A Peaceful, Silent, Deadly Remedy: The Ethics of Economic Sanctions

Ethics and International Affairs

Volumn 13, Issue , 1999, Pages 123-142

  Gordon, Joy ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84968879772     PISSN: 08926794     EISSN: 17477093     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-7093.1999.tb00330.x     Document Type: Article

References (57)

1. Hamilton Foley, ed., Woodrow Wilson's Case for the League of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1923), p. 71.
2. David Leyton-Brown, “Extraterritoriality in United States Trade Sanctions,” in David Leyton-Brown, ed., The Utility of International Economic Sanctions (London: Croom Helm, 1987), quotation at p. 255
3. a 1997 study by the National Association of Manufacturers, cited in Richard Haass, “Sanctioning Madness,” Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December 1997), p. 74.
4. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 161.
5. See generally Ian Clark, Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 87–97
6. James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981)
7. Telford Taylor, “War Crimes,” in his Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (New York: Times Books, 1970).
8. Drew Christiansen, S.J., and Gerard F. Powers, “Economic Sanctions and Just-War Doctrine,” in David Cortright and George A. Lopez, eds., Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 102–3.
9. Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World?, p. 107.
10. Lori Fisler Damrosch, “The Collective Enforcement of International Norms Through Economic Sanctions,” Ethics & International Affairs 8 (1994), pp. 74–75.
11. Ethics & International Affairs, p. 107.
12. Lori Fisler Damrosch, “The Collective Enforcement of International Norms Through Economic Sanctions,” Ethics & International Affairs 8 (1994), pp. 74–75.
13. See the overview of the internal debate over sanctions described in chapter 2 of Africa Research Centre, The Sanctions Weapon (Cape Town: Bucho Books, 1989).
14. Claudette Antoine Werleigh, “The Use of Sanctions in Haiti: Assessing the Economic Realities,” in Lopez and Cortright, eds., Economic Sanctions, p. 162.
15. “The Civilian Impact of Economic Sanctions,” in Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993) p. 302.
16. Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, p. 302.
17. For example: “Milosevic … consolidated much of his power by implementing tight controls and limiting both the flow and the content of public information. Although one radio and television station and two independent papers existed, they had few resources and were greatly limited in what they could report.” Julia Devin and Jaleh Dashti-Gibson, “Sanctions in the Former Yugoslavia,” in Thomas G. Weiss et al., eds., Political Gain and Civilian Pain (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pp. 180–81.
18. Walzer, p. 162, note 4
19. citing “The Wars of the Jews,” bk. VI of The Works of Josephus, Tho. Lodge, trans. (London, 1620), chap. XIV, p. 722.
20. The Works of Josephus, p. 162.
21. The Works of Josephus, p. 173.
22. The Works of Josephus.
23. “Sanctioning Madness,” p. 82.
24. Lawrence J. Brady, “The Utility of Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument” in Leyton-Brown, ed., The Utility of International Economic Sanctions, p. 298.
25. Donald L. Losman, International Economic Sanctions (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979), p. 1.
26. Johan Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics 19 (April 1967), p. 395.
27. Ivan Eland, “Economic Sanctions as Tools of Foreign Policy,” in Lopez and Cortright, eds., Economic Sanctions, p. 32.
28. The League imposed sanctions on Italy in 1935 to prevent Mussolini from annexing Ethiopia, but did not embargo coal, oil, or steel. Furthermore, the United States did not participate in the sanctions (and in fact increased its sales of oil to Italy from 6.5 percent to 17 percent), nor did Austria, Hungary, or Germany. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: Supplemental Case Histories, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990), p. 36.
29. “Far from imposing on the Italian people a desire to reverse their government's policy, sanctions made the Ethiopian war popular.” George W. Baer, “Sanctions and Security: The League of Nations and the Italian-Ethiopian War, 1935–1936,” International Organization 27 (Spring 1973), p. 179.
30. On June 10, 1936, Neville Chamberlain said in a public speech that sanctions had “failed to prevent war, failed to stop war, failed to save the victims of aggression”; on June 18, Anthony Eden told the House of Commons that “the fact has to be faced that sanctions did not realize the purpose for which they were imposed.” Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1981), pp. 17–18.
31. Losman, International Economic Sanctions, pp. 125–26.
32. Diane B. Kunz, “When Money Counts and Doesn't: Economic Power and Diplomatic Objectives,” Diplomatic History 18 (Fall 1994), p. 461.
33. Updated in Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2d ed.
34. Robert Pape challenges Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott's evaluation, arguing that in almost all of the situations judged to indicate the efficacy of sanctions, there were in fact other factors (such as military intervention) to which the efficacy could also be attributed. Pape concludes that of the 115 cases of sanctions cited in the study, a reading of the data with a higher degree of methodological integrity shows that in fact sanctions themselves have brought about political compliance less than 5 percent of the time. Robert Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security 22 (Fall 1997), p. 106.
35. The Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott analysis has also been criticized on methodological grounds by A. Cooper Drury in “Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered,” Journal of Peace Research 35 (1998).
36. Losman, International Economic Sanctions, pp. 14–15.
37. International Economic Sanctions, p. 15.
38. For example, when the United States imposed a grain embargo on the USSR in 1980, in response to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Soviets bought grain instead from Canada and Argentina, albeit at a higher cost. M. S. Daoudi and M. S. Dajani, Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experiences (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 160. Likewise, the Arab oil boycott against the United States caused only economic inconvenience but not devastation, and in the long term arguably resulted in greater economic self-sufficiency, as was the case with Germany in World War II.
39. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, pp. 97–98.
40. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, rule number (3), p. 114.
41. Kimberly Ann Elliott, “Factors Affecting the Success of Sanctions,” in Lopez and Cortright, eds., Economic Sanctions, p. 53.
42. “Sanctions,” in Evans Clark, ed., Boycotts and Peace: A Report by the Committee on Economic Sanctions (New York: Harper & Bros., 1932), p. 104.
43. Jack T. Patterson, “The Political and Moral Appropriateness of Sanctions,” in Lopez and Cortright, eds., Economic Sanctions, p. 90, quoting Richard Falk.
44. Kim Richard Nossal, “International Sanctions as International Punishment,” International Organization 43 (Spring 1989), pp. 301–2.
45. Johan Galtung, “Pacifism from a Sociological Point of View,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 3 (March 1959), pp. 67–84
46. Per Lundborg, The Economics of Export Embargoes: The Case of the U.S.-Soviet Grain Suspension (London: Croom Helm, 1987).
47. Renwick, Economic Sanctions, p. 85.
48. Kaempfer and Lowenberg join them in rejecting the “traditional” view of sanctions as instrumental, and argue that “sanctions might have an altogether different goal”-which is to serve the interests of pressure groups within the sanctioning country, and to obtain some utility from taking a moral stance against the objectionable behavior of other nations. William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, “The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach,” American Economic Review 78 (Sept. 1988), p. 786.
49. See, for example, “UN Sends a Message to Iraq, Suspends Review of Sanctions,” Chicago Tribune, Sept. 10, 1998
50. “Nuclear Crisis Sparks Call for Tougher Sanctions, Advocates Want the Clinton Administration to Send a Message,” Journal of Commerce, June 1, 1998.
51. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, pp. 163–66.
52. Nossal, “International Sanctions as International Punishment,” p. 316.
53. “International Sanctions as International Punishment,” pp. 315, 321.
54. “The Functions of Economic Sanctions: A Comparative Analysis,” Journal of Peace Research 4 (April 1967), p. 144.
55. See Michael Klare's discussion in his Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995) of how the “rogue doctrine” came to be articulated by the U.S. military as a conceptual framework that would provide a justification for the size and nature of the U.S. military in the face of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Eastern bloc.
56. Nossal mentions “the markedly different international reaction” to the destruction by a Soviet fighter of Korean Airlines flight 007 in September 1983 (which triggered diplomatic retaliation and limited sanctions by the United States and several other countries) and the destruction by a U.S. cruiser of Iran Air flight 655 in July 1988. “Many Western leaders called [the KAL incident] an act of ‘murder.’ … In 1988, by contrast, the downing of 655, with the loss of 290 lives, was widely characterized as a ‘tragic accident.’” Nossal, “International Sanctions as International Punishment,” p. 307, n. 29.
57. Whitton and Gonsiorowski, “Sanctions,” p. 95.