Serial cost-sharing of excludable public goods

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 1994, Pages 305-325

  Moulin, Hervé ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84962996767     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2297983     Document Type: Article

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