Appropriate causal models and stability of causation

Proceedings of the International Conference on Knowledge Representation and Reasoning

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 198-207

  Halpern, Joseph Y ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GEMS;

CAUSAL MODEL; EXTRA VARIABLES; HOPKINS; ORIGINAL MODEL; STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS;

KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION;

EID: 84962110937     PISSN: 23341025     EISSN: 23341033     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (25)

1. Aleksandrowicz, G.; Chockler, H.; Halpern, J. Y.; and Ivrii, A. 2013. Complexity of causality: updated results. unpublished manuscript.
2. Beer, I.; Ben-David, S.; Chockler, H.; Orni, A.; and Trefler, R. J. 2012. Explaining counterexamples using causality. Formal Methods in System Design 40(1):20-40.
3. Blanchard, T., and Schaffer, J. 2013. Cause without default. unpublished manuscript.
4. Cushman, F.; Knobe, J.; and Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 2008. Moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Cognition 108(1):281-289.
5. Eiter, T., and Lukasiewicz, T. 2002. Complexity results for structure-based causality. Artificial Intelligence 142(1):53-89.
6. Gerstenberg, T., and Lagnado, D. 2010. Spreading the blame: the allocation of responsibility amongst multiple agents. Cognition 115:166-171.
7. Glymour, C.; Danks, D.; Glymour, B.; Eberhardt, F.; Ramsey, J.; Scheines, R.; Spirtes, P.; Teng, C. M.; and Zhang, J. 2010. Actual causation: a stone soup essay. Synthese 175:169-192.
8. Hall, N. 2007. Structural equations and causation. Philosophical Studies 132:109-136.
9. Halpern, J. Y., and Hitchcock, C. 2010. Actual causation and the art of modeling. In Dechter, R.; Geffner, H.; and Halpern, J., eds., Causality, Probability, and Heuristics: A Tribute to Judea Pearl. London: College Publications. 383-406.
10. Halpern, J. Y., and Hitchcock, C. 2014. Graded causation and defaults. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Available at http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/halpern/papers/normality.pdf.
11. Halpern, J. Y., and Pearl, J. 2001. Causes and explanations: A structural-model approach. Part I: Causes. In Proc. Seventeenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI 2001), 194-202.
12. Halpern, J. Y., and Pearl, J. 2005. Causes and explanations: A structural-model approach. Part I: Causes. British Journal for Philosophy of Science 56(4):843-887.
13. Halpern, J. Y. 2008. Defaults and normality in causal structures. In Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proc. Eleventh International Conference (KR '08). 198-208.
14. Hiddleston, E. 2005. Causal powers. British Journal for Philosophy of Science 56:27-59.
15. Hitchcock, C., and Knobe, J. 2009. Cause and norm. Journal of Philosophy 106:587-612.
16. Hitchcock, C. 2001. The intransitivity of causation revealed in equations and graphs. Journal of Philosophy XCVIII(6):273-299.
17. Hitchcock, C. 2007. Prevention, preemption, and the principle of sufficient reason. Philosophical Review 116:495-532.
18. Hopkins, M., and Pearl, J. 2003. Clarifying the usage of structural models for commonsense causal reasoning. In Proc. AAAI Spring Symposium on Logical Formalizations of Commonsense Reasoning.
19. Hopkins, M. 2001. A proof of the conjunctive cause conjecture. Unpublished manuscript.
20. Kahneman, D., and Miller, D. T. 1986. Norm theory: comparing reality to its alternatives. Psychological Review 94(2):136-153.
21. Knobe, J., and Fraser, B. 2008. Causal judgment and moral judgment: two experiments. In Sinnott-Armstrong, W., ed., Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 441-447.
22. Lagnado, D.; Gerstenberg, T.; and Zultan, R. 2013. Causal responsibility and counterfactuals. Cognitive Science 37:1036-1073.
23. Livengood, J. 2013. Actual causation in simple voting scenarios. Nous 47(2):316-345.
24. Spohn, W. 2008. Personal email.
25. Weslake, B. 2014. A partial theory of actual causation. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. To appear.