7. The Conditions for Successful Collective Action

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 1994, Pages 563-592

  Libecap, Gary D ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

cartelization; collective action; common pool; fisheries; oil field unitization

Indexed keywords

EID: 84965437705     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951692894006004007     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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3. Citrograph, (1933), September.
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10. Hoffman, Elizabeth and Gary D. Libecap (1994) ‘Political Bargaining and Cartelization in the New Deal: Orange Marketing Orders’, in Claudia Goldin and Gary D. Libecap (eds), The Political Economy of Regulation: An Historical Analysis of Government and the Economy, pp. 189-221. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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13. Libecap, Gary D. (1978) ‘Economic Variables and the Development of the Law: The Case of Mineral Rights’, Journal of Economic History 38: 338-362.
14. Libecap, Gary D. (1989) Contracting for Property Rights. New York: Cambridge University Press.
15. Libecap, Gary D. and Steven N. Wiggins (1984) ‘Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil’, American Economic Review 74: 87-98.
16. Libecap, Gary D. and Steven N. Wiggins (1985) ‘The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization’, Journal of Political Economy 93: 690-714.
17. Oil Weekly, (1942), 13 April; (1943), 3 May.
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