Financial fragility and economic performance

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 105, Issue 1, 1990, Pages 87-114

  Bernanke, Ben ^a   Gertler, Mark ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84963086963     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2937820     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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