Electricity market games: How agent-based modeling can help under high penetrations of variable generation

Electricity Journal

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 2016, Pages 39-46

  Gallo, Giulia ^a  

^a NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agent based modeling; Electricity market design; Missing money problem; Revenue sufficiency; Uplift payments; Variable generation

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; ELECTRIC INDUSTRY;

AGENT-BASED MODEL; ELECTRICITY MARKETS DESIGNS; MARKET GAME; MARKET PARTICIPANTS; MISSING MONEY PROBLEM; POWER GRID MODELS; POWER SYSTEM MODELING; REVENUE SUFFICIENCY; UPLIFT PAYMENT; VARIABLE GENERATIONS;

POWER MARKETS;

EID: 84961935890     PISSN: 10406190     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tej.2016.02.001     Document Type: Article

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