The management of innovation

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 109, Issue 4, 1994, Pages 1185-1209

  Aghion, Philippe ^a,b   Tirole, Jean ^c,d  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^b EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT   (United Kingdom)

^c Toulouse School of Economics   (France)

^d MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84960613841     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2118360     Document Type: Article

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