Gray & Schein’s (2016) Objections Are Theoretically and Statistically Faulty

Perspectives on Psychological Science

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 2016, Pages 330-332

  Inbar, Yoel ^a   Scott, Sydney E ^b   Rozin, Paul ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EMOTION; GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD; HUMAN; MORALITY;

EMOTIONS; FOOD, GENETICALLY MODIFIED; HUMANS; MORALS;

EID: 84971476674     PISSN: 17456916     EISSN: 17456924     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1745691616635615     Document Type: Article

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