History of science and its sociological reconstructions

History of Science

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 1982, Pages 157-211

  Shapin, Steven ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84965954976     PISSN: 00732753     EISSN: 17538564     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/007327538202000301     Document Type: Article

References (194)

1. Ben-David Joseph, The scientist's role in society: A comparative study (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971), 7–13.
2. Hall A. Rupert, “Microscopic analysis and the general picture”, Times literary supplement (26 April 1974), 437–8, p. 438.
3. Laudan Larry, Progress and its problems: Towards a theory of scientific growth (London, 1977), ch. 7, esp. 204, 209, 219, 243 n. 10. For programmatic criticisms of Laudan's strictures: Barnes Barry, “Vicissitudes of belief”, Social studies of science, ix (1979), 247–62; Bloor David, “The strengths of the strong programme”, Philosophy of the social sciences, xi(1981), 199–213.
4. Especially Barnes Barry, Scientific knowledge and sociological theory (London, 1974); idem, Interests and the growth of knowledge (London, 1977); Bloor David, Knowledge and social imagery (London, 1976); Mulkay Michael, Science and the sociology of knowledge (London, 1979).
5. Nor will I treat the history of the social sciences, although I do not accept that these materials present an ‘easier case’ for the sociology of knowledge in anything but a persuasive sense. Perhaps the greatest losses resulting from my selective criteria are: (i) an excellent literature dealing with the cognitive foundations of research schools and disciplines; and (ii) some attempts to operationalize Mary Douglas's ‘grid-group’ schema. Some selected references are included in the Bibliography, Section VI (c) and (d).
6. Obviously, I cannot and do not claim scholarly competence in all the relevant areas; therefore I cannot ‘vouch for’ the factual accuracy of much empirical work I treat. Nevertheless, I see no major problem in presenting empirical achievements as, so to speak, ‘state of the art’. Very little of this work has been challenged in print, but, where such challenges do exist and may bear upon the adequacy of interpretive perspectives, I shall make every effort to point this out in references. I must also stress that summarizing empirical studies always results in loss of detail and therefore of persuasive power. The brief sketches I provide should be regarded more as guides to reading empirical work, than as substitutes for reading it.
7. A positivistic sociology of the dynamics of science and its foci of interest appeared in Merton R. K., Science, technology and society in seventeenth-century England (new ed., New York, 1970; orig. publ. in Osiris, iv (1938), 360–632).
8. Rudwick is preparing a full-length study of the Devonian controversy.
9. The argument establishing that in principle all experimental conclusions can be challenged was stated by Duhem P. in The aim and structure of physical theory (Princeton, 1954), ch. 6. If an experiment produces unexpected results or appears to refute a hypothesis, it is always possible to lay the blame on a subsidiary assumption in the test procedure. Using the usual notation of symbolic logic: If A·H→O and ∼ O, then all that can be concluded is ∼ H or ∼ A where H = hypothesis; A = background assumption; O = observation. A decisive refutation would require a proof that there does not exist an alternative A, say A*, such that A* ·H produces an ‘acceptable’ observational outcome. Since proofs of the non-existence of a suitable A are never available in practice, neither is a decisive or crucial experiment. These themes have been taken up by Quine W. V. O., “Two dogmas of empiricism”, in his From a logical point of view (2nd ed., Cambridge, MA, 1964), esp. p. 43. In Pickering's usage a ‘closed’ experimental system would be one in which all variables were perfectly understood and controlled, and all findings deriving from such a system would command universal assent. An ‘open’ system would be one which was imperfectly understood, measurements upon which would be open to a variety of interpretations. Scientists sometimes behave as if their experimental findings should be incontestable, although Pickering doubts whether such a thing as a ‘closed’ system exists in reality [16, p. 218].
10. An interesting study of Dirac and the monopole concept, providing background to the episode discussed by Pickering, is Kragh Helge, “The concept of the monopole: A historical and analytic case-study”, Studies in history and philosophy of science, xii(1981), 141–72.
11. Cf. Knorr-Cetina Karin, “Relativism — What now?”, Social studies of science, xii (1982), 133–6.
12. Quite recently there has appeared a programme devoted solely to analysing scientists’ ‘discourse’: Mulkay Michael, “Action and belief or scientific discourse?”, Philosophy of the social sciences, xi (1981), 163–71; Gilbert Nigel and Mulkay Michael, “Contexts of scientific discourse: Social accounting in experimental papers”, in Knorr, eds [9], 269–94; and a series of forthcoming papers by Mulkay and Gilbert. This programme is advanced as a way out of a “current analytic impasse” in the descriptive and explanatory project, viz. most of the empirical work discussed in this paper. We should try to analyse how scientists talk rather than what their talk is about: “It is simply impossible”, according to Mulkay, “to produce definitive versions of scientists’ actions and beliefs” (p. 169). There are many problems with this position, not least that relating to the claim that the discourse analyst “is no longer required to go beyond the data”. It will be for others to judge whether the ‘discourse project’ should count as a contribution to the sociology of knowledge.
13. Recently, some aspects of Allen's work have been criticized by Maienschein Jane Rainger Ronald and Benson Keith in Journal of the history of biology, xiv (1981), 83–158. Their diverse objections seem to centre upon (i) the rapidity of the shift to experimental techniques (which is not an issue in the present context), and (ii) the extent of polarization between morphological and experimental methods; the dichotomy is accepted by Allen's critics, although they wish to stress the complexity of the situation.
14. In this connection Morrell and Thackray [38, pp. 461–465] provide valuable institutional background to Rudwick's account of the Devonian controversy [22], pointing to the explanatory role of the control of resources in geology. Their study of the British Association for the Advancement of Science also offers institutional considerations relevant to explaining early nineteenth century controversies over wave versus corpuscular theories of light and differing views of the adequacy of mathematical methods in physics [38, pp. 466–84]. In this instance different evaluations were rooted in contrasted Cambridge and Edinburgh pedagogical traditions, as well as in conflicting English and Scottish conceptions of the social and cultural position of science. At the most vulgar level the disputes involved competition for students and alternative schemata for the social support of the man of science. For analyses (mostly pitched at a far less vulgar level) of these episodes: Cantor G. N., “The reception of the wave theory of light in Britain: A case study illustrating the role of methodology in scientific debate”, Historical studies in the physical sciences, vi (1975), 109–32, and Miller David P., “The Royal Society of London, 1800–1835: A study in the cultural politics of scientific organization” (unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1981), ch. 3.
15. These paragraphs refer to the British setting. The sparser literature dealing with France points to a significantly different pattern of cultural connections and institutionalization obtaining there; see, for example, Outram Dorinda, “Politics and vocation: French science, 1793–1830”, The British journal for the history of science, xiii (1980), 27–43, also the studies cited in her note 2.
16. For excellent materials on these subjects, see Morrell and Thackray [38, esp. chs 1, 3, and 5].
17. For a perceptive account of the discovery of Uranus: Schaffer Simon, “Uranus and the establishment of Herschel's astronomy”, Journal for the history of astronomy, xii (1981), 11–26; and, on a related topic, idem, “Herschel in Bedlam: Natural history and stellar astronomy”, The British journal for the history of science, xiii (1980), 211–39.
18. For a discussion of Pannekoek's work in a theoretical sociology of knowledge context: Barnes Barry, T. S. Kuhn and social science (London, 1982), 94–101; and for general treatments of similarity-dissimilarity judgments, idem, “On the conventional character of knowledge and cognition”, Philosophy of the social sciences, xi (1981), 303–35; idem, “On the extensions of concepts and the growth of knowledge”, Sociological review (in the press).
19. Lakatos Imre, “History of science and its rational reconstructions”, in ElkanaY., ed., The interaction between science and philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1974), 195–241.
20. This brief discussion of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors overlaps with a more extended account in Barnes, Scientific knowledge and sociological theory (ref. 4), ch. 5, but the point regarding their status as actors’ categories is still so often forgotten or missed that repetition may be justified.
21. Historians disagree whether such demonstrations may be said to show ‘external’ influences upon science. Writers like Koyré appear to regard neo-Platonic philosophy as part of rational science. Others seem to think of religion and metaphysics as ‘external’ to science, while preserving a crucial boundary around the domain of ‘the intellect’ in general. Again, we may take such boundary-placements purely as expressions of historians’ evaluations unless the issue concerns where historical actors themselves placed cultural boundaries.
22. Webster [78] generally accepts Basalla's [61] findings while pointing out certain problems arising from the use of mechanical metaphors in Harvey's overall vitalist orientation. There is some criticism of both Basalla and Webster in Burchell Howard B., “Mechanical and hydraulic analogies in Harvey's discovery of the circulation”, Journal of the history of medicine, xxxvi (1981), 260–77; Burchell says that contemporary technology played only an illustrative and expository role in Harvey's work, not a ‘triggering’ role, but it remains unclear how a distinction is made between the language in which discovery is communicated and ‘the discovery itself’. For Harvey's use of conceptions of the social order see Hill [85].
23. In a short note Barry Barnes has pointed out some significant analogies between how historians deal with the science-technology relationship and how they might more constructively treat the connections between science and social context: Barnes, “The science-technology relationship: A model and a query”, Social studies of science, xii (1982), 167–73.
24. Set alongside the voluminous historical literature on the Darwin-Malthus link it is significant that there is only one paper dealing with Darwin's use of the ‘extra-scientific’ resources provided by the culture of pigeon-fanciers: Secord [76], even though one could argue that the patterns Darwin observed there were at least as important to his theory of selection as the resources of political economy and natural theology. This historiographical distortion does not escape Secord's notice, and his paper is in every way a model of how to treat the use of cultural resources in making science.
25. Gillispie C. C., “Comment on Freeman”, in Freeman D., “The evolutionary theories of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer”, Current anthropology, xv (1974), 224; cf. idem, The edge of objectivity (Princeton, N.J., 1960), 311, 343; Bowler [62]; Ospovat [71]; and Shapin and Barnes [52]. The last reference treats some seldom-acknowledged problems associated with individualistic approaches to science and its cultural connections.
26. Forman's paper [66] has been widely criticized by word of mouth, but there has been only one sustained effort to reassess its arguments and the evidence for them: Hendry John, “Weimar culture and quantum causality”, History of science, xviii (1980), 155–80. The gist of Hendry's criticism appears to be that Forman neglects ‘internal influences’ on the adoption of acausal perspectives and that he exaggerates the extent to which acausality actually was taken up. Only the specialist can properly assess the weight of Hendry's particular objections to Forman, but it would seem highly desirable that some competent scholar should recover the ground and examine the relations between purposes within the subculture of physics and purposes which connected physical thought to the wider society.
27. The cultural cluster including eugenics, biometry and statistics has been something of a locus classicus for social historical study in recent years. Only the most sociologically explicit work is discussed in detail, but also see admirable contributions by Norton Bernard, “Karl Pearson and statistics: The social origins of scientific innovation”, Social studies of science, viii (1978), 3–34; idem, “Karl Pearson and the Galtonian tradition: Studies in the rise of quantitative social biology” (unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1978); Provine William B., The origins of theoretical population genetics (Chicago, 1971); Farrall Lyndsay, “Controversy and conflict in science: A case study—the English biometric school and Mendel's laws”, Social studies of science, v (1975), 269–301; idem, “The origins and growth of the English eugenics movement 1865–1925” (unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, University of Indiana, 1970); Rosenberg Charles E., “The social environment of scientific innovation: Factors in the development of genetics in the United States”, in Rosenberg [51, ch. 12]; Allen Garland, “Genetics, eugenics and society: Internalists and externalists in contemporary history of science”, Social studies of science, vi (1976), 105–22; and Kevles Daniel J., “Genetics in the United States and Great Britain, 1890–1930: A review with speculations”, Isis, lxxi(1980), 441–55.
28. Habermas Jürgen, Knowledge and human interests (Boston, 1971). See discussions of this perspective in Barnes, Interests and the growth of knowledge (see ref. 4), ch. 1, and Shapin [103, pp. 63–65].
29. The contrast between “conservative” and “natural law” styles of thought is set out in Mannheim Karl, “Conservative thought”, in Essays in sociology and social psychology (London, 1953), 74–164. For empirical studies utilizing Mannheim's categories, see Bibliography, Section VI (a).
30. See some selected references in Bibliography, Section VI (b).
31. It is true that some of the vocabulary Farley and Geison use in their paper invites a psychological reading of their argument: The “influence” of “external factors” upon Pouchet is made to hinge upon his “sincerity” in insisting upon his orthodoxy (p. 184); we are obliged to choose whether Pasteur “allowed ‘external’ factors” to “influence” him “consciously” or “unconsciously” (pp. 196–7). It would seem, however, that this individualism and psychologism does not sit easily with the main strands of the paper's argument, which is pitched at a sociological level. Interestingly, a critical assessment of this paper has picked upon the psychologism and exploited its weakness: Roll-Hansen Nils, “Experimental method and spontaneous generation: The controversy between Pasteur and Pouchet, 1859–64”, Journal of the history of medicine, xxxiv (1979), 273–92.
32. The ‘coercive model’ (not so labelled) is most explicitly set forth in Laudan, Progress and its problems (see ref. 3), ch. 7, where the empirical failures of this approach are given as reasons for rejecting the sociology of knowledge.
33. There are many sources for this line of attack; perhaps the most explicit is Flew A. G. N., “Is the scientific enterprise self-refuting?”, Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences: Los Angeles, 1979 (New York, 1980), i, 347–60.
34. It is remarkable how little attention the ‘Great Tradition’ in the history of science has actually paid to experimental practice. Two recent major studies go some way to remedying this neglect; both point out how problematic is the connection between that practice and the theoretical culture that has been the major focus of historical interest: Frank R. G. Jr, Harvey and the Oxford physiologists: A study of scientific ideas (Berkeley, 1980), and, especially, Heilbron John L., Electricity in the 17th & 18th centuries: A study of early modern physics (Berkeley, 1979).
35. See, for example, Barnes, Scientific knowledge and sociological theory (ref. 4), esp. ch. 1; idem, Interests and the growth of knowledge (ref. 4), esp. ch. 1; Bloor, Knowledge and social imagery (ref. 4), chs 2, 8; Barnes Barry and Bloor David, “Relativism, rationalism and the sociology of knowledge”, in Lukes S. and Hollis M., eds, Relativism and rationality (Oxford, 1982), in the press, and Barnes papers in ref. 18.
36. See Shapin [121] for the notion of actors ‘laying bets’ on representations of perceived reality. In this episode the actors themselves privileged their preferred representations and provided psychological and sociological explanations of their opponents’ ‘erroneous’ accounts.
37. Garfinkel Harold, Studies in ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1967), 66 ff.
38. For the ‘network model’: Hesse Mary, The structure of scientific inference (London, 1974); its sociological significance and implications for history of science have been developed in Bloor David, “Klassifikation und Wissenssoziologie: Durkheim und Mauss neu betrachtet”, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft xxii (1980), 20–51 (an English version will shortly be appearing in Studies in history and philosophy of science under the title “Durkheim and Mauss revisited: Classification and the sociology of knowledge”).
39. Barnes Barry, “Natural rationality: A neglected concept in the social sciences”, Philosophy of the social sciences, vi(1976), 115–26.
40. Laudan, Progress and its problems (ref. 3), 219.
41. This bibliography consists almost entirely of empirical work discussed in the text. It is by no means an exhaustive list of relevant studies, but it is inclusive enough to constitute a working bibliography in the historical sociology of scientific knowledge. Doubtless, I have offended many authors, although perhaps the more profound apologies are owed to writers who will be surprised to see their work treated in a sociological context than to those who may (rightly) feel that they ought to have been included.
42. The Bibliography is arranged into sections closely connected to corresponding sections in the text. For the most part this is a purely conventional categorization of empirical work. Many studies contain material that relates to more than one sociological theme, and perfunctory indication of these overlaps is given at the foot of several sections in the Bibliography. Some wholesale omissions of sociological foci and interpretive themes are pointed out in Section VI of the Bibliography. I have attempted to make this list as current as possible, but given the healthy state of the empirical sociology of knowledge, I fully expect (and hope) that it will very soon be out of date.
43. I. Contingency and the sociology of knowledge: Observation and experiment.
44. Baxter Alice and Farley John, “Mendel and meiosis”, Journal of the history of biology, xii (1979), 137–73.
45. Burkhardt Richard Jr, “Closing the door on Lord Morton's mare: The rise and fall of telegony”, Studies in history of biology, iii (1979), 1–21.
46. Black Sandra E., “Pseudopods and synapses: The amoeboid theories of neuronal mobility and the early formulation of the synapse concept, 1894–1900”, Bulletin of the history of medicine, lv (1981), 34–58.
47. Collins H. M., “The seven sexes: A study in the sociology of a phenomenon, or the replication of experiments in physics”, Sociology, ix (1975), 205–24.
48. Collins H. M., “Son of seven sexes: The social destruction of a physical phenomenon”, Social studies of science, xi(1981), 33–62.
49. Collins H. M., “The place of the ‘core set’ in modern science: Social contingency with methodological propriety in science”, History of science, xix (1981), 6–19.
50. Collins H. M. and Pinch Trevor, “The construction of the paranormal: Nothing unscientific is happening”, in Wallis Roy, ed., On the margins of science: The social construction of rejected knowledge, Sociological review monograph, xxvii (Keele, Staffs, 1979), 237–70.
51. Desmond Adrian J., “Designing the dinosaur: Richard Owen's response to Robert Edmond Grant”, Isis, lxx (1979), 224–34.
52. Harvey Bill, “The effects of social context on the process of scientific investigation: Experimental tests of quantum mechanics”, in Knorr K. D. Krohn R. and Whitley R., eds, The social process of scientific investigation (Sociology of the sciences, iv; Dordrecht, 1980), 139–63.
53. Harvey Bill, “Plausibility and the evaluation of knowledge: A case-study of experimental quantum mechanics”, Social studies of science, xi (1981), 95–130.
54. Jacyna L. S., “John Goodsir and the making of cellular reality”, Journal of the history of biology, in the press.
55. Latour Bruno and Woolgar Steve, Laboratory life: The social construction of scientific facts (Beverly Hills and London, 1979).
56. Maulitz Russell C., “Schwann's way: Cells and crystals”, Journal of the history of medicine, xxvi (1971), 422–37.
57. Nye Mary Jo, “N-rays: An episode in the history and psychology of science”, Historical studies in the physical sciences, xi(1980), 125–56.
58. Pickering Andrew, “Constraints on controversy: The case of the magnetic monopole”, Social studies of science, xi (1981), 63–93.
59. Pickering Andrew, “The hunting of the quark”, Isis, lxxii (1981), 216–36.
60. Pickstone John V., “Globules and coagula: Concepts of tissue formation in the early nineteenth century”, Journal of the history of medicine, xxviii (1973), 336–56.
61. Pinch Trevor J., “Normal explanations of the paranormal: The demarcation problem in parapsychology”, Social studies of science, ix (1979), 329–48.
62. Pinch Trevor J., “The sun-set: The presentation of certainty in scientific life”, Social studies of science, xi(1981), 131–58.
63. Rehbock Philip F., “Huxley, Haeckel, and the oceanographers: The case of Bathybius haeckelii”, Isis, lxvi(1975), 504–33.
64. Rudwick Martin J. S., “Darwin and Glen Roy: A ‘great failure’ in scientific method?”, Studies in history and philosophy of science, v (1974), 99–185.
65. Rudwick Martin J. S., “The Devonian: A system born from conflict”, in The Devonian system, Special papers in palaeontology, xxiii (London, The Palaeontological Association, 1979), 9–21.
66. Rupke Nicolaas A., “Bathybius haeckelii and the psychology of scientific discovery”, Studies in history and philosophy of science, vii (1976), 53–62.
67. Travis G. D. L., “On the construction of creativity: The memory transfer phenomenon and the importance of being earnest”, in Knorr, eds [9], 165–93.
68. Travis G. D. L., “Replicating replication? Aspects of the social construction of learning in planarian worms”, Social studies of science, xi(1981), 11–32.
69. Winsor Mary P., “Barnacle larvae in the nineteenth century: A case-study in taxonomic theory”, Journal of the history of medicine, xxiv (1969), 294–309.
70. Wynne Brian, “C. G. Barkla and the J phenomenon: A case-study in the treatment of deviance in physics”, Social studies of science, vi (1976), 307–47.
71. Wynne Brian, “Between orthodoxy and oblivion: The normalisation of deviance in science”, in Wallis, ed. [7], 67–84. Also relevant are Farley and Geison [116]; Kohler [32]; Lankford [49]; MacKenzie [35, pp. 120–25]; Shapin [121]. II. Professional vested interests and sociological explanation.
72. Allen Garland E., “Hugo de Vries and the reception of the ‘Mutation Theory’”, Journal of the history of biology, ii (1969), 55–87.
73. Allen Garland E., “Naturalists and experimentalists: The genotype and the phenotype”, Studies in history of biology, iii (1979), 179–209.
74. Dean John, “Controversy over classification: A case study from the history of botany”, in Barnes Barry and Shapin Steven, eds, Natural order: Historical studies of scientific culture (Beverly Hills and London, 1979), 211–30.
75. Kohler Robert E., “The reception of Eduard Buchner's discovery of cell-free fermentation”, Journal of the history of biology, v(1972), 327–53.
76. Kohler Robert E., “The enzyme theory and the origin of biochemistry”, Isis, lxiv(1973), 181–96.
77. Law John, “Fragmentation and investment in sedimentology”, Social studies of science, x (1980), 1–22.
78. MacKenzie Donald, Statistics in Britain, 1865–1930: The social construction of scientific knowledge (Edinburgh, 1981).
79. MacKenzie Donald and Barnes Barry, “Biometriker versus Mendelianer. Eine Kontroverse und ihre Erklärung”, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft xviii (“Wissenschaftssoziologie”) (1975), 165–96; English version available from Science Studies Unit, Edinburgh University (page references in text are to English typescript).
80. MacKenzie Donald and Barnes Barry, “Scientific judgment: The biometry-Mendelism controversy”, in Barnes and Shapin, eds [31], 191–210.
81. Morrell Jack and Thackray Arnold, Gentlemen of science: Early years of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (Oxford, 1981).
82. Ospovat Dov, “Perfect adaptation and teleological explanation: Approaches to the problem of the history of life in the mid-nineteenth century”, Studies in history of biology, ii (1978), 33–56.
83. Pickering Andrew, “The role of interests in high-energy physics: The choice between charm and colour”, in Knorr, eds [9], 107–38. Also relevant are Barnes and MacKenzie [111]; MacKenzie [118]. III. Interests and the boundaries of the scientific community.
84. Brooke John Hedley, “The natural theology of the geologists: Some theological strata”, in Jordanova L. J. and Porter Roy S., eds, Images of the earth: Essays in the history of the environmental sciences, British Society for the History of Science Monographs, i (Chalfont St. Giles, Bucks, 1979), 39–64.
85. Daston Lorraine J., “British responses to psycho-physiology, 1860–1900”, Isis, lxix(1978), 192–208.
86. Durant J. R., “The meaning of evolution: Post-Darwinian debates on the significance for man of the theory of evolution, 1858–1908” (unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1977).
87. Durant J. R., “Scientific naturalism and social reform in the thought of Alfred Russel Wallace”, The British journal for the history of science, xii (1979), 31–58.
88. Jacyna L. S., “Scientific naturalism in Victorian Britain: An essay in the social history of ideas” (unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1980).
89. Jacyna L. S., “Somatic theories of mind and the interests of medicine in Britain, 1850–1879”, Medical history (in the press).
90. Jacyna L. S., “The physiology of mind, the unity of nature, and the moral order in Victorian thought”, The British journal for the history of science, xiv (1981), 109–32.
91. Jones Greta, Social Darwinism and English thought: The interaction between biological and social theory (Brighton, 1980).
92. Lankford John, “Amateurs versus professionals: The controversy over telescope size in late Victorian science”, Isis, lxxii (1981), 11–28.
93. Pannekoek A., “The discovery of Neptune”, Centaurus, iii (1953), 126–37.
94. Rosenberg Charles E., “George M. Beard and American nervousness”, in Rosenberg, No other gods: On science and American social thought (Baltimore, 1976), ch. 5.
95. Shapin Steven and Barnes Barry, “Darwin and social Darwinism: Purity and history”, in Barnes and Shapin, eds [31], 125–42.
96. Smith Roger, Trial by medicine: Insanity and responsibility in Victorian trials (Edinburgh, 1981).
97. Turner Frank Miller, Between science and religion: The reaction to scientific naturalism in late Victorian England (New Haven, 1974).
98. Turner Frank Miller, “Rainfall, plagues, and the Prince of Wales: A chapter in the conflict of religion and science”, Journal of British studies, xiii (1974), 46–65.
99. Turner Frank M., “The Victorian conflict between science and religion: A professional dimension”, Isis, lxix(1978), 356–76.
100. Westrum Ron, “Science and social intelligence about anomalies: The case of Ufos”, Social studies of science, vii (1977), 271–302.
101. Westrum Ron, “Science and social intelligence about anomalies: The case of meteorites”, Social studies of science, viii (1978), 461–93.
102. Westrum Ron, “Knowledge about sea-serpents”, in Wallis, ed. [7], 293–314.
103. Young R. M., “The role of psychology in the nineteenth-century evolutionary debate”, in Chant Colin and Fauvel John, eds, Darwin to Einstein: Historical studies on science and belief (London, 1980), 155–78. Also: Edge and Mulkay [133]. IV (a). The use of cultural resources.
104. Basalla George, “William Harvey and the heart as a pump”, Bulletin of the history of medicine, xxxvi(1962), 467–70.
105. Bowler P. J., “Malthus, Darwin and the concept of struggle”, Journal of the history of ideas, xxxvii (1976), 631–50.
106. Brown Theodore M., “The College of Physicians and the acceptance of iatromechanism in England, 1665–1695”, Bulletin of the history of medicine, xliv(1970), 12–30.
107. Brown Theodore M., “From mechanism to vitalism in eighteenth-century English physiology”, Journal of the history of biology, vii (1974), 179–216.
108. Cardwell D. S. L., From Watt to Clausius: The rise of thermodynamics in the early industrial age (London, 1971).
109. Forman Paul, “Weimar culture, causality, and quantum theory, 1918–1927: Adaptation by German physicists and mathematicians to a hostile intellectual milieu”, Historical studies in the physical sciences, iii(1971), 1–115.
110. Forman Paul, “The reception of an acausal quantum mechanics in Germany and Britain”, in MauskopfSeymour, ed., The reception of unconventional science, Aaas Selected Symposium, xxv (Boulder, Colorado, 1978), 11–50.
111. Frankel Eugene, “Corpuscular optics and the wave theory of light: The science and politics of a revolution in physics”, Social studies of science, vi (1976), 141–84.
112. Gale Barry G., “Darwin and the concept of a struggle for existence: A study in the extrascientific origins of scientific ideas”, Isis, lxiii (1972), 321–44.
113. Kuhn T. S., “Sadi Carnot and the Cagnard engine”, Isis, lii (1961), 567–74.
114. Ospovat Dov, “Darwin after Malthus”, Journal of the history of biology, xii (1979), 211–30.
115. Rattansi P. M., “Paracelsus and the Puritan revolution”, Ambix, xi (1963), 24–32.
116. Rattansi P. M., “The Helmontian-Galenist controversy in Restoration England”, Ambix, xii (1964), 1–23.
117. Rudwick Martin J. S., “Poulett Scrope on the volcanoes of Auvergne: Lyellian time and political economy”, The British journal for the history of science, vii (1974), 205–42.
118. Rudwick Martin J. S., “Transposed concepts from the human sciences in the early work of Charles Lyell”, in Jordanova and Porter, eds [41], 67–83.
119. Secord James, “Nature's fancy: Charles Darwin and the breeding of pigeons”, Isis, lxxii (1981), 163–86.
120. Smith Roger, “Alfred Russel Wallace: Philosophy of nature and man”, The British journal for the history of science, vi (1972), 177–99.
121. Webster Charles, “William Harvey's conception of the heart as a pump”, Bulletin of the history of medicine, xxxix (1965), 508–17.
122. Young Robert M., “Malthus and the evolutionists: The common context of biological and social theory”, Past and present, xliii (1969), 109–45.
123. Young Robert M., “The historiographic and ideological context of the nineteenth-century debate on man's place in nature”, in Teich M. and Young R. M., eds, Changing perspectives in the history of science (London, 1973), 344–438.
124. Young Robert M., “Natural theology, Victorian periodicals and the fragmentation of the common context”, in Chant and Fauvel, eds [60], 69–107. IV (b). The social use of nature in the wider society.
125. Harwood Jonathan, “The race-intelligence controversy: A sociological approach. I: Professional factors”, Social studies of science, vi (1976), 369–94.
126. Harwood Jonathan, “The race-intelligence controversy: A sociological approach. Ii: External factors”, Social studies of science, vii (1977), 1–30.
127. Harwood Jonathan, “Heredity, environment, and the legitimation of social policy”, in Barnes and Shapin, eds [31], 231–51.
128. Hill Christopher, “William Harvey and the idea of monarchy”, in WebsterC., ed., The intellectual revolution of the seventeenth century (London, 1974), 160–81.
129. Jacob J. R., Robert Boyle and the English revolution: A study in social and intellectual change (New York, 1977).
130. Jacob J. R., “Boyle's atomism and the Restoration assault on pagan naturalism”, Social studies of science, viii (1978), 211–33.
131. Jacob J. R., “Aristotle and the new philosophy: Stubbe versus the Royal Society”, in Hanen Marsha P., eds, Science, pseudo-science and society (Waterloo, Ontario, 1980), 217–36.
132. Jacob J. R. and Jacob M. C., “The Anglican origins of modern science: The metaphysical foundations of the Whig constitution”, Isis, lxxi(1980), 251–67.
133. Jacob M. C., The Newtonians and the English revolution, 1689–1720 (Ithaca, N.Y. and Hassocks, Sussex, 1976).
134. Jacob M. C., “Newtonian science and the Radical Enlightenment”, Vistas in astronomy, xxii(1978 [publ. 1979]), 545–55.
135. Jacob M. C., The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, freemasons and republicans (London, 1981).
136. McEvoy J. G., “Joseph Priestley, ‘aerial philosopher’: Metaphysics and methodology in Priestley's chemical thought, from 1772 to 1781”, Ambix, xxv (1978), 1–55 93–116, 153–75; xxvi (1979), 16–38.
137. McEvoy J. G., “Electricity, knowledge, and the nature of progress in Priestley's thought”, The British journal for the history of science, xii(1979), 1–30.
138. McEvoy J. G. and McGuire J. E., “God and nature: Priestley's way of rational dissent”, Historical studies in the physical sciences, vi (1975), 325–404.
139. Provine William, “Geneticists and the biology of race crossing”, Science, clxxxii(23 November, 1973), 790–6.
140. Rosenberg Charles E., “The bitter fruit: Heredity, disease and social thought”, in Rosenberg [51], ch. 1.
141. Rosenberg Charles E., “Florence Nightingale on contagion: The hospital as moral universe”, in idem, ed., Healing and history: Essays for George Rosen (New York, 1979), 116–36.
142. Schaffer Simon, “Natural philosophy”, in Rousseau G. S. and Porter R., eds, The ferment of knowledge: Studies in the historiography of eighteenth-century science (Cambridge, 1980), 55–91.
143. Schaffer Simon, “Newtonian cosmology and the steady state” (unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University, 1980).
144. Schaffer Simon, “Electricity, the people, and the wrath of God: The Martin-Freke debate”, forthcoming.
145. Shapin Steven, “Phrenological knowledge and the social structure of earl nineteenth-century Edinburgh”, Annals of science, xxxii (1975), 219–43.
146. Shapin Steven, “Homo phrenologicus: Anthropological perspectives on an historical problem”, in Barnes and Shapin, eds [31], 41–71.
147. Shapin Steven, “Social uses of science”, in Rousseau and Porter, eds [99], 93–139.
148. Shapin Steven, “Of gods and kings: Natural philosophy and politics in the Leibniz-Clarke disputes”, Isis, lxxii (1981), 187–215.
149. Shapin Steven, “Licking Leibniz [essay review of A. R. Hall, Philosophers at war]”, History of science, xix(1981), 293–305.
150. Shapin Steven and Barnes Barry, “Science, nature and control: Interpreting mechanics’ institutes”, Social studies of science, vii (1977), 31–74.
151. Smith-Rosenberg Carroll and Rosenberg Charles E., “The female animal: Medical and biological views of women”, in Rosenberg [51], ch. 2.
152. Stewart Larry, “Samuel Clarke, Newtonianism, and the factions of post-Revolutionary England”, Journal of the history of ideas, xlii (1981), 53–72.
153. Wilde Christopher, “Hutchinsonianism, natural philosophy and religious controversy in eighteenth-century Britain”, History of science, xviii (1980), 1–24. V. Full circle: Contingency and wider social interests.
154. Barnes Barry and MacKenzie Donald, “On the role of interests in scientific change”, in Wallis, ed. [7], 49–66.
155. Cowan Ruth Schwartz, “Sir Francis Galton and the continuity of the germ-plasm: A biological idea with political roots”, Actes du Xiie Congrès International d'Histoire des Sciences, viii (1968), 181–6.
156. Cowan Ruth Schwartz, “Francis Galton's statistical ideas: The influence of eugenics”, Isis, lxiii (1972), 509–28.
157. Cowan Ruth Schwartz, “Francis Galton's contribution to genetics”, Journal of the history of biology, v (1972), 389–412.
158. Cowan Ruth Schwartz, “Nature and nurture: The interplay of biology and politics in the work of Francis Galton”, Studies in history of biology, i (1977), 133–208.
159. Farley John and Geison Gerald, “Science, politics and spontaneous generation in nineteenth-century France: The Pasteur-Pouchet debate”, Bulletin of the history of medicine, xlviii(1974), 161–98.
160. Lawrence Christopher, “The nervous system and society in the Scottish Enlightenment”, in Barnes and Shapin, eds [31], 19–40.
161. MacKenzie Donald, “Statistical theory and social interests: A case study”, Social studies of science, viii (1978), 35–83.
162. MacKenzie Donald, “Karl Pearson and the professional middle class”, Annals of science, xxxvi(1979), 125–43.
163. MacKenzie Donald, “Sociobiologies in competition: The biometrician-Mendelian debate”, in WebsterCharles, ed., Biology, medicine and society 1840–1940 (Cambridge, 1981), 243–88.
164. Shapin Steven, “The politics of observation: Cerebral anatomy and social interests in the Edinburgh phrenology disputes”, in Wallis, ed. [7], 139–78.
165. Wynne Brian, “Physics and psychics: Science, symbolic action and social control in late Victorian England”, in Barnes and Shapin, eds [31], 167–86. VI. Other sociological perspectives not discussed in text.
166. (a) ‘Conservative thought’.
167. Caneva Kenneth L., “From Galvanism to electrodynamics: The transformation of German physics and its social context”, Historical studies in the physical sciences, ix(1978), 63–159, esp. pp. 155–9.
168. Coleman William, “Bateson and chromosomes: Conservative thought in science”, Centaurus, xv(1970), 228–314. Also: Harwood [83]; MacKenzie [35, pp. 142–50].
169. (b) Towards a sociology of mathematics.
170. Bloor David, “Polyhedra and the abominations of Leviticus”, The British journal for the history of science, xi (1978), 245–72.
171. Bloor David, “Hamilton and Peacock on the essence of algebra”, in Mehrtens H. Bos H. and Schneider I., eds, Social history of nineteenth century mathematics (Boston, 1981), 202–32.
172. Daston Lorraine J., “The reasonable calculus: Classical probability theory, 1650–1840” (unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1979).
173. Daston Lorraine J., “Probabilistic expectation and rationality in classical probability theory”, Historia mathematica, vii (1980), 234–60.
174. Fisher Charles S., “The death of a mathematical theory: A study in the sociology of knowledge”, Archive for history of exact sciences, iii (1966), 137–59.
175. Richards Joan L., “The reception of a mathematical theory: Non-Euclidean geometry in England, 1868–1883”, in Barnes and Shapin, eds [31], 143–66.
176. Richards Joan L., “The art and the science of British algebra: A study in the perception of mathematical truth”, Historia mathematica, vii (1980), 343–65. Also: MacKenzie [35, ch. 7; 118]. (c) Discipline formation and research schools.
177. Danziger K., “The social origins of modern psychology”, in BussA. R., ed., Psychology in social context (New York, 1979), 27–45.
178. Edge David O. and Mulkay Michael J., Astronomy transformed: The emergence of radio astronomy in Britain (New York, 1976).
179. Geison Gerald L., Michael Foster and the Cambridge school of physiology (Princeton, 1978).
180. Lemaine Gerard, eds, Perspectives on the emergence of scientific disciplines (The Hague, 1976).
181. Lowe P. D., “Amateurs and professionals: The institutional emergence of British plant ecology”, Journal of the Society for the Bibliography of Natural History, vii (1976), 517–35.
182. Morrell J. B., “The chemist breeders: The research schools of Liebig and Thomas Thomson”, Ambix, xix(1972), 1–46. Also: Kohler [33]; MacKenzie [35]; Rosenberg [51, ch. 12]. (d) ‘Grid and group’: Cultural bias in the sciences.
183. Bloor Celia and Bloor David, “Twenty industrial scientists: A preliminary exercise”, in DouglasMary, ed., Essays in the sociology of perception (London, 1982), 83–102.
184. Caneva Kenneth L., “What should we do with the monster? Electromagnetism and the psychosociology of knowledge”, in Mendelsohn E. and Elkana Y., eds, Science and cultures, Sociology of the sciences yearbook (Dordrecht, Boston and London, 1981), 101–31.
185. Pickstone John V., “Bureaucracy, liberalism and the body in post-Revolutionary France: Bichat's physiology and the Paris School of Medicine”, History of science, xix(1981), 115–42, esp. pp. 133–6, 142 n. 35.
186. Rudwick Martin, “Cognitive styles in geology”, in Douglas, ed. [138], 219–41. Also: Bloor [125]. Addenda (Roman numerals indicate relevance to Bibliography sections).
187. Collins H. M. and Pinch T. J., Frames of meaning: The social construction of extraordinary science (London, 1982). (I).
188. Desmond Adrian, Archetypes and ancestors: Palaeontology in Victorian London, 1850–1875 (London, 1982). (I, Ii).
189. Hirsh Richard F., “A conflict of principles: The discovery of argon and the debate over its existence”, Ambix, xxviii (1981), 121–30. (I).
190. Holton Gerald, “Subelectrons, presuppositions, and the Millikan-Ehrenhaft dispute”, in idem, The scientific imagination: Case studies (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), 25–83. (I).
191. Ospovat Dov, The development of Darwin's theory: Natural history, natural theology, and natural selection, 1838–1859 (Cambridge, 1981). (Ii, Iii).
192. Roe Shirley A., Matter, life, and generation: Eighteenth-century embryology and the Haller-Wolff debate (Cambridge, 1981), esp. chs 3–4. (I).
193. Secord James A., “King of Siluria: Roderick Murchison and the imperial theme in nineteenth-century British geology”, Victorian studies, xxv (1982) (in the press). (Iva).
194. Weindling Paul, “Theories of the cell state in Imperial Germany”, in Webster, ed. [120], 99–155. (Iva, b).