Are Public Goods Myths?

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 1994, Pages 369-385

  Cornes, Richard ^a   Sandler, Todd ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

clubs; institutions; nonexcludability; nonrivalry; public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 84965485433     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951692894006003006     Document Type: Article

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