Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influence

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 101, Issue 1, 1986, Pages 1-31

  Douglas Bernheim, B ^a   Whinston, Michael D ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84963015050     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1884639     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Bernheim, B. D., and M. D. Whinston, "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria," Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper #1075, 1984
2. Bhagwati, J., and P. Desai, Planning for Industrialization: India: Industrialization and Trade Policies since 1951 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970)
3. Clarke, E. H., "Multipart Pricing of Public Goods," Public Choice, XI (1971), 19-33
4. Groves, T., "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, XLI (1973), 617-31
5. Mas-Colell, A., "Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods," this Journal, XCIV (1980), 625-41
6. Milgrom, P. R., and R. J. Weber, "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, L (1982), 1089-1122
7. Peleg, B., "Quasi-Coalitional Equilibria, Part I: Definitions and Preliminary Results," Center for Research in Mathematics and Game Theory, Hebrew University, Research Memorandum #59, 1984
8. Selten, R., "Re-examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games," International Journal of Game Theory, IV (1975), 25-55
9. Wilson, R., "Auctions of Shares," this Journal, XCIII (1979), 675-89