Political consequences of military strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models

World Politics

Volumn 44, Issue 4, 1992, Pages 497-538

  Glaser, Charles L ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84959610525     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: 10863338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2010486     Document Type: Article

References (76)

1. This categorization is suggested by offense-defense and security dilemma theories. Key works include John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2 (January 1950); Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (January 1978); Stephen W. Van Evera, “Causes of War” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1984); idem, “Offense, Defense, and Strategy: When Is Offense Best?” (Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the APSA, Chicago, September 1987); and George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: John Wiley, 1977). On potential confusion in defining the offense-defense balance, see Jack S. Levy, “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 28 (June 1984).
2. On the importance of images, see Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), esp. 5–10.
3. For an analysis of this debate, see Douglas Seay, “What Are Soviet Objectives in Their Foreign, Military and Arms Control Policy?” in Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller, eds., Nuclear Arguments (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. 54–55.
4. They may, however, sometimes share a single source. For example, poor evaluative capabilities might allow a state to justify its greedy actions in terms of insecurity and also to come to believe its justifications; similarly, such a state might exaggerate its insecurity because it fails to recognize that its own greedy policies provoked the alliances that formed to oppose it. On these possibilities, see Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Robert J. C. Butow, Tajo and the Coming of the War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969).
5. Jervis (fn. 1), 168-69; on the cumulativity of resources, see Van Evera (fn. 1, 1984), chap. 5.
6. Additional reasons for the increase in the probability of war as states become more insecure include the following: (1) insecure states become less willing to compromise in political disputes; (2) they are more inclined to adopt more confrontational tactics in crises; and (3) they have increased incentives for preventive war. See Van Evera (fn. 1, 1984), pt. 1; on preventive war, see Jack S. Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics 40 (October 1987).
7. For related discussion, see George W. Downs, “Arms Races and War,” in Philip Tetlock et al., eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
8. Although conceptually distinct, the argument that the adversary can be simultaneously greedy and insecure can lead to the same policies as the argument that the defender's policy should be designed to account for uncertainty about whether the spiral or deterrence model applies; Jervis (fn. 3) suggests the latter (p. 111).
9. Ibid., 92–94.
10. On the role of British cooperation, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Detente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations, 1911-1914,” International Security 11 (Fall 1986). We should note that arguments that the Germans were interested in expansion and intentionally provoked World War I are not inconsistent with the central claims of the spiral model. These arguments suggest that the war was not primarily inadvertent, but discrediting the spiral model requires going a step further—showing that German interest in war was not driven by insecurity.
11. This does not mean that there were necessarily policies adequate to prevent war. On this point, see Stephen Van Evera, “Why Cooperation Failed in 1914,” in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 116–17.
12. On structural theories, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
13. Confusion on this point is common, however, with analysts arguing that structural theories predict that states will try to maximize their power, not their security, which could lead to expansionist behavior by secure states. Some realists have made this argument, but Waltz does not. See Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Relations: A Response to My Critics,” in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 334; and Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), 68–69.
14. Thus, the deterrence model rejects third image explanations and is built on first and/or second image theories. On these categories of explanations, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
15. See, e.g., NSC 68, reprinted in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 385–442.
16. Although Jervis's chapter emphasizes misperceptions, it is clear on this point. See Jervis (fn. 3), 62–67.
17. On these points, see Jervis (fn. 1), 187–214.
18. For the basic strategic critique, see Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter,” Political Science Quarterly 94 (Winter 1979-80); on the dangers, see Paul Nitze, “Deterring Our Deterrent,” Foreign Policy 25 (Winter 1976–77). Reviewing this debate is Charles L. Glaser, “Why Do Strategists Disagree about the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence?” in Eden and Miller (fn. 5).
19. On related points, see Van Evera (fn. 1, 1987), 12—13.
20. The discussion in the text focuses on misperceptions that increase the difficulties facing the defender, but not all misperceptions lead to worse outcomes. For example, a potentially insecure adversary that incorrectly views the defender's offense as defense will be less insecure than if it were clear-sighted. On related points, see Arthur A. Stein, “When Misperception Matters,” World Politics 34 (July 1982).
21. On the role of expectations, see Jervis (fn. 3), 143-201; and Deborah Welch Larson, The Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
22. On this type of misperception, see Jack Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), 24–26, 211–14.
23. These broad political purposes of offensive policies complement more common arguments based on military requirements, which hold that the defender requires offensive capabilities to deter a highly expansionist adversary. For example, proponents argued that the United States required nuclear superiority to make its threats sufficiently credible to deter Soviet attacks on U.S. allies. See Colin S. Gray, “Nuclear Strategy: A Case for a Theory of Victory,” International Security 4 (Summer 1979); for disagreements, see Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), chap. 5, which addresses the negative political consequences of superiority. Similarly, proponents of an offensive conventional strategy claimed that the ability to defeat a Soviet conventional invasion was insufficient to deter it. See Samuel P. Huntington, “Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe,” International Security 8 (Winter 1983–84), 36-40. On the range of possible military requirements for offense, see Van Evera (fn. 1, 1987). On the political and military benefits of counteroffensive capabilities, see Barry R. Posen, “Crisis Stability and Conventional Arms Control,” Daedalus 120 (Winter 1991).
24. Jervis (fn. 3), 67–76, 349-53; and Larson (fn. 32), 37–42.
25. Jervis (fn. 3), 354–355.
26. The international relations literature has focused on psychological limitations: see Jervis (fn. 3); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Larson (fn. 32); and John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). On the difficulty of determining whether decision makers suffered from misperceptions, see Robert Jervis, “War and Misperception,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988). Chaim Kaufmann explains how to identify nonrational misperceptions. See Kaufmann, “Deterrence and Rationality in International Crises” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1990), chap. 3.
27. Van Evera (fn. 1, 1984), pt. 2, emphasizes organizational interests; Jack Snyder (fn. 6) emphasizes domestic political dynamics. Earlier work on organizations and bureaucracies focused on explaining foreign policy not national misperceptions. A good summary of the biases produced by bureaucratic politics is Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), 109–14. Graham T. Allison identifies factors that influence bureaucratic bargaining; see Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), esp. 168–69.
28. On these conditions, see Van Evera (fn. 1, 1984), 272–73.
29. This is a specific type of what Snyder has termed a “perceptual security dilemma,” in Jack L. Snyder, “Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914,” in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (fn. 37).
30. Snyder (fn. 33), 28; Van Evera (fn. 1, 1984), 254–73.
31. Snyder (fn. 6).
32. Van Evera (fn. 1, 1984), chap. 8; idem, “Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Washington, D.C., 1988).
33. On these points, see Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security 9 (Summer 1984), esp. 66-70; idem (fn. 18), 93-95; Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” International Security 9 (Summer 1984), esp. 115-29; idem (fn. 33); Holger H. Herwig, “Imperial Germany,” in Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's Enemies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). On the faulty analysis that underpinned Tirpitz's arguments for the naval buildup, see Paul Kennedy, “Strategic Aspects of the Anglo-German Naval Race,” in Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870–1945 (Aylesbury, England: Fontana, 1984). Arguing that the extent of poor evaluation is exaggerated, others hold that Germany had strong strategic rationales for its policies. See Scott D. Sagan, “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability,” International Security 11 (Fall 1986).
34. See, e.g., Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard in Arms Control Implications of Current Defense Budget, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 92d Cong., 1st sess., July 13, 1971, pp. 171-77; and Dr. John Foster, Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple Warhead Missiles, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 1st sess., July 1969, pp. 244–45, 258–63. Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), 135, reports that, to support their case, proponents of mirv also exaggerated Soviet progress in developing mirv capabilities. In fact, the Soviets did see U.S. mirvs posing an increased threat; see fn. 80 below.
35. On Soviet views, see Bruce Parrott, The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), 24-25; and Raymond L. Garthoff, “bmdand East-West Relations,” in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), 292–298.
36. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), 23; and Gerald M. Boyd, “Reagan Proposes U.S. Soviet Accord on Mobile Missiles,” New York Times, November 2, 1985, p. 4.
37. For example, Committee on the Present Danger, “Has America Become Number 2?” (June 29, 1982), reprinted in Charles Tyroler II, ed., Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), 208.
38. On U.S. and Soviet forces and views of the balance in the 1970s, see Garthoff (fn. 45), 785-800; for interesting comparisons, see Warner R. Schilling, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1970s: The Search for Sufficiently Equivalent Countervailing Parity,” International Security 6 (Fall 1981); on the evolution of counter-silo forces, see Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), Appendix A; and Congressional Budget Office, Trident II Missiles (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986).
39. Michael Salman, Kevin J. Sullivan, and Stephen Van Evera, “Analysis or Propaganda? Measuring American Strategic Nuclear Capability, 1969-1988,” in Eden and Miller (fn. 5).
40. On this point, see John J. Mearsheimer, “Numbers, Strategy and the European Balance,” International Security 12 (Spring 1988), 180 n. 8. See also Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
41. Along these lines, Jack Snyder suggested that conventional arms control negotiations could contribute to the growing role of civilians in Soviet defense policy. See Snyder, “International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change,” World Politics 42 (October 1989), 26–27. I do not mean to imply by making this recommendation that militaries always advocate dangerous policies and civilians always champion safe ones. However, militaries do appear, in general, to favor offensive policies; when these are unduly offensive, civilian involvement might offer a valuable counterbalance.
42. Matthew Evangelista argues that interactions between Western European proponents of nonoffensive defense and Soviet civilian reformers influenced Gorbachev's policy on conventional forces. See Evangelista, “Transnational Alliances and Soviet Demilitarization” (Paper prepared for the Council on Economic Priorities, Project on Military Expenditures and Economic Priorities, October 1990).
43. Matthew Evangelista notes the inadequacy of learning models and the importance of “second-image models” in explaining arms competition and cooperation. See Evangelista, “Cooperation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1960s,” World Politics 42 (July 1990), 526–528.
44. Jack Snyder, “Averting Anarchy in the New Europe,” International Security 14 (Spring 1990); Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978).
45. For example, in the Soviet case compare the views of moderates (e.g., Gorbachev and proponents of the new political thinking) with opponents of reform. See Stephen M. Meyer, “The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security,” International Security 13 (Fall 1988); and Raymond Garthoff, “New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine,” Washington Quarterly 11 (Summer 1988).
46. On some of these basic points, with examples from a range of great power cases, see Snyder (fn. 52), who considers additional factors, including whether the regime is weakly or strongly institutionalized; see also James G. Richter, “Action and Reaction in Khrushchev's Foreign Policy: How Leadership Politics Affect Soviet Responses to the International Environment” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1989).
47. See Alexander Yanov, “In the Grip of the Adversarial Paradigm,” in Robert O. Crummey, ed., Reform in Russia and the U.S.S.R. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989); George F. Minde II and Michael Hennessey, “Reform of the Soviet Military under Khrushchev and the Role of America's Strategic Modernization,” in Crummey; William Taubman (“Khrushchev and Detente,” in Crummey), who argues that the United States pursued the correct policy, given Khrushchev's belligerent policies; and Richter (fn. 57), chaps. 6, 7.
48. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, U.S.-U, S.S.R. Strategic Forces, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 93d Cong., 2d sess., March 1974, p. 18; and Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, before the same subcommittee, September 11, 1974, p. 9.
49. U.S. doctrine preceded the Soviet buildup, and counterforce had influential supporters in the U.S. military. On doctrine, see Desmond Ball, “The Development of the slop, 1960-1983,” in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986). On the Air Force, see Graham T. Allison and Frederic A. Morris, “Armaments and Arms Control: Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons,” Daedalus 104 (Summer 1975), 120. On the influence of the military in the mirv decision, see Ted Greenwood, Making the mirv (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975); and Gerard Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I (New York: University Press of America, 1985), chap 4.
50. Critics included Barry E. Carter, “Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Weapons,” Scientific American 230 (May 1974); G. W. Rathjens, “Flexible Response Options,” Orbis 18 (Fall 1974); and Jervis (fn. 28). Along similar lines, Snyder (fn. 44) finds that although the offensive strategies of the European powers before World War I were primarily domestic in origin, they were also partly imported; he also notes the export of Soviet counterforce doctrine in the 1970s (p. 146).
51. On the need for cooperative policies, which are sometimes described as reassurance or a mix of deterrence and reassurance, see, e.g., Richard Ned Lebow, “The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?” in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (fn. 37); and Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, who review a variety of approaches from cooperation theory in Lebow and Stein, “Beyond Deterrence,” Journal of Social Issues 43, no. 4 (1987).
52. The offense-defense balance reflects the relative cost of equal protection provided by offensive and defensive strategies. Jervis (fn. 1), 187–188.
53. For additional possibilities, see Van Evera (fn. 1, 1987), who considers factors that influence whether defense can meet extended deterrence commitments, for example, by stationing denial forces on allies territory (pp. 8–12).
54. Of course, this possibility assumes Germany wanted only to protect its borders and was otherwise willing to forgo expansion. On the feasibility of a defensive option, see Snyder (fn. 33), who argues that the best option might have included a limited offensive in the East (pp. 116–122).
55. Arms control might also be valuable when offense and defense are indistinguishable. When combined with adequate verification provisions, it could increase both countries security by increasing their confidence that the other was not going to launch an arms buildup and that they would therefore not fall behind in an arms race. This could reduce misperceptions of motivations, as well as concerns about military capabilities.
56. Jervis (fn. 1), 201.
57. Unfortunately, barriers to agreements grow with the advantage of offense, since the defender's security becomes more sensitive to cheating. However, this risk can be reduced by allowing the deployment of additional defensive systems.
58. In addition, when offense has an advantage over defense, these agreements enhance the defender's military capability for defense and/or deterrence. Although not formulated explicitly in terms of offense-defense, classical arms control theory focuses on this objective. See, e.g., Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).
59. For an overview of this period and citations to more extensive discussions, see David N. Schwartz, “Past and Present: The Historical Legacy,” in Carter and Schwartz (fn. 46).
60. On grit, see Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1962); Deborah Welch Larson, “Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty,” International Organization 41 (Winter 1987); and George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), esp. 41–51.
61. Huntington (fn. 34), 32–56.
62. On the requirements of conventional deterrence, see John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); on the conventional balance, see the policy focus section in International Security 12 (Spring 1988).
63. On the sensitivity of Tit-for-Tat to misinterpretation, see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson, “Arms Races and Cooperation,” in Oye (fn. 18), 137–143.
64. This possibility is supported by the fact that U.S. military policies did fuel Soviet insecurity during the cold war. On Soviet concerns during the cold war, see Garthoff (fn. 45); specifically on views of U.S. nuclear policy, see Garthoff, pp. 417–18, 768–70, 796-800; Samuel B. Payne, “The Soviet Debate on Strategic Arms Limitation, 1968-1972,” Soviet Studies 27 (January 1975); and Parrott (fn. 46), 9–21.
65. On the effect of U.S. policy on Soviet domestic politics, see Snyder (fn. 52); Richter (fn. 57); and Matthew Evangelista, “Missed Opportunities and Closed Archives: Did the Eisenhower Administration Defeat Khrushchev's Disarmament Initiatives?” (Paper presented at a conference on Eisenhower's World Legacy, Moscow, November 1990).
66. Whether the United States should shift to competitive policies if hard-liners regain power is a more difficult question. If Russian national-level evaluative capabilities are weak, then this approach is likely to backfire. On the weaknesses of civilian institutions that provided military advice in the former Soviet Union, see Snyder (fn. 52), 25-28; Condoleezza Rice, “The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union,” World Politics 40 (October 1987); and Stephen M. Meyer, “Civilian and Military Influence in Managing the Arms Race,” in Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Reorganizing America's Defense (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985).
67. For analysis of American counterforce requirements, see Glaser (fn. 34), chap. 7; idem, “Nuclear Policy without an Adversary: U.S. Planning for the PostSoviet Era,” International Security 16 (Spring 1992).
68. On these recent initiatives, see “Text of Bush's Message: Heating Up the Economy, and Looking Beyond,” New York Times, January 29, 1992, p. 16; and John Lancaster and Barton Gellman, “Navy Subs, Big Army Programs Facing Ax,” Washington Post, January 19, 1992, p. 12.
69. On the basic cold war naval missions and the debate over them, see John J. Mearsheimer, “A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe,” International Security 11 (Fall 1986); and Linton F. Brooks, “Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy,” International Security 11 (Fall 1986).
70. On the feasibility of this approach, see Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
71. See Matthew Bunn, “Star Wars Redux: Limited Defenses, Unlimited Dilemmas,” Arms Control Today 21 (May 1991), 12–18.
72. This policy is outlined in Glaser (fn. 83).
73. For arguments supporting security guarantees, see Samuel P. Huntington, “America's Changing Strategic Interests,” Survival 33 (January-February 1991), 13.
74. For useful discussion, see Stephen Van Evera, “Managing the Eastern Crisis: Preventing War in the Former Soviet Empire,” Security Studies 1 (Spring 1992).
75. The case for collective security is well presented in Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,” International Security 16 (Summer 1991).
76. On the wide range of views on the prospects for avoiding tensions between Western European states, see Sean Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).