A Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-47

Diplomatic History

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 1980, Pages 333-352

  McFarland, Stephen L ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84963042025     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: 14677709     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.1980.tb00354.x     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. Washington Post, 1 November 1945, p. 11.
2. For a brief essay on the movazaneh strategy, see Rouhollah Ramazani, Iran’s Foreign Policy 1941-1973 (Charlottesville, 1975), pp. 70-72.
3. For a brief examination of the role of small nations in big power diplomacy, see Annette Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II(Chicago, 1959).
4. In English, for example, see Peter Avery, Modern Irun (New York, 1965); George Lenczowski, Russiu and the West in Iran, 1918-1948 (Ithaca, 1949); Ramazani, Iran‘s Foreign Policy; and Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton, 1980). In Persian, among others, see Seyyed Hossein Amuzgar, Nqft vu huvades-e Azarban [Oil and the Events of Azerbaijan] (Tehran, 1947/48); Mohammad Khan Malek Yazdi, Anesh-e masu‘i-ye Iran dar jung [The Value of Iran‘s Efforts in the War] (Tehran, 1950/51); and Hossein Kuhi Kermani, Az Shuhrivupe 1320 ta fqii‘eh-ye Azurbum vu Zunjczn [From August 1941 to the Fall of Azerbaijan and Zanjan], 2 vols. (Tehran, 1946/47, 1950/51). In Russian, among others, see A. V. Bashkirov, Ekspansia Angliiskikh i Amerikanskikh imperiulistov v Irane (1941-1953 gg) [The Expansion of English and American Imperialists in Iran (1941-53)] (Moscow, 1954); M. V. Popov, Amerikanskii imperialism I Irune v gody vtoroi voiny [American Imperialism in Iran in the Years of the Second War] (Moscow, 1956); E. A. Orlov, Vneshniuiupolitika Iruna poslevtomi mirovoi voiny [The Foreign Policy of Iran After the Second World War] (Moscow, 1975); and A. I. Demin and V. V. Trubetskoi, “Iran nakanune vtoroi mirovoi voiny” [Iran at the Beginning of the Second World War] in Imn: ocherki noveishei istorii, ed. A. Z. Arabadzhian (Moscow, 1976), pp. 120-66.
5. Walter LaFeber, “American Policy-Makers, Public Opinion, and the Outbreak of the Cold War, 1945-50” in The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, eds. Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye (New York, 1977), p. 50; Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace (Boston, 1977), p. 179; and Harry S Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1: Year of Decisions (Garden City, 1955), pp. 551-52.
6. Thomas Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation (Baltimore, 1973), p. 177; Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (Middlesex, 1971), p. 131; Yergin, Shattered Peace, p. 179; Richard Cottam, “The United States, Iran and the Cold War” Iranian Studies 3 (Winter 1970): 4-5; Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, p. 176; Avery, Modern Iran, p. 390; Richard Pfau, “Containment in Iran, 1946: The Shift to an Active Policy” Diplomatic History 1 (Fall 1977): 359, 372; Eduard Mark, “Allied Relations in Iran, 1941-1947: The Origins of a Cold War Crisis” Wisconsin Magazine of History 59 (Autumn 1975): 51; G. R. Hess, “The Iranian Crisis of 1945-1946 and the Cold War” Political Science Quarterly 89 (March 1974): 119, 146; and Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, p. 304.
7. Kuniholm, in Origins of the Cold War, attempts to examine the “regional perspective” but is unable to break free from the belief that events in Iran were controlled ultimately from Washington, New York, London, and Moscow.
8. U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1940, 3:629-30 (hereafter cited as FRUS, followed by appropriate year); Nasrollah S. Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy: Powderkeg in Iran (New York, 1954), p. 186; and FRUS, 1941, 3:355-73, 388-99.
9. FRUS, 1941. 3:418-19; Ramazani, Iran’s Foreign Policy, pp. 70-72; FRUS, 1942, 4:238-39; FRUS, 1943, 4:417-19; U.S., Department of State, Decimal File, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, 891.114/344, 6 November 1941 (hereafter cited by decimal file number); FRUS, 1942, 4:316; Ettela'at, 17 Azar 1320, p. 1; 891.9111/436, 23 April 1941; 891.9111/437, 3 May 1941; Ettela'at, 30 Mordad 1321, p. 1; and 891.4081/6, 23 January 1942.
10. Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs (New York, 1965), p. 325; Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy, pp. 219, 234; Hossein Kay'Ustavan, Siyasat-e movazaneh-ye manfi dar Majles-e Chahardahom [The Policy of Negative Equilibrium in the Fourteenth Parliament], 2 vols. (Tehran, 1949-50), 1:193-94; FRUS, 1944, 5:390-92; James Thorpe, “The Mission of Arthur C. Millspaugh to Iran, 1943-1945" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1973), p. 385; and Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, p. 271.
11. FRUS, 1942, 4:264-65; 891.00/1829, 2 March 1942; and FRUS, 1943: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 619-20, 648-49.
12. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols. (New York, 1948), 2:1253; and FRUS, 1944, 5:442-43, wherein Secretary of State Hull and Secretary of War Stimson clearly expressed their fears of a Soviet campaign to absorb Iran into the USSR after the war.
13. William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York, 1950), p. 49; FRUS, 1941, 3:383-477; FRUS, 1942, 4:318-25; FRUS, 1943, 4:319-427; FRUS, 1944, 5:445-86; FRUS, 1945, 8:359-522; 891.00/1827, 2 February 1942; 891.00/1866, 3 May 1942; 891.00/1874, 15 May 1942; 891.00/1875, 16 May 1942; FRUS, 1941, 3:463-64; 891.43/9-2244, No. 38; 891.00/3012, 3 February 1944; andFRUS, 1943, 4:338-42.
14. Ervand Abrahamian, “Factionalism in Iran: Political Groups in the 14th Parliament (1944-46)” Middle Eastern Studies 14 (January 1978): 32-35.
15. 891.00/1771, 12 September 1941; FRUS, 1941, 3:461; Office of Strategic Services, Numerical File, 115902, Record Group 226, National Archives, Washington (hereafter cited as OSS, followed by numerical file number), 13 February 1945; 891:43/5, 6 April 1943; and OSS, 84161, 8 July 1944.
16. FRUS, 1945, 8:384-86; Ettela'at, 4 Aban 1320, p. 1; 891.00/2042-7/8, 4 November 1943; FRUS, 1942, 4:219-20; 891.00/3005, 22 January 1944; Department of the Army, United States Army in World War II: The Middle East Theater; The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, ed. T. H. Vail Motter (Washington, DC, 1952; rep. ed., 1969), p. 172; andFRUS, 1943, 4:405-6, 408-10.
17. FRUS, 1942, 4:242; and Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2:1507.
18. 891.00/3012, 3 February 1944; 891.00/7-1944; 891.00/9-2544; 891.00/10-944; Bashkirov, Ekspansia Angliiskikh i Amerikanskikh imperialistov v Irane, pp. 99-107; and Popov, Amerikanskii imperialism v Irane v gody vtoroi voiny, pp. 209-3 5.
19. FRUS, 1940, 3:659-63; and 891.6363 STANDARDOI1V430, 7 May 1940.
20. 891.6363/12-1144, No. 148; 891.6363/808, 20 October 1943; FRUS, 1943, 4:625; FRUS. 1944, 5:343-45; 891.6363/802, 22 June 1943; FRUS, 1943, 4:627-28; 891.6363/826, 28 February 1944; 891.6363/836, 3 April 1944;FRUS, 1944, 5:445-46; and 891.6363/12-1144, No. 148.
21. FRUS, 1944, 5:456-57, 462-63; 891.6363/12-1144, No. 148; OSS, L49460, 16 November 1944; andFRUS, 1944, 5:457-61.
22. Popov, Amerikanskii imperialism v Irane v gody vtoroi voiny, pp. 218-19; Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, p. 177; Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War (New York, 1968), pp. 300-1; Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, 1964), p. 229; L. P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics (London, 1955; rep. ed., 1975), pp. 11, 14, 18, 21, 33, 36-42;FRUS, 1943, 4:626; Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy, pp. 244—45; Bashkirov, Ekspansia Angliiskikh i Amerikanskikh imperialism vIrane, pp. 56-51;FRUS, 1943, 4:625; and891.6363/12-2844, No. 7288. On 2 December 1944, under the sponsorship of Mohammad Mosaddeq, the Iranian Parliament passed a law outlawing any discussions with foreigners on the subject of an oil concession. In Iranian historiography this Mosaddeq law has received special emphasis and has been glorified as one of the first examples of nationalist reaction against foreign imperialists in modern Iranian history. The law also forms part of the mystique surrounding Mosaddeq. The Mosaddeq law was largely bravado, designed for internal consumption, because the 8 October government announcement postponing discussions was the coup de grace of the wartime oil question. For the text of the law, see FRUS, 1944, 5:479. For the Iranian view, see Amuzgar, Naft va havades-e Azarbaijan, pp. 45-74; and Kay'Ustavan, Siyasat-e movazaneh-ye manfi darMajles-e Chahardahom, 1:184—87.
23. FRUS, 1944, 5:492-93; and FRUS, 1945, 8:360-62, 373-74, 383.
24. Treaty of Alliance Between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and Iran” Department of State Bulletin 6 (21 March 1942): 249-52; tmdFRUS, 1945, 8:470-71.
25. FRUS. 1945, 8:436-37, 442-43, 433, 440-41, 447:18; 891.00/11-2845, No. 1009; and FRUS, 1945, 8:470, 472, 477.
26. FRUS, 1945, 8:495, 501-2.
27. New York Times, 11 November 1945, p. 19; Matthew Connelly (secretary to the president) to Stanley Woodword (acting state department chief of protocol), 26 January 1946, Box 569, Official File, Papers of Harry S Truman, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO; zndFRUS, 1945, 8:461-62, 500-1, 508. The idea of Iran as a spark for a third world war was a popular theme among Iranian writers during the period. See, for example, Mohammad Khan Malek Yazdi, Jang-e jahangir-e sevom darlran [The Third World War in Iran] (Tehran, 1952). Loy Henderson, director of the Office of Near East and African Affairs, and Harold Minor, chief of the Division of Middle East Affairs, were two of the most visible advocates of pursuing a hard line. Henderson, for example, accepted and repeated Iran’s claim that the United States was Iran’s only hope for freedom. SeeFRUS, 1945, 8:501.
28. Arfa, Under Five Shahs, p. 346; and Mohammad Mosaddeq, speech before Parliament, Mozakerat-e majles [Parliamentary Debates], sess. 171, 14th Majles, 23 Azar 1324. Ja'far Pishevari, head of the Azerbaijani movement, was born in Iran but moved to Russia where he participated in the Bolshevik Revolution. He returned to Iran after World War I to aid the short-lived uprising in Gilan. In the 1920s and 1930s he vacillated between exile in the Soviet Union and Communist activities in Iran. He was the Iranian delegate in the Communist International for a time and in 1945 became the head of the Democratic party of Azerbaijan. His record reveals the extent of Soviet involvement in the events of 1945^*6. Qazi Mohammad, head of the Kurdish movement, was a religious figure and leading citizen of Mahabad, the capital of the Kurdish People’s Republic. He had few, if any, ties to the Soviet Union, though he visited Baku in 1945. For him the Soviets were a means to achieve Kurdish autonomy or independence. His record reveals the nationalist impetus behind the events of 1945-46.
29. Hussein Ala, “Iran’s Dilemma: Promises of Allies Not Kept” Vital Speeches of the Day 12 (1 March 1946): 305; FRUS, 1945, 8:487-88, 500-1, 508; FRUS, 1946, 7:292-94, 309, 340-45; Joseph Stalin, “New Five-Year Plan for Russia” Vital Speeches of the Day 12 (1 March 1946): 300-4; Truman, Memoirs, 1:552; FRUS, 1946, 7:346-48; FRUS, 1946, 6:696-709; and Winston Churchill, “Alliance of English-Speaking People” Vital Speeches of the Day 12 (15 March 1946): 329-32. In September 1945 the Gallup Poll indicated 54 percent of the American people still trusted the Soviets. By March 1946, 77 percent decried Soviet policies in Iran. Washington Post, 24 March 1946, p. 5B.
30. Hussein Ala, “Power Politics in the Near East Crossroads of Russia” Vital Speeches of the Day 12(15 August 1946):662;FRUS, 1946, 7:350-54, 340, 342-43, 344-45;.Ate>v York Times, 14 March 1946, p. 1; and Mehdi Davudi, Qavam al-Saltaneh (Tehran, 1948), pp. 115-16.
31. FRUS, 1946, 7:495-96. For a treatment of Iran’s case before the United Nations and of American support for Iran, see Richard W. Van Wagenen, The Iranian Case, 1946 (New York, 1952).
32. Kay‘UstavanS, iyasar-e movaraneh-ye mafi dar Majles-e Chaharriahom, 2:245; Faterni, Oil Diplomacy, p. 320; 891.00/6-146, No. 792; 891.00/10-2446, No. 231; and George V. Allen, “Mission to Iran,” pp. 11 1-2 1, unpublished manuscript, Box 1, Papers of George V. Men, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO.
33. Kay'Ustavan, Siyasat-e movazaneh-ye manfidarMqjles-e Chahardahom, 2:245; Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy, p. 320; 891.00/6-146, No. 792; 891.00/10-2446, No. 231; and George V. Allen, “Mission to Iran” pp. 111-21, unpublished manuscript, Box 1, Papers of George V. Allen, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, MO.
34. 34891.00/8-2246, memorandum; and FRUS, 1946, 7515-16, 529-36, 544-47, 560-41. A recent article in Didomatic Histon, traces the development of this activist foreign policy in Iran. See FYau, ‘kontainment in tan, 1946: The Shifito an Active Policy,” pp. 359-72
35. 891.00/8-2246, memorandum; and FRUS, 1946, 7:515-16, 529-36, 544-47, 560-61. A recent article in Diplomatic History traces the development of this activist foreign policy in Iran. See Pfau, “Containment in Iran, 1946: The Shift to an Active Policy” pp. 359-72. The victory over Azerbaijan and Kurdistan should be attributed to Qavam and the shah. The shah all along had wanted to use the army to reunite the nation. Qavam restrained him, aware of the army’s weakness and the probability of Soviet intervention to rescue the northern separatists. Qavam skillfully waited until strong statements of American support were forthcoming, announced the need to supervise elections in the North, correctly determined that Soviet interest in having a new Parliament approve the 4 April 1946 agreement would keep them from intervening, negotiated a joint occupation of Zanjan to act as a launching point for the eventual invasion of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, and broke the power of the prc-Soviet Tudeh by coopting its leaders into his cabinet. Once these steps were taken, the shah then could order the army to press forward. This researcher has been unable to fhd any supporting evidence to indicate whether this process was accidental or part of a strategy. See FRUS, 1946, 7:511-12, 54548; 891.00/9-846, No. 1 199; and Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy, pp. 320-21.
36. FRUS, 1947, 5:463-65F; RUS, 1946, 1:34-35; FRUS, 1947, 5:904-5, 909-10, 934-36; the public statement of support came in a speech before the Iran-America Cultural Society in Tehran by Ambassador Allen, 11 September 1947; 891.6363/1 2347, No. 1031; 891.6363/10-2347, No. 1035; FRUS, 1947, 5:929-30; Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy, p. “FRUS, 1947, 5:463-65F; RUS, 1946, 1:34-35; FRUS, 1947, 5:904-5, 909-10, 325; 891.00/8-3047, NO. 3049; and FRUS, 1947, 5:948-50, 969-70.The Soviet Union searched for oil in Iran during 1945 and 1946, despite the lack of an agreement. Perhaps the reason they did not insist more forcibly on the approval of the 4 April 1946 agreement WBS their inability to find oil in the concession area. George Kennan, writing from Moscow in I944 in response to the oil crisis of that year, determined that the Soviets were pushing the concession issue in late 1944 to ensure no other great power established a presence in northern Iran and therefore had no real interest in Iranian oil. See FRUS, 1944, 5:470-71. Intensive Soviet drilling in northern Iran after the war would, at least in part, refute his analysis. For a record on the Soviet oil search, see 891.6363/11-2645, No. 163; 891.6363/1-846, No. 35; and 891.6363/12-2446, No. 28. See also OSS files: XL22220, 9 October 1945; XL26453, 16 October 1945; XL26521, 22 October 1945; XL27875, 29 October 1945; XL30644, 15 November 1945; XL30645, 26 November 1945; XL44109, 29 January 1946; and XL47939, 4 March 1946.
37. FRUS, 1947, 5:906-7.
38. L. P. Elwell-Sutton, “Political Parties in Iran, 1941-1948,” Middle EastJournal 3 (Winter 1949): 46.