Technologies of Empire: IMF Conditionality and the Reinscription of the North/South Divide

Leiden Journal of International Law

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 749-813

  Pahuja, Sundhya ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

Conditionality; Globalization; IMF; International Economic Law; International Monetary Fund; Post Colonial

Indexed keywords

EID: 84969527242     PISSN: 09221565     EISSN: 14789698     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0922156500000479     Document Type: Article

References (136)

1. A. Appadurai, Modernity at Large: The Cultural Dimensions of Globalization 159 (1996).
2. I hesitate to use these terms, not the least because of their geographical inaccuracy. By using them here 1 do not wish to endorse the construct, however they do capture some sense of where the ‘divide’ falls. Using this binary conveys some sense, not only of the wealth and poverty on each respective side of the slash, but of the specific American/British/European-ness of the putative ‘North’. See, generally, I. Head, On A Hinge of History; The Mutual Vulnerability of South and North (1992). Each of these binaries has its inadequacies, however, for the purposes of this essay, I will not engage with the problematics of the various constructs and will use the various terms largely interchangeably
3. “Conditionality is a portmanteau word that encompasses all the policies that the Fund wishes a member to follow so that it can resolve its problems consistently with the articles.” J. Gold, Conditionality (1979).
4. Washington Shatters Asia's Dreams, The Guardian, Week Ending 25 January 1998, at 1.
5. See, for example, B. Rajgopal, Crossing the Rubicon: Synthesising the Soft International Law of the IMF with Human Rights, 11 Boston U, Int'l L.J. 8i (1993).
6. See, for example, Symposium, Social Justice and Development: Critical Issues facing the Bretton Woods System, 6 Transnational L. & Contemporary Problems I (1996).
7. On an implicit acceptance of the view that globalization is a process of trade liberalization, see, for example, P. Krugman, Pop Internationalism (1997)
8. The conflation of a state with its economy was apparent during the APEC conference held in Van- couver, Canada in November 1997. Both APEC official literature and dialogue used the terms “member state” and “member economy” interchangeably. See, for example, a letter dated 16 May 1997, sent by die Secretariat for the Seoul APEC Meeting to all APEC members in which the ad- dressees are referred to as “member economies”. The letter is unpublished, but copies were made available during the APEC people's forum held concurrently in Vancouver with the APEC meeting in November 1997.
9. On the notion of dualistic thinking and its pitfalls, see, generally, A.L. Jennings, Public or PrivdAe: Institutional Economics and Feminism, in M. A. Ferber & J. A. Nelson (Eds.), Beyond Economic Man; Feminist Theory and Economics (1993), at 111.
10. G. Dwyer, The Money Pit ami the Pendulum, The (Toronto) Globe and Mail, 17 January 1998, A17.
11. See, for example, C. Lichtenstein, Aiding the Transformation of Economies: Is the Fund's Conditionality Appropriate to the Task?, 62 Fordhani Law Review 1943 (1994); M. Malloy, Shifting Paradigms: Institutional Roles in a Changing World, 62 Fordham Law Review 1911 (1994); D. Carreau, Why not Merge the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)?, 62 Fordham Law Review 1989 (1994); E.W, Ro-bichek. The International Monetary Fund: An Arbiter in the Debt Restructuring Process, 23 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 143 (1984).
12. See, for example, Carreau, infra note 13, at 1990.
13. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 22 July 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, TIAS No. 1501, 2 UNTS 39 (entered into force 27 December 1945) [hereinafter of Agreement]
14. See, generally, M. Chossudovsky, The Globalisation of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms (1997).
15. Some theorists have drawn a distinction between information and knowledge, as though information is something which comes before knowledge. ‘Information’, according to such theorists, is what wc get before we contextual ize, interpret, conceptualize and argue about something. (An example of this is D. Bell, Gutenberg and the Computer, May Encounter 15, at 17 (1985) as referred to in R. Ericson & K. Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society (1997), at 84). However, more persuasive to my mind, is the argument that there is no such distinction possible between information and knowledge. Things designated as information have already been interpreted in context, even though their first appearance (as, for example, news), may form the basis of many subsequent interpretations in context. The point is that even the initial appearance (or creation) of that information is a form of knowledge. This is true of the information produced by the IMF. See, generally, Ericson & Haggerty, ld.,2i. 84.
16. Including R.L. Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations (1996) and D. Tarullo, Logic, Myth and the International Economic Order, 26 Harvard International Law Journal 533 (1985). On this point, see, generally, Doty, id., at 5.
17. See, for example, Appadurai, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations note 1. G.Ch. Spivak, The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Didogues (1990).
18. G.Ch. Spivak, Preface, in J. Derrida, Of Grammatology (1976), at xxv.
19. I wish to thank Professor Jane Kelsey for having reminded me of these differences during discussions on the IMF, at the Australian Law and Society Conference, La Trobe University, Melbourne, November 1998.
20. See, generally, J.K. Horsefield, (Ed.), The Intemational Monetary Fund 1945-1965: Twenty Years Of International Monetary Cooperation 3-118 (1969).
21. J. Gold, The Relationship Between the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 15 Creighton L, Rev. 499, at 501-502 (1981-82).
22. Bretton Woods Agreements Acts: Hearings on H.R. 2211 Before the House Comm, on Banking and Currency, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1945) (Statement of H.D. White, US Treasury Department), quoted in Rajgopal, The Relationship Between the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank note 5, at 87.
23. Rajgopal, Agreements Acts: Hearings on H.R. note 5, at 87.
24. D. Otto, Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of Global Community and the Incommensurability of Difference, 5:3 Social and Legal Studies; An International Journal 337, at 339 (1996).
25. An example of this is the Refugee Convention which was designed to cope mostly with the flows of Jewish reftjgees from Europe and in which the definitions of “refugee” and so forth are clearly related to its origins. See, generally, G.S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (1988)
26. See, generally, J.K. Galbraith, The World Economy Since the Wars: A Personal View (1994)
27. J. Asherman, The International Monetary Fund: A History of Compromise, 16 NYUJ of Int'l L & Politics 235, at 238 (1984); S. Horie, The International Monetary Fund 32-36 (1964)
28. D. Salvatore, International Economics 509 (1983).
29. A. Lowenfield, The International Monetary System 14 (1977). Compare Galbraith, Id. note 34, at 34-37.
30. US Department of State, Proceedings and Documents of United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire 81 (1944), cited in Asherman, The International Monetary System note 35, at 240.
31. Although there were 44 conferees, only 30 nations became signatories to the Articles of Agreement when they became effective in December 1945. By 1960, the membership of the Fund was still only 68, By 1971, it had risen to 120. Of these, 30 were original members; 19 had joined in the Fund's first 5 years of existence, and 19, including FRD, Argentina and Japan joined between 1951 and 1958. Poland had left and Czechoslovakia had been expelled; The former Soviet Union had never joined (though it was present, at Bretton Woods). China's seat was held by Taiwan and Switzerland and New Zealand were two other absentees. By 1960, two thirds of the Fund members were developing countries (referred to in the IMF annual report of 1960 as “less industrialized countries”) and the proportion was to increase. See Asherman, Article I note 35. S.Strange (Ed.), International Mone* tary Relations of the Western World 1959-1971 (1976), at 32.
32. R. Gardner, The Political Setting, in A.L.K. Acheson, S.F. Chant & M.F.J. Prachowny (Eds.), Bretton Woods Revisited 20 (1972).
33. The formation of the “Paris Club” further increased the power of the richest member states. This club was created, at a time when the Fund needed to borrow money as its resources were dwindling. The Genera! Agreement to Borrow was set up and this formed the “Paris Club” of the ten most industrialized nations. This created a divide into rich and poor countries which emphasised the North/South split but shored up the Fund so that it could live to see another day. It also meant that increased collaboration took place between the central banks of the industrialized nations and the Fund, maintaining, at least some relevance for the Fund in the intemational monetary arena. See, generally, A. Rieffel, The Paris Club, 1978-1983, 23 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 83 (1984). See also Strange, The Political Setting note 41, at 111-117.
34. In 1986, continuing its involvement with the low-income developing countries that had come with participation in the multi-lateral solutions to the debt crisis, the IMF established a new structural adjustment facility to make concessional loans, at 0.5% interest with repayments beginning 5 years and ending 10 years after each disbursement. In December 1987, the IMF established an additional fund, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility. In March 1994 an enlarged ESAF was put into place. Lichtenstein, Gold note 13, at 1950.
35. For example, this is implicit in the argument made in C. Payer, Lent and Lost; Foreign Credit and Third World Development (1991).
36. N. Ardito-Barletta, Managing Development and Transition, in P.B. Kenan, (Ed.), Managing the World Economy m, at 183 (1994).
37. Strange, Managing Development and Transition note 41, at 92.
38. L.B. Pearson, Partners in Development: Report of The Commission on Intemational Development 209 (1969).
39. C. Prout, Finance for Developing Countries: an Essay, in Strange (Ed.), Partners in Development: Report of The Commission on Intemational Development note 41, at 361.
40. Pearson, Finance for Developing Countries: an Essay, in Strange note 54, at 134,209; Strange, Finance for Developing Countries: an Essay, in Strange note 41, at 56.
41. Pearson, Finance for Developing Countries: an Essay, in Strange note note 54, at 208.
42. J. White, The Politics of Foreign Aid 209 (1974); Payer, Finance for Developing Countries: an Essay, in Strange note note note 50, at 42; Pearson, Finance for Developing Countries: an Essay, in Strange note note note 54, at 134. See also M. Millikan & D. Blackmer (Eds.), The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy (1961).
43. White, The Politics of Foreign Aid note 58, at 215; Prout, The Politics of Foreign Aid note 55, at 362.
44. Pearson, Development Assistance Committee note 54, at 208. This is a very brief sketch indeed and is included by way of background to suggest that multilateral approaches to aid were increasing. For a more fulsome account of the evolving role of the DAC, see Prout, Development Assistance Committee note 55, at 367-370.
45. International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers Vol. XVII, at 89-90 (1970). For a detailed argument about the factors which precipitated the crisis of the 1970s, see Payer, Development Assistance Committee note note 50, in particular 57-59.
46. International Monetary Fund, ITie Use of Commercial Credits by Developing Countries for Financing Imports of Capital Goods, Staff Papers Vol. XVII, at 33-35 (1970).
47. In 1969, a World Bank Study found that of the 39 countries surveyed, six of them accounted for more than 80 percent of the total outstanding debt from export credits. Prout, %upra note 55, at 386.
48. In fact, the first “Paris Club” (as it is known) took place in relation to Argentina in 1956 wlien Argentina agreed to meet in Paris with its official creditors to find a mutually acceptable basis for rescheduling payments due on officially supported export credits. A. ReifFel, The Role of The Paris Club in Managing Debt Problems 3 (1985).
49. Payer, IMF note 50, at 47; Reiffel, IMF note 74, at 5; Prout, IMF note 55, at 391.
50. Indeed, that the IMF's involvement was crucial to Paris Club rescheduling is implicit in Reiffel's description of the rescheduling of two loans made to India and Pakistan respectively being “an aberration” and that those loans were not considered Paris Club agreements because, inter alia, the granting of debt relief was not tied to IMF conditionality. Reiffel, IMF note note 74, at 47
51. This took the form of the creditor government insisting that the debtor country enter into an IMF standby agreement as a condition of rescheduling. Payer, IMF note note note 50, at 47, 76; Reiffel IMF note note note 74, at 4.
52. In addition, by 1975, commercial banks also insisted on IMF involvement with debtor nations, eventually providing in their loan contracts that the termination of a standby or extended arrangment with the Fund would constitute an event of default. R. Bernal, Transnational Banks, The International Monetary Fund and External Debt of Developing Countries, 31:4 Social and Economic Studies 71, at 85, 86 (1982); Payer, IMF note note note note 50, at 76.
53. Continuous dialogue would be facilitated because all member countries with currency restrictions were already consulting with the Fund each year pursuant to Article XTV. Articles of Agreement, IMF note note note note note 18. See, infra.
54. Prout, JMpra note 55, at387.
55. Reiffel, Articles of Agreement note 74, at 8.
56. 86, Quoted in C. Payer, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World 31 (1976).
57. Similar reasoning seems also to be behind the strict prohibhion on the provision of new credit in Paris Club rescheduling. See, for example, Reiffel The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World note 74, at 12.
58. Prout, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World note note 55, at 393.
59. The respective roles of the Fund and the Bank were not always clear. When short term balance of payments problems were involved, it was the Fund who was drawn in, when it was long term development problems, it was the Bank. However, when the problems of the developing country fell into neither camp very clearly, it was difficult to define their roles. An example of this was the Ghanaian situation; after Nkrumah was deposed in the coup in February 1966, a team from both the Fund and the Bank went to Accra. See Prout, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World note note note 55, at 393.
60. Note that legally speaking, drawings from the IMF's General Resources Account are not loans but raTher agreements pursuant to which the drawer “purchases” currency and/or Special Drawing Rights (SDR's) in exchange for its own currency which it is then required to repurchase. See, generally, R, Edwards, International Monetary Collaboration 248-276 (1985).
61. International Monetary Fund, Annual Report 95 (1953).
62. J. Gold, The Stand-by arrangements of the International Monetary Fund (1970); IMF, International Monetary Fund note 100, at 95.
63. For a critical analysis of the conditions themselves, see Payer, IMF note 86, at 32-38.
64. L. Phillips, Discursive Deficits: A Feminist Perspective on the Power of Technical Knowledge in Fiscal Law and Policy, 11 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 141 (1996)
65. J. Gold, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Agreements, 77 AJIL 443 (1983). There is no difference in the normative quality of “soft” as opposed to “hard” international law as such. The central character of “soft” law is the intended vagueness of the obligations it imposes or the weakness of its commands. As a result, either failure to observe it or observing it cannot, by itself, be dispositive of the legal effects. Id. For an argument that this is a confusion between legal norms and ethical values or political principles and goals, see N. Horn, Normative Problems of a New International Economic Order, 16 J. World Trade L. 338 (1982). For a discussion about the difference belween “hard” and “soft” norms and the idea of varying degrees of normativity, see P. Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 11 AJIL 413 (1983).
66. The extraordinary nature of giving the Fund jurisdiction in this area and the scope of its powers should not be underestimated. Until the creation of the Fund, determining the external value of one's currency was considered to be an integral and inviolable part of a nation's sovereignty. In the Serbian and Brazilian Loans Cases, the Permanent Court of International Justice asserted that “[i]t is indeed a generally accepted principle that a state is entitled to regulate its own currency.” Serbian Loans (France v. Serbia), Judgment of 12 July 1929 PCIJ (Ser, A7B) Nos 14/15, at 44 as cited in Carreau, id. note note note 13, at 1991. See also J. Gold, Transformations of the International Monetary Fund, 20 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 227, at 228 (1981). Indeed, it has been said that “the Fund was[…]a great deal more sophisticated and powerful a piece of international regulatory and mediatory machinery than the world had ever known, both in terms of its legal authority and of the financial resources, at its disposal.” Strange, id. note note note 41, at 33.
67. B. Eichengreen & P.B. Kenan, Managing the World Economy under the Bretton Woods System: An Overview, in P.B. Kenan, (Ed.), Managing the World Economy 3, at 13 (1994).
68. Sir Joseph Gold points to one of these ambiguities being the meaning of the term “fundamental disequilibrium” which was never defined by the Fund, It was perhaps a lacunae in the powers of the Fund that it was not able to recommend to a member that it was judged to be in “fundamental disequilibrium” hence should change its par value. Id., at 446
69. The reasons for this are multiple and consideration of them is well represented in the literature on the subject. See, for example, R. Marston, American Monetary Policy and the Eurodollar Market, (1974). The United States made known the economic, political and even military considerations which had impelled it to its actions in 1971 and published some of its criticisms of the par value system in The US Proposals for Using Reserves as an Indicator of the Need for Balance-of-Payments Adjustment, Economic Report of the President, Transmitted to the Congress January 1973, at 160-174 as cited in Gold, Id note 133, at 448.
70. Gold, note 133, at 447.
71. L. Heiikin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy 62, 64-66 (1979).
72. In effect, the new exchange provisions legalized the prevailing monetary situation. Carreau, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy note 13, at 1995.
73. This is in contrast to breaches under the original system which were apparent immediately a currency left the approved range of values without the prior consent of the Fund. See text accompanying note 147 above.
74. For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Gold, text accompanying note note 133, at 456.
75. International Monetary Fund, The IMF, at a Glance: Areas of Activity (1997), http://www.imforg/ xr/facts/glance.html [hereinafter The IMF at a Glance ].
76. IMF, Special Facilities: Financing Helps Members Adjust to Special Balance of Payments Problems, IMF Survey Supplement 18, 20 (1993), as cited in Lichtenstein, The IMF at a Glance note 13, at 1951.
77. There is a vast literature on the implications of the policies and programs of the IMF and World Bank on human rights. See, generally, G. Comia et al, (Eds.), Adjustment With a Human Face (1987); R, Broad, Unequal Alliance: The World Bank, ITie International Monetary Fund and the Philippines (1988); Payer, IMF note 86.
78. Strange, Adjustment With a Human Face note 41, at 94.
79. Cynthia Lichtenstein suggests that commercial banks suffered during the Eurodollar crisis because without IMF involvement, banks had no way of enforcing the loans against the state borrowers; Id. note note 13, at 1948.
80. C. Bogdanowicz-Bindert, The Debt Crisis: The Case of Small and Medium Sized Debtors, 17 NYUJ of Int'l L & Politics 527, at 529 (1985)
81. There is avast amount of literature on the Mexican debt crisis. For an example of legal literature on point see S. Amaral, The Debt Crisis from the Point of View of a Debtor Country, 17 NYUJ of Int'l Law and Politics 633 (1985). For an example (though perhaps not typical) from the economic literature, see S. Strange, States and Markets 108-109 (1988).
82. On this point, see, generally, Carreau, Kill or Cure note 13; M. Malloy, Shifting Paradigms: Institutional Roles in a Changing World, 62 Fordham Law Review 1911 (1994).
83. Appadurai, Shifting Paradigms: Institutional Roles in a Changing World note 1, at 142.
84. International Monetary Fund, IMF supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand; A Preliminary Assessment 6 (Preliminary Version released January 1999) [unpublished but available from IMF Website, www.imf.org] [hereinafter A Preliminary Assessment ].
85. P. Hartcher, World's Fiscal Police Play Down Errors, The Australian Financial Review, 20 January 1999, 8.
86. By “operating circumstances” I mean such factors as huge speculative investments and currency flows which factors are not generated by the domestic economy. See, generally, Chossudovsky, A Preliminary Assessment note 19.
87. For a useful interdisciplinary study of the discourses of development, See, generally, J, Crush, (Ed.), Power of Development (1995).
88. E. Said, Orientalism 290 (1979).
89. Doty, Orientalism note 21, at 157.
90. See, generally, Appadurai, Orientalism note note 1, at 139-144; Crush, Orientalism note note 204.
91. S. Krasner, Transforming International Regimes: What the Third World Wants and Why, 25:1 International Studies Quarterly 119, at 140 (1982); C. Murphy, What the Third World Wants: An Interpretation of the Development and Meaning of the New International Economic Order Ideology, 27:1 International Studies Quarterly 55, at 56 (1983).
92. See, for example, R. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (1990); R. Jackson & C. Rosberg, Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood, 35:1 World Politics (1982).
93. R. Ashley, Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique, 17:2 Millennium: Journal of International Studies 227, at 238 (1988).
94. Jackson & Rosberg, Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique note 215; Doty, Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique note 21; Ashley, Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique note 216.
95. A. Shonfield, Intoduction: Past Trends and New Factors, in Strange, paragraph note 41, at 13.
96. See, generally, B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1983) as cited in Appadurai, Id. note 1, at 21.
97. This idea is evidenced by the frequent instances in which self determination is understood to have reached its full potential in international law only when it is expressed in terms of statehood. See, for example, R. M. Wallace, International Law 87 (1986).
98. Appadurai, International Law note 1, at 55. Note however that Appadurai, attributes the respective “exits” of Burma and Albania to a “long supressed desire for exit” from the international community. This notion of the “exit” of states with repressive regimes hints at the complexity of inclusion in the international community which may, on occasion, carry with it some liberating or democratising potential, limited and constrained though it may be
99. R. Guha, Introduction, in R. Guha, (Ed.), A Subaltern Studies Reader 1986-1995, ix, at xv (1997).
100. Otto, International Law note note 30, at 349.
101. R. Guha, The Prose of Counter-Insurgency, in R. Guha & G. Chravorty Spivak, (Eds.), Selected Subaltern Studies 45 (1988).
102. E. Said, Foreword, in Guha & Spivak, The Prose of Counter-Insurgency note 247, at ix.
103. Otto, Foreword note 30, at 352.
104. R. Guha, On Some Aspects of the Colonialist Historiography of Colonial India, in Guha & Spivak, Id. note note 247, at 43
105. Otto, Some Aspects of the Colonialist Historiography of Colonial India note 30, at 352.
106. Guha, A Preliminary Assessment note 253.
107. International Monetary Fund, Nigeria: Experience with Structural Adjustment (1997) [hereinafter The Report\. Whilst I am not dealing, at all with the World Bank in this paper, it is an interesting question about the extent to which World Bank reports in a similar vein perform similar discursive functions. An example of one such report is World Bank, El Salvador: Meeting the Challenge of Globalization (1996).
108. Otto, The disclmmer states note 30, at 341.
109. See, generally, H. Charlesworth, The Sex of the State in International Law, in N. Naffine & R.J. Owens, (Eds.), Sexing the Subject of Law 251 (1997).
110. Said, The Sex of the State in International Law, note 205, at 72.
111. Appadurai, The Sex of the State in International Law, note note 1, at 115.
112. Appadurai, The IMF at Glance note 1, at 142. It may also be that the perceived need for ever increasing markets and ever cheaper labour is one of the forces which compels the “expansion” of the “intemational community” and necessitates the presence of the mediating power of such bodies as the IMF. This is partly evidence by the link between the IMF and the abortive International Trade Organisation - one of the key goals in achieving international monetary stability was to facilitate international trade. On this link See, generaily, Horsefield, The IMF at Glance note 26. It also seems likely that the force of migratory flows and fear of the physical effects of an unincluded state influence the shape of international institutions, including tiie IMF. See, generally, S. Sassen, Losing Control: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (1997). Unfortunately, I have not the space to consider this question here.
113. Appadurai, The IMF at Glance note note 1, at 125-6.
114. Appadurai, The IMF at Glance note note note 1, at 126.
115. Ericson & Haggerty, The IMF at Glance note note note note 20, at 95.
116. Strange, Indeed note 187, at 97.
117. Otto, Indeed note note 30, at 352.
118. Appadurai, note 1, at 142.
119. See, for example, P. Hirst & G. Thompson, Globalization in Question (1996), and J.K Gibson-Graham, The End of Capitalism (as we knew it): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy (1996).
120. Guha, Globalization in Question note 245.
121. Tarullo, Globalization in Question note note 21. at 548.
122. Doty, Globalization in Question note note note 21, at 10; Tarullo, Globalization in Question note note note 21, at 549. And see, generally, Gibson-Graham, Globalization in Question note note note 284.
123. Tarullo, note 21.
124. Ardito-Barletta, note note 51, at 193.
125. G. Procacci, Social Economy and the Government of Poverty, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon & P. Miller, (Eds.), The Foucauh Effect: Studies in Govemraentality 151 (1991).
126. Doty, Social Economy and the Government of Poverty note 21, at 129.
127. See, for example, Dwyer, A Preliminary Assessment paras note 11
128. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider The extent to which democratic processes are also being given short shrift in the first world. This claim has been the thmst of, at least part of the grass roots movements against such proposed instruments as the Multi-lateral Agreement on Investment (“MAI”). However, my point is that it would be interesting to compare the ways in which the “problem” of democracy is managed differently in the North compared to the South. My impression is that whereas in the South, a focus on subject identities permits the exclusion of democratic processes, in the North such exclusion is achieved through the use of technocratic discourse and what might be called the technicalization of the political sphere. I believe this technicalization is achieved largely through the use of economics. This question certainly merits further consideration. See, generally, Phillips, A Preliminary Assessment paras notemit 131.
129. Appadurai, Chairman's Summary no VI. 1, at 130.
130. Ericson & Haggerty, note 20, at 83.
131. See, generally, Otto, note note 30.
132. Appadurai, note note note 1.
133. See, generally, J. Derrida, Force of Law: ‘The Mystical Foundation of Authority, 11 Cardozo Law Review 420 (1990).
134. D. Chakrabarty, Marx After Marxism, Meanjin 421, at 426 (1993), as cited in Otto, Force of Law: ‘The Mystical Foundation of Authority note 30, at 344.
135. Otto, Marx After Marxism note 30. at 354.
136. Chakrabaty, Marx After Marxism note note 323.