Assembly Systems with Sequential Supplier Decisions and Uncertain Demand

Production and Operations Management

Volumn 25, Issue 8, 2016, Pages 1404-1414

  Kyparisis, George J ^a   Koulamas, Christos ^a  

^a FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

asymmetric information; push assembly systems; sequential supplier decisions

Indexed keywords

EID: 84963979970     PISSN: 10591478     EISSN: 19375956     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/poms.12556     Document Type: Article

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