The Zebra Crossing Game – Using game theory to explain a discrepancy between road user behaviour and traffic rules

Safety Science

Volumn 92, Issue , 2017, Pages 298-301

  Bjørnskau, Torkel ^a  

^a INSTITUTE OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS   (Norway)

Author keywords

Cars; Crossing; Cyclists; Game theory; Interaction; Yielding

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; CROSSINGS (PIPE AND CABLE); CROSSWALKS; PAVEMENTS; RAILROAD CARS; ROADS AND STREETS; TRANSPORTATION;

COMBINED CYCLE; CYCLISTS; GAME-THEORETIC; INTERACTION; NORMAL SOLUTIONS; TRAFFIC SAFETY; WALKING PATHS; YIELDING;

GAME THEORY;

ARTICLE; CYCLING; DRIVING ABILITY; GAME; HUMAN; OUTCOME ASSESSMENT; PREDICTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RISK ASSESSMENT; RISK FACTOR; TRAFFIC ACCIDENT; TRAFFIC SAFETY;

EID: 84960839689     PISSN: 09257535     EISSN: 18791042     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ssci.2015.10.007     Document Type: Article

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