Gossip Versus Punishment: The Efficiency of Reputation to Promote and Maintain Cooperation

Scientific Reports

Volumn 6, Issue , 2016, Pages

  Wu, Junhui ^a   Balliet, Daniel ^a   Van Lange, Paul A M ^a  

^a VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONTROLLED STUDY; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION; PUNISHMENT; TRUST; ADULT; COOPERATION; FEMALE; GAME; HUMAN RELATION; MALE; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; PSYCHOLOGY; YOUNG ADULT;

ADULT; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; FEMALE; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MALE; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; PUNISHMENT; TRUST; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84962339170     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20452322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/srep23919     Document Type: Article

References (49)

1. Balliet, D., Mulder, L. B. & Van Lange, P. A. M. Reward, punishment, and cooperation: A meta-analysis. Psychol. Bull. 137, 594-615 (2011).
2. Fehr, E. & Gächter, S. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415, 137-140 (2002).
3. Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature 437, 1291-1298 (2005).
4. Rockenbach, B. & Milinski, M. The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment. Nature 444, 718-723 (2006).
5. Wu, J.-J. et al. Costly punishment does not always increase cooperation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 106, 17448-17451 (2009).
6. Henrich, J. et al. Costly punishment across human societies. Science 312, 1767-1770 (2006).
7. Guala, F. Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate. Behav. Brain Sci. 35, 1-15 (2012).
8. Sigmund, K. Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans. Trends Ecol. Evol. 22, 593-600 (2007).
9. Dunbar, R. I. M. Gossip in evolutionary perspective. Rev. Gen. Psychol. 8, 100-110 (2004).
10. Foster, E. K. Research on gossip: Taxonomy, methods, and future directions. Rev. Gen. Psychol. 8, 78-99 (2004).
11. Feinberg, M. & Willer, R., Stellar, J. & Keltner, D. The virtues of gossip: Reputational information sharing as prosocial behavior. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 102, 1015-1030 (2012).
12. Giardini, F. & Conte, R. Gossip for social control in natural and artificial societies. Simulation 88, 18-32 (2012).
13. Piazza, J. & Bering, J. M. Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game. Evol. Hum. Behav. 29, 172-178 (2008).
14. Beersma, B. & Van Kleef, G. A. How the grapevine keeps you in line: Gossip increases contributions to the group. Soc. Psychol. Personal. Sci. 2, 642-649 (2011).
15. Milinski, M., Semmann, D. & Krambeck, H.-J. Reputation helps solve the 'tragedy of the commons'. Nature 415, 424-426 (2002).
16. Sylwester, K. & Roberts, G. Reputation-based partner choice is an effective alternative to indirect reciprocity in solving social dilemmas. Evol. Hum. Behav. 34, 201-206 (2013).
17. Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., Semmann, D. & Milinski, M. Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 104, 17435-17440 (2007).
18. Giardini, F., Paolucci, M., Villatoro, D. & Conte, R. In Advances in Social Simulation (eds Kaminski, B. & Koloch, G.) 107-118 (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014).
19. Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D. & Nowak, M. A. Winners don't punish. Nature 452, 348-351 (2008).
20. Gächter, S., Renner, E. & Sefton, M. The long-run benefits of punishment. Science 322, 1510 (2008).
21. Balliet, D., Parks, C. & Joireman, J. Social value orientation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-analysis. Gr. Process. Intergr. Relations 12, 533-547 (2009).
22. Batson, C. D. Altruism in Humans (Oxford University Press, 2011).
23. Chen, X. P., Dang, C. T. & Keng-Highberger, F. In Reward and Punishment in Social Dilemmas (eds Van Lange, P. A. M., Rockenbach, B. & Yamagishi, T.) 115-132 (Oxford University Press, 2014).
24. Van Lange, P. A. M., Joireman, J., Parks, C. D. & Van Dijk, E. The psychology of social dilemmas: A review. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process 120, 125-141 (2013).
25. Ariely, D., Bracha, A. & Meier, S. Doing good or doing well? Image motivation and monetary incentives in behaving prosocially. Am. Econ. Rev. 99, 544-555 (2009).
26. Fehr, E. & Gächter, S. Do incentive contracts undermine voluntary cooperation? doi: 10.2139/ssrn.313028 (2002).
27. Mulder, L. B., Dijk, E. Van, Cremer, D. De & Wilke, H. A. M. Undermining trust and cooperation: The paradox of sanctioning systems in social dilemmas. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 42, 147-162 (2006).
28. Chen, X. P., Pillutla, M. M. & Yao, X. Unintended consequences of cooperation inducing and maintaining mechanisms in public goods dilemmas: Sanctions and moral appeals. Gr. Process. Intergr. Relations 12, 241-255 (2009).
29. Nelissen, R. M. A. & Mulder, L. B. What makes a sanction 'stick'? The effects of financial and social sanctions on norm compliance. Soc. Influ. 8, 70-80 (2013).
30. Feinberg, M., Willer, R. & Schultz, M. Gossip and ostracism promote cooperation in groups. Psychol. Sci. 25, 656-664 (2014).
31. Yaniv, I. & Kleinberger, E. Advice taking in decision making: Egocentric discounting and reputation formation. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process 83, 260-281 (2000).
32. West, B. T., Welch, K. B. & Galecki, A. T. (2014). Linear Mixed Models: A Practical Guide Using Statistical Software (CRC Press, 2014).
33. Feinberg, M., Cheng, J. T. & Willer, R. Gossip as an effective and low-cost form of punishment. Behav. Brain Sci. 35, 25 (2012).
34. Barclay, P. & Raihani, N. Partner choice versus punishment in human prisoner's dilemmas. Evol. Hum. Behav. doi: 10.1016/j. evolhumbehav.2015.12.004 (2016).
35. Van Lange, P. A. M., Rockenbach, B. & Yamagishi, T. Reward and Punishment in Social Dilemmas (Oxford University Press, 2014).
36. Lienard, P. In Reward and Punishment in Social Dilemmas (eds Van Lange, P. A. M., Rockenbach, B. & Yamagishi, T.) 214-234 (Oxford University Press, 2014).
37. Ostrom, E. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
38. Ostrom, E. Experiments combining communication with punishment options demonstrate how individuals can overcome social dilemmas. Behav. Brain Sci. 35, 33-34 (2012).
39. Balliet, D. Communication and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-analytic review. J. Conflict Resolut. 54, 39-57 (2010).
40. Andrighetto, G. et al. Punish and voice: Punishment enhances cooperation when combined with norm-signalling. Plos One 8, e64941 (2013).
41. Ben-Ner, A. & Putterman, L. Trust, communication and contracts: An experiment. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 70, 106-121 (2009).
42. Hess, N. C. & Hagen, E. H. Informational warfare. Retrieved from http://cogprints.org/2112/ (2002).
43. Hess, N. H. & Hagen, E. H. Psychological adaptations for assessing gossip veracity. Hum. Nat. 17, 337-354 (2006).
44. Paolucci, M. False reputation in social control. Adv. Complex Syst. 3, 39-51 (2000).
45. Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A. G. & Buchner, A. G∗Power 3: A flexible statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behav. Res. Methods 39, 175-191 (2007).
46. Hendriks, A. SoPHIE-Software platform for human interaction experiments. Working Paper (University of Osnabrueck, 2012).
47. Berg, J., Dickhaut, J. & McCabe, K. Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games Econ. Behav. 10, 122-142 (1995).
48. Bellemare, C. & Kröger, S. On representative social capital. Eur. Econ. Rev. 51, 183-202 (2007).
49. Van Lange, P. A. M., Otten, W., De Bruin, E. M. & Joireman, J. A. Development of prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations: Theory and preliminary evidence. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 73, 733-746 (1997).