Escalation and Cooperation in Conflict Situations: The dollar auction revisited

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 1989, Pages 231-254

  Leininger, Wolfgang ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84970159940     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: 15528766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002789033002003     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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2. Harris, G. and J. Vickers (1985) “Perfect equilibrium in a model of a race.” Rev. of Economics Studies L11: 193-209.
3. Hellwig, M. and W. Leininger (1988) “A note on the relation between discrete and continuous games of perfect information.” J. of Econ. Theory.
4. Leininger, W. (1986) “Strategic equilibrium in sequential games” (SFB Discussion Paper A-94). Bonn: Univ. of Bonn Press.
5. O'Neill, B. (1986) “International escalation and the dollar auction.” J. of Conflict Resolution 30: 33-50.
6. Patchen, M. (1987) “Strategies for eliciting cooperation from an adversary.” J. of Conflict Resolution 31: 164-185.
7. Schelling, T. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
8. Selten, R. (1975) “Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games.” Int. J. of Game Theory 4: 25-55.
9. Shubik, M. (1971) “The dollar auction game: a paradox in non-cooperative behavior and escalation.” J. of Conflict Resolution 15: 545-547.
10. Teger, A. et al. (1980) Too Much Invested to Quit. New York: Pergamon.