Pay-for-Performance Incentives in Low- and Middle-Income Country Health Programs

Encyclopedia of Health Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 457-466

  Miller, G ^a   Babiarz, K S ^a,b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Absenteeism; Contracting out; Extrinsic motivation; Health care financing; Incentives; Intrinsic motivation; Multitasking; Pay for performance; Performance pay; Results based financing

Indexed keywords

EID: 84971016164     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-12-375678-7.00126-7     Document Type: Chapter

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