Constitutional and Institutional Developments: Guilt by Majority in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Does This Meet the Standard of Proof ‘Beyond Reasonable Doubt’?

Leiden Journal of International Law

Volumn 10, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 557-578

  Pruitt, Renée C ^a  

^a International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

criminal procedure; guilt; International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; verdict

Indexed keywords

EID: 84966528999     PISSN: 09221565     EISSN: 14789698     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0922156597000423     Document Type: Article

References (63)

1. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, T. Ch. II, 7 May 1997; Sentencing Judgment, 14 July 1997.
2. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-T, T. Ch. I, 29 November 1996.
3. Case No. IT-96-21-T
4. Case No. IT-95-14-T.
5. In the Tadic case, it is arguable whether any such difficulty arose, as the three judges on the panel unajsjjnously agreed as to the actual conduct of the accused that was proved by the prosecution. The sole dissenting opinion centred on the applicability of Article 2 of the Statute of the International Tribunal regarding whether those attacked were protected persons under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention. As the trial chamber failed to dearly articulate whether the burden of proof for such an issue is also that of beyond reasonable doubt, it is uncertain whether this became an issue of concern
6. International Tribunal, Statute, UN Doc. S/25704/Ann. (1993), reproduced in 32 ILM 1192 (1995).
7. (/., Art. 23(2). Rule 88(c) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Tribunal note 5, reiterates Lhis provision.
8. Rule 87 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, (/., Art. 23(2). Rule 88(c) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Tribunal note 5, reiterates Lhis provision. note 5.
9. V. Morris & P. Scharf, Insider's Guide to the Internittional Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Voi. I, at 271, n. 704 (1993).
10. Revised Report of the Working Group on the Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, UNDdc. A/CN/.4/L.490, 19 July 1993, and UN Doc. A/CN/.4/L/490/Add. 1, 19 July 1993.
11. Annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement), London, 8 August 1945, 85 UNTS 251 (1945) (Nuremburg Charter).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, published at Nuremberg, Germany at 310 and 327 (1947).
15. Art. 2 Charter of the International Militarj Tribunal for tKe Far East, 26 April 1946, sttprA note 11.
16. Id., Art. 4.
17. %ee P. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial; Allied War Crimes Operations in the East 1945-51, ai 28 (1979).
18. GAOR, 51st Session, Supp. No. 10 (6 May-26 July 1996) UN Doc. A/51/10.
19. M, at 61.
20. Art. 6(2.d) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims on Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (1979). Art. 75(4) Additional Protocol I tr rKp Cenpva Cnnvenfinns is substantially the same as this provision, 1125 UNTS 1442 (1979).
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 71 (1976); American Convention on Human Rights, Treaty Series No. 36, OAS Off. Rec.; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamemal Freedoms, 213 UNTS 311 (1955).
22. Section 17 Juries Act 1974, as cited in Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 1995, Section 440 (1995).
23. Id.
24. F. McAulcy & J. O'Do-wd, IrcUtKl, in C. van den Wyngacrt (Ed.), Criminal Proccdmc Systems in the European Community 190-191 (1993).
25. N. Osner, A. Quinn Si G. Crown Eds., The Royal Commission of Criminal Justice, Criminal Justice Systems in Other Jurisdictions 65 (1993).
26. See notes 63-64 and accompanying text, infrn.
27. See, e.g., Nigeria Criminal Procedure Code and Nigeria Penal Procedure Code.
28. C. van den Wyngaert, Belgium, in Van den Wyngaert (Ed.), Nigeria Criminal Procedure Code and Nigeria Penal Procedure Code. note 27, at 22, 33, and 38.
29. V. Greve, Denmark, in id., at 57.
30. J. Pradcl, Frante, in at 113, 114, and 129.
31. A. D. Spielmann, Luxembourg, and A.H.J. Swart, The Netherlands, in id., at 264-265 and 287-288, respectively.
32. Art. 338 Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure (1993-1994).
33. Id., Art. 365.
34. Art. 23 Yugoslav Law on Criminal Procedure, enacted by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Assembly in a Session of the Federal Chamber (24 December 1976).
35. Id., Art. 347(2).
36. J. Maguire, J. Weinstein, J. Chadbournec J. Mansfield (Eds.), Cases and Materials on Evidence 1, 6th ed, (1973).
37. This standard of proof is generally used in most civil proceedings in the United States. See Ji.D. Morgan, Problems of Proof in the Anglo-American System of Trials SZ (iyb6).
38. In re Winship, 397 US 358 (1970).
39. Id., at 364
40. US 197, at 208 (1977) (citation omitted).
41. For an in-depth discussion on this issue, see J.O. Newman, Beyond ‘Reasonable Doubt’, 68 New York University Law Review 979, at 980-981 (1993).
42. See, e.g., Ferguson v. The Queen, LW9 1 All ER 877, at S78 (PC 1S78).
43. Newman, Ferguson v. The Queen note 44, at 9S4 (footnote omitted; citing United States Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, at 1037-1039 (7th Cir. 1988); and Murphy v. Holland, 776 F.2d 470. at 478-479 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 475 US 1138 (1986)); and, generally, Note, Doming Reasonable Doubt: To Define, or Not to Dine, 90 Columbia Law Review 1716, at 1/lS-1721 (1990).
44. United States Federal Judicial Center Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 28, Instruction 21 (1987).
45. Victor V. Nebraska, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1244, and 1248 (the Supreme Court was called upon to evaluate these two competing instruaions given to juries by trial courts).
46. See, e.g., L. Tribe, A Further Critique of MathemMicid Proof, 84 Harvard Law Review 1810, at 1817 (1971); and L. Tribe, Trial hy Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harvard Law Review 1329, at 1374-1375 (1971), arguing that the quantification of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ and other burdens of proof diminishes the symbolic function of burdens of proof, especially where it is done in jury instructions as an acceptable risk of error which the fact finder may deliberately subject the defendant to may result in the application or use of a lower standard that jurors would otherwise apply. See also Jackson, Prohahility and Mathematics in Court Fact-Finding, 31 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 239, at 253 (1980); “[o]f course the law could determine a numerical quantification on the level of doubt which is permissible. But the point is that the law does net do this. It leaves the standard of satisfaction required vague. It requires a credibility statement that the facts.
47. This term is also expressed in England and Wales as involving the ‘preponderance of probability’ or ‘the balance of probabilities’. C. Tapper, Cross on Evidence 149 (1990).
48. SI F.vamplps nf bitrdpns nf proof that, arp iispd in rnmmnn law systems include probable caiisp (standard that is applied where officer makes stop, arrest, seizure, search in United States), clear and convincing (in civil actions initiated by states where there is more than simply a monetary dispute between two private parties), and clearly erroneous (by appellate courts when reviewing findings of fact by lower courts).
49. C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Beli, Cmnta of Evidence, or ComtitMional Guarantees?, 35 Vanderbilt Law Review 1293, at 1322 (1982).
50. Id.
51. UiiiLcJ Slates-u. pHticu, 458 F. Supp. 388, 411 (EDNY 1978).
52. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 US 238, at 367, n. 158 (1992) (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting W. O, Douglas, Foreword to J. Frank & B. Frank, Not Guilty 11-12 (1957)); Goetz V. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 39 (2d Cir. 1992) (Newman, J., concurring); and Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, at 352 (9th Cir. 1991) (en franc) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
53. See J. Forescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae 65 (1942): “I should, indeed, prefer twenty guilty men to escape death through mercy, than one innocent be condemned unjustly”.
54. US V. Faltico, jMpra note 54, at 410.
55. McCauUff, iu'pra note 52, at 1324-1325.
56. Id., at 13J2. It is also worth noting that several judges complained that because burdens of proof address qualitative judgments rather than quantitative, percentages are deceptive.
57. Simon, Jtides’ Translations of Burdens of Proof Into Statements of Probability, 13 Trial Law Guide 103, at 108 (1969).
58. G. Thom-js III flc B. Pollack, Rahinking Guilt, Juries, and Jeopardy, ?1 Michigan Law Review 1, at 8 (1992).
59. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 72 (1961), attributing the view to John Austin, Lecture VI, in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 241 (1832).
60. Thomas & Pollack, The Concept of Law 72-note 62, at 8. This configuration was used to ascertain whether or not true guilt was established in regard to individvial proceedings.
61. See Art. 12 Statute, The Concept of Law 72-note 62 note 7: “[c]hambers shall be composed of eleven independent judges, no two of whom may be nationals of the same State”.
62. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Art. 12 Statute note 5.
63. Legal Assistant to Her Excellency Judge Gabrielle Kirk. McDonald, International Criminal Tribunal for the Fortner Yugoslavia, The Hague, The Netherlands. J.D. Harvard Law School 1993, B.S. Florida A&M University 1990.