Advertising and coordination

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 1994, Pages 153-171

  Bagwell, Kyle ^a   Ramey, Garey ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84963043975     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2297881     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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