology of Language, at §§7.5, 9.2, 4.
35. For applications to biblical law, see further Bernard S. Jackson, The Original Oral Law, in Jewish Ways of Reading the Bible 3 (G.W. Brooke ed., Oxford U. Press 2000)
36. Jackson, Studies, Jewish Ways of Reading the Bible, at 75–82.
37. The example is discussed in greater detail in Jackson, The Original Oral Law, Jewish Ways of Reading the Bible, at 6–8
38. Jackson, Studies, Jewish Ways of Reading the Bible, at 75–77.
39. Discussed and rejected in Bernard S. Jackson, Theft in Early Jewish Law 204–206 (Clarendon Press 1972).
40. Ong, Theft in Early Jewish Law, at 115.
41. Narrative images still underlie much of our case law and jurisprudential theorising about it: see Bernard S. Jackson, Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence especially chs. 3–5 (Deborah Charles Publications 1988).
42. For example, the history of legal drafting: see Bernard S. Jackson, Legal Drafting in the Ancient Near East in the Light of Modern Theories of Cognitive Development, in Melanges à la mémoire de Marcel-Henri Prévost: Droit Biblique, Interprètation Rabbinique, Communautés et Société 49 (Presses U. France 1982)
43. Jackson, Studies, Melanges à la mémoire de Marcel-Henri Prévost: Droit Biblique, Interprètation Rabbinique, Communautés et Société, at ch. 4 (discussing progressions from concrete to more abstract terminology; the movement towards consistency; increasing combination of variables within a single clause; increasing grammatical complexity (as in the number of clauses within a single paragraph); the tendency towards greater rule elaboration and systematisation; and the giving of reasons for rules).
44. On the contribution which cognitive developmental psychology may make to our understanding of legal development more generally, see Jackson, Making Sense in Law, Melanges à la mémoire de Marcel-Henri Prévost: Droit Biblique, Interprètation Rabbinique, Communautés et Société, at chs. 7–8
45. Jackson, Making Sense in Jurisprudence, Melanges à la mémoire de Marcel-Henri Prévost: Droit Biblique, Interprètation Rabbinique, Communautés et Société, ch. 3.
46. Christopher Robert Hallpike, Foundations of Primitive Thought 39–40 (The Clarendon Press 1979). Support for such an approach is also to be found in the work of Morris Ginsberg, Talcott Parsons, and a number of legal scholars.
47. See Bernard S. Jackson, Historical Aspects of Legal Drafting in the Light of Modern Theories of Cognitive Development, 3 Intl. J. L. & Psych. 349,349–350(1980).
48. See Bernard S. Jackson, Exodus 21:18–19
49. the Origins of the Casuistic Form, 33 Israel L. Rev. 798 (1999) (Falk memorial issue).
50. David Daube, On the Third Chapter of the “Lex Aquilia ”, 52 L. Q. Rev. 253 (1936).
51. This medieval rule, affirmed in modern times in Rex v. Dyson, 2 K.B. 454 (1908) (Crim. App.) was repealed only in 1996: Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act, 1996, ch. 19 (Eng.). However, the Attorney-General's consent to the prosecution is still required if death occurs more than three years later, or if the defendant has already been convicted of another (i.e. non-fatal) offence in connection with the incident.
52. Daube rightly stressed that we ought not to interpret such rules as “primitive,” exhibiting a state of legal evolution where causation could be conceived only in “direct” terms. See David Daube, Direct and Indirect Causation in Biblical Law, 11 Vetus Testamentum 246 (1961). He noted, for example, that within the Bible itself, direct forms of causation are required where death occurs, and the life of the defendant may be at stake; on the other hand, in cases of damage to property, leading only to payment of damages, causation can be far less direct: witness the law of the pit
53. Exod. 21:33–34
54. damage by depasturation (Exod. 22:4, MT)
55. damage by fire (Exod. 22:5, MT).
56. See Bernard S. Jackson, Practical Wisdom and Literary Artifice in the Covenant Code, in The Jerusalem 1990 Conference Volume 65, 67–78 (B.S. Jackson & S.M. Passamaneck eds., Jewish Law Association Studies VI, Scholars Press 1992)
57. Jackson, Studies, The Jerusalem 1990 Conference, at 82–87.
58. Exod. 21:35
59. Exod. 21:2
60. Exod. 22:2 (MT) is normally translated: “if he has nothing, then he shall be sold for his theft.” However, the language of this seemingly straightforward apodosis, venimkar bigeneyvato, is ambiguous.
61. Z.W. Falk, Hebrew Legal Terms: II, 12 J. of Semitic Stud. 241, 242–243 (1967), pointed out that the verb makhar is not restricted to the concept of sale, but may refer more generally to delivery. Moreover, the noun genevah can mean either “the thing stolen” (the stolen property) or “theft.” It is clear, however, that the noun is used in the former sense in the very next verse, where the genevah is said to be found in the hand of the accused. This provides a very strong case for understanding the slavery provision in the same sense. The prefix b' is found elsewhere, in conjunction with the verb makhar, to mean “in exchange for:”
62. for example, Deut. 21:14 forbids a warrior from selling his captive woman bakesef-in exchange for silver.
63. In Jackson, Theft, Deut., at 140–141
64. I suggested that the apodosis of Exod. 22:2 (MT) be rendered “he shall be handed over in exchange for the stolen animal,” and compared the Roman institution of addictio. It is unlikely, however, that the value of the thief, or of his labour for the period involved, would happen to coincide with the value of the stolen animal (or of the multiple restitution, if we view that as included).
65. In its way, the remedy is very comparable to that of Exod. 21:35
66. Exod. The thief has nothing. The economic value of the animal has disappeared, whether the animal has been slaughtered or sold (for thieves, then as now, are likely to spend the proceeds pretty quickly).
67. The remaining economic value, in this case, is that of the thief himself. Indeed, there is one more element of arbitrariness, if, in accordance with the rabbinic view (and cf. Gen. 44:10)
68. one views this sale as creating a form of debt-slavery which is subject to the six-year rule of Exod. 21:2. The enslaved thief will therefore go free after six years. What is being exchanged is not the value of the thief on the slave-market, but the value of his labour for six years.
69. If that does not reach the value of the animal he has stolen (or the multiple, if we take that view: see Jackson, Theft, Exod, at 142–144), then that is the price that is to be paid for the ability to resolve the matter without requiring institutional assistance.
70. See Bernard S. Jackson, Judaism as a Religious Legal System, in Religion, Law and Language: Comparative Studies in Religious Law § 3 (Andrew Huxley ed., Curzon Press 2002).
71. See Jackson, Modelling Biblical Law, Exod, at 1807–1816.
72. See Frank Crusemann, The Torah: Theology and Social History of Old Testament Law 336–337 (Allan W. Mahnke trans., Fortress Press 1996)
73. James W. Watts, Reading Law: The Rhetorical Shaping of the Pentateuch 138–143 (Sheffield Academic Press 1999)
74. Jackson, Studies, Reading Law: The Rhetorical Shaping of the Pentateuch, at 142.
75. For fuller discussions of talion in biblical law, see Bernard S. Jackson, The Problem of Exod. XXI 22–25 (lus Talionis), 23 Vetus Testamentum 273 (1973)
76. repr. in Jackson, Essays, The Problem of Exod, at 75
77. Jackson, Studies, The Problem of Exod, at ch.10
78. “Lex Talionis.” Revisiting Daube's Classic (2001) (available at ) (print version forthcoming).
79. The present account, however, goes beyond the above in some respects, especially in § 5.3, infra.
80. I have myself previously referred to “you shall do to him (the perjurer) as he had meant to do to his brother” as “the talionic principle”, by contrast with “the concrete formula.” See An Aye for an I?: The Semiotics of “Lex Talionis ” in the Bible, in New Approaches to Semiotics and the Human Sciences: Essays in Honor of Roberta Kevelson 127, 134–135 (William Pencak & J. Ralph Lindgren eds., Peter Lang 1998).
81. David Daube, Studies in Biblical Law 117–121 (Cambridge University Press 1947), has argued that in both these cases the guard's liability to lose his life is expressed in terms of his liability personally to replace the escaped prisoner. The latter was doomed to execution, so the guard, now standing in his stead, is equally doomed to execution. However, the parable told to Ahab is slightly different. We would not know, from it alone, that the prisoner was “destined to destruction” (Daube's phrase), rather than slavery.
82. Id. at 119.
83. If it were the latter, then vehayta nafshekha tahat nafsho could mean (as I have argued for nefesh tahat nefesh in Exod. 21:23
84. Jackson, Essays, Exod, at 96–98
85. see Jackson, Studies, Exod, at 288–289 that the guard must take the escapee's place as a slave.
86. Samson explains his actions against the Philistines with the words: ‘“As they did to me, so have I done to them,’” ka ‘asher asu li, ken asiyti lahem (Judges 15:11).
87. Samson's father-in-law had given his wife to his companion (Judges 14:20)
88. after Samson had gone back to his own father's house (Judges 14:19)
89. thus seemingly deserting/divorcing her (cf Judges 14:2).
90. Samson takes revenge through the blazing foxes (Judges 15:4–6), a purely property-oriented response.
91. The Philistines clearly recognise that this act is in response to the loss of his bride (Judges 15:6).
92. They then burn the bride and her father (Judges 15:6).
93. Samson swears further revenge for this: ‘“If this is what you do, I swear I will be avenged upon you, and after that I will quit.’ And he smote them hip and thigh with great slaughter.” (Judges 15:7–8).
94. The Philistines then attack Lehi, claiming that they want to take Samson prisoner and “to do to him as he did to us,” (la ‘asot lo ka ’asher asah lanu) (Judges 15:10).
95. The Judaites send 3000 men to Samson, to ask him to explain his actions. Samson does so by using the same ka ‘asher formula that the Philistines had used in justifying their own actions (Judges 15:11): “And he said to them, “As they did to me, so have I done to them’” (ka'asher asu li, ken asiyti lahem).
96. The reference, in context, is surely to Samson's “great slaughter” in response (explicitly: “If this is what you do” (Judges 15:7)) to the killing of his wife and father-in-law, rather than to his destruction of their fields by the foxes (or, if it is that as well, the latter is in response to the deprivation of his bride—and her “fruits”).
97. Clearly, that explanation does not satisfy the Judaites—or, if it does, they fear that it will not satisfy the Philistines—and they carry out their mission to take Samson prisoner and hand him over to the Philistines (Judges 15:12–13).
98. See Jackson, Studies, Judges, at 271–280.
99. See Bernard S. Jackson, Law, Wisdom and Narrative, in Narrativity in Biblical and Related Texts/La Narrativité dans la Bible el les textes apparantés 31, 45–49 (Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 149 (G.W. Brooke & J.D. Kaestli eds., Leuven U. Press 2000).
100. I leave aside for present purposes the complications of the two situations regulated in verses 22–23, discussed in detail in Jackson, The Problem of Exod. XXI 22–25 (Ius Talionis)
101. The Problem of Exod. Even if the conclusion there reached, that the talionic formula is here a late addition- indeed, it is possible that the entire paragraph is not original to the Covenant Code-is accepted, there is still a strong argument, given the evidence of the narratives, that the formula itself, even when added to the literary context, should be interpreted in terms of oral residue.
102. David Daube, The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism 255–259 (Athlone Press 1956), argues from the antithetical examples Jesus provides that he is arguing not against mutilation for bodily injury but rather against suing for damages for insult.
103. The immediate context of this occurrence of the formula is indeed accidental injury (Exod. 21:22–23).
104. But it is probable that this context is not original: on the interpolation of these verses, see my Essays, Exod, at 96–107.
105. J.J. Finkelstein, The Ox That Gored, 71 Transactions of the Am. Phil. Socy. pt. 2, 34–35 (1981), wrote that talio should be regarded as a “paradigm”.
106. Cf. Philo's rendition: De Specialibus Legibus bk. III, §195, in Philo: With an English Translation by F.H. Colson vol. 7, 597 (Loeb Classical Lib., Harv. U. Press 1958): “If, then, anyone has maliciously (epibebouleukws) injured another in the best and lordliest of senses, sight, and is proved to have struck out his eye, he must in his turn suffer the same.”
107. Babylonian Talmud, Baba Kamma 84a, p. 477 (Soncino ed., 1978).
108. See Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics: With an English Translation by H. Rackham bk. V, ch. 5, 279 (Loeb Classical Lib., Harv. U. Press 1962)
109. Haim Hermann Cohn, Talion, 15 Ency. Judaica 741 (Keter Publg. House 1973).
110. That is clear in Deut. 19:21
111. Lev. 24:20, in the light of which any argument that the formula
112. Exod. 21:24–25 was originally governed by the verb in the previous verse (venatatah nefesh tahat nefesh) is much weakened.
113. David offered kofer to the Gibeonites (2 Sam. 21:3)
114. indeed, in the case of murder such “ransom” appears to have been banned only at a late stage in the history of biblical law (Num. 35:31–32)
115. in the case of adultery it does not appear to have been banned in biblical times at all (Prov. 6:32–35).
116. These are all, however, matters of some controversy. See Jackson, Essays, Prov., at 41–50, 59–62.
117. Cf. S.M. Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant in the Light of Cuneiform and Biblical Law 76 (E.J. Brill 1970)
118. at least as regards Exod. 21:24–25
119. aliter, Hans Jochen Boecker, Law and the Administration of Justice in the Old Testament and Ancient East 175 (Jeremy Moiser trans., SPCK 1980): “[talion] was valid only as the official sentence of a properly constituted court.”
120. Otto also associates the introduction of talion with the work of the local courts: Eckart Otto, Wandel der Rechtsbegründungen in der Gesellschaftsgeschichte des antiken Israel. Eine Rechtsgeschichte des “Bundesbuches” Ex XX 22—XXIII:13 30–31 (E.J. Brill 1988)
121. Eckart Otto, Körperverletzungen in den Keilschriftrechten und im Alten Testament: Studien zum Rechtstransfer im Alten Testament 183 (Neukirchener Verlag 1991)
122. cf. Philip J. Nel, The Talion Principle in Old Testament Narratives, 20 J. N.W. Semitic Languages 21, 21–22 (1994). We may note that Deut. 19 can hardly be used to argue for court enforcement for talion in general, since the very context of the offence is the judicial process
123. cf. Bernard S. Jackson, Talion and Purity: Some Glosses on Mary Douglas, in Reading Leviticus: A Conversation with Mary Douglas 107, 110 (J.F.A. Sawyer ed., Sheffield Academic Press 1996). Westbrook, in my view, seeks too uniform a picture of the ancient Near Eastern (including the biblical) position insofar as he presents the “dual right—to revenge or ransom” as “a legal right—that is to say, it was enforceable with the aid of the machinery of the legal system”
124. Raymond Westbrook, Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law 45 (J. Gabalda 1988). According to the biblical sources, even homicide appears to have remained largely a private matter long after the establishment of the monarchy.
125. VIII:2, Si membrum rup(s)it, ni cum eo pacit, talio esto, reflecting a similarly early stage in Roman institutional history. Fontes luris Romani Anteiustiniani pt. I, 53–54 (S. Riccobono ed., S.A.G. Barbéra 1941).
126. We need not go as far as Westbrook (Studies, Fontes luris Romani Anteiustiniani, at 71
127. cf The Nature and Origins of the Twelve Tables, 105 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Rom. Abt.) 74, 103 (1988)), on VIII:4, in claiming that the Roman provision actually reflects ancient Near Eastern influence, though the possibility is not excluded.
128. Flavius Josephus, Jewish Antiquities: Books I-IV bk. IV, §280
129. Josephus: With an English Translation by H. St. J. Thackeray vol. 4, 611 (Loeb Classical Lib., Harv. U. Press 1961)
130. Daube, New Testament, With an English Translation by H. St. J. Thackeray, at 256
131. Jackson, Talion and Purity, With an English Translation by H. St. J. Thackeray, at 109–110. The explanation offered by Josephus presupposes that the dispute is settled privately, rather than before a court (unlike his understanding of Exod. 21:22, which he presents quite separately: Ant. IV, 278).
132. Umberto Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus 276–277 (Israel Abrahams trans., Magnes Press 1967)
133. Jackson, Essays, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, at 85–86
134. Joe W. Sprinkle, The Interpretation of Exodus 21:22–25 (Lex Talionis)
135. Abortion, 55 Westminster Theological J. 233, 238–243 (1993)
136. Joe W. Sprinkle, ‘The Book of the Covenant:’ A Literary Approach 94 (Sheffield Academic Press 1994)
137. Westbrook, Studies, A Literary Approach, at 45–47, 71–77, 80–81.
138. Also in support of the availability of kofer in respect of talion, C. Houtman, Das Bundesbuch. Ein Kommentar (E.J. Brill 1997), 166, cites 1 Kings 20:39: that is a case of compounding a (supposed) capital liability by payment of money.
139. However, the capital liability is expressed in terms of the formula of Exod. 21:23: nafsheha tahat nafsho o kikar kesef tishkol.
140. Pace Sprinkle, Exod, at 242, who suggests that “it may be more ‘poetic justice’ than an application of the original, intended meaning of this law”.
141. But though the story does not use the formula as it appears in Exod. 21:24, there is
142. see infra n. 62
143. a close terminological connection with the “ka'asher formula” in Deut. 19
144. Lev. 24
145. both of which reflect also the formula as it appears in Exod. 21:24.
146. Chiasmus does not appear to have been confined, however, to the purely “literary” sphere: there is a remarkable example of its use in one of the legal practice documents from Elephantine: Cowley 13, in A. Cowley, Aramaic Papyri from the Fifth Century B.C. 37–41 (Clarendon Press 1923).
147. See Bezalel Porten, Structure and Chiasm in Aramaic Contracts and Letters, in Chiasmus in Antiquity: Structures. Analyses, Exegesis 169, 172 (John Welch ed., Gerstenberg 1981)
148. Jackson, Practical Wisdom, Chiasmus in Antiquity: Structures. Analyses, Exegesis, at 90.
149. On the relationship between dispute resolution and laws proclaimed in that context, see Jackson, Studies, Chiasmus in Antiquity: Structures. Analyses, Exegesis, at 58–63.
150. Cf. John W. Welch, Chiasmus in Biblical Law: An Approach to the Structure of Legal Texts in the Bible, in Jewish Law Association Studies VI: The Boston Conference Volume 5, 7–9 (Bernard S. Jackson ed., Scholars Press 1990) (citing Thomas Boys, 1825, as having first identified the major part of this structure).
151. Moshe Weinfeld, The Uniqueness of the Decalogue and its Place in Jewish Tradition, in The Ten Commandments in History and Tradition 1, 12 (Ben-Zion Segal & Gershon Levi eds., Magnes Press 199.0)
152. citing Moshe Zeidel, Hikre Miqra 1–97 (Mosad ha-Rav Kook 1978); I have not had access to the latter.
153. Cf. the tendency towards greater rule elaboration and systematisation noted in the works cited Hikre Miqra.
154. See Jackson, Making Sense in Law, Hikre Miqra, at 247–248.
155. The Rabbis in Baba Kamma 84a, Hikre Miqra, do the reverse. They take the “one law” principle out of its own narrative context and apply it to that of talion.
156. See Maine, Hikre Miqra.
157. Cf. the works cited Hikre Miqra. Indeed, there is a philosophical tradition that regards rules themselves as reasons for action.
158. See Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Hutchinson 1975).
159. Jackson, Studies, Practical Reason and Norms, at 236–241.
160. Gen. 37:22,28,29.
161. Gen. 42:16
162. though ultimately only Shimon suffers this fate: Gen. 42:19,24
163. the Egyptian dungeon where Joseph was himself imprisoned is itself described as a bor. Gen. 41:14.
164. A.C.J. Phillips, Book Review, Socy. for Old Testament Study Book List 48, 49 (1973). At the time, I did not know that Anthony Phillips had trained as a Solicitor before turning to the Ministry!