Challenging, but not Trouble-Making: cultural elites in China’s urban heritage preservation

Journal of Contemporary China

Volumn 25, Issue 98, 2016, Pages 292-306

  Yao, Yuan ^a   Han, Rongbin ^b  

^a NANJING UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CULTURAL HERITAGE; CULTURAL RELATIONS; ELITE POLITICS; ETHNOPOLITICS; PARTY POLITICS; STATE ROLE;

CHINA;

EID: 84959241574     PISSN: 10670564     EISSN: 14699400     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1075720     Document Type: Article

References (101)

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17. Similarly, protestors often can hardly find justice in the courtrooms, particularly at the local level where cadres have considerable influence over the court through personnel and funding.
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40. Hsing, The Great Urban Transformation, p. 10.
41. Other factors can influence local officials’ choice between preservation and destruction. For instance, they may choose to pursue urban renovation projects for rent-seeking opportunities. Personal preferences can also affect local officials’ decision-making. Such possibilities are not explored here because of the limited space.
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44. The authoritarian regime has institutionalized channels for deliberation and cultural elites are often included. But the focus of this article is how cultural elites take such channels as opportunities to advance heritage preservation. For discussion on ‘authoritarian deliberation’
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46. For instance, the state has shown tolerance towards retired officials and academics even when they establish a visible network arguing for democratization.
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49. Cultural elites also encouraged residents to petition through existing channels like the National People’s Congress, and Central, Provincial and Municipal Party Disciplinary Inspection Commissions.
50. Interview with Mr Xie Chensheng in Beijing on 23 December 2012.
51. See Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, ‘Beijing Chengshi Zongti Guihua (2004-2020)’ [‘2004-2020 Master Plan of the Beijing City Area’], available at: http://www.bjpc.gov.cn/fzgh_1/csztgh/200710/t195452.htm (accessed 10 February 2014).
52. For details of instructions by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, see Beijing City Planning Academy, Hutong Baohu Guihua Yanjiu [Studies on Hutong Preservation Planning] (Beijing: Beijing City Planning Academy, 2005), p. 33.
53. The document is available at: http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2008-04/29/content_957280.htm (accessed 10 February 2014).
54. For a collection of the reports at National Party Congress Conferences, see the following link: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/21/content_698625.htm (accessed 10 February 2014).
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56. Interview with Ms Zeng Yizhi in Harbin on 20 June 2012.
57. Daniela Stockmann, Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
58. Even market-oriented media outlets are affiliated to state-run media outlets. Behind these two papers are Guangming Daily and Xinhua News Agency, respectively.
59. The authors counted more than 90 pieces of reports by major media outlets on the issue. For instance
60. see Liu Xudun, ‘“Weigai” yu baohu’ [‘Renovation of dilapidated buildings and heritage preservation’], Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], (23 July 2009), p. 20
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62. Chen Ying, ‘Gucheng wuxu jiyi?’ [‘The old city needs no memory?’], Lianhe Zaobao [United Morning Paper], (23 August 2009), p. 23
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64. Zhan Yanhui, ‘Neican jiemi’ [‘Uncover the secrets of internal reference’], Phoenix Weekly 14, (2005), pp. 28-29.
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67. Interview with Mr J. W., former journalist at B Province Branch of Xinhua News Agency, on 5 March 2007.
68. Kang was a prominent scholar, political thinker and reformer in the late Qing period
69. Liang joined the Communist Party as early as 1947, and was former director of Jiangsu Provincial Administration of Cultural Heritage and former curator of Nanjing Museum. Jiang and Pan are professor emeriti of Nanjing University and Southeast University, respectively. They are the only three scholars sitting in Jiangsu Provincial Cultural Relic Management Commission, a semi-governmental consultation agency that is headed by a deputy governor and composed of officials from relevant government agencies.
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71. Beijing People’s Court, ed., Beijing Xingzheng Susong Anli Yanjiu [Case Study of Administrative Proceedings in Beijing] (Beijing: Law Press, 2003), p. 30.
72. The letters and visits system, or xinfang, is an institutionalized petition channel in China. Petitioners can write letters or pay visits to state agencies and officials to lodge complaints. Studies suggest that the system hardly works, even when petitioners take their cases to Beijing.
73. See Lianjiang Li, Mingxing Liu and Kevin O’Brien, ‘Petitioning Beijing: the high tide of 2003-2006’, The China Quarterly 210, (2012), pp. 313-334
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78. See Hu Jintao, ‘Speech at the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party’, 15 October 2007, available at: http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2007-10/24/content_785431.htm (accessed 10 February 2014).
79. Interview with Mr Xie Chensheng in Beijing on 23 December 2012.
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83. For instance, 2,099 of the 2,987 representatives in the 11th NPC are Communist Party members
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89. See ‘Zhengxie weiyuan fanying sheqing minyi you naxie qudao?’ [‘What are the channels for CPPCC members to report social dynamics and public opinion?’], available at: http://www.hefei.gov.cn/n1105/n32932/n8680090/n8680570/13530348. html (accessed 10 February 2014).
90. See ‘Quanguo zhengxie weiyuan fanying sheqing minyi xinxi’ [‘Summary of reports by National CPPCC members on social dynamics and public opinion’], available at: http://cppcc.people.com.cn/GB/34961/59086/59089/4145817.html (accessed 10 February 2014).
91. Interview with Mr Yang Yongquan in Nanjing on 23 August 2012.
92. In the case of Nanjing, for instance, district governments receive approximately 70% of the benefits and the remaining goes to the municipal government.
93. See ‘Jiang Zanchu: shouhu Lao Nanjing’ [‘Jiang Zanchu: protecting Old Nanjing’], Xiandai Kuaibao [Modern Express], (27 October 2013), pp. A8-A9.
94. Shan Jixiang, ‘Xu’ [Preface], in Li, ed., Xie Chensheng Xiansheng Wanglai Shuzha.
95. Robert Putnam, ‘Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital’, Journal of Democracy 6(1), (1995), pp. 65-78.
96. As will be briefly explained in the conclusion, cultural elites are reluctant to form non-governmental organizations because they want to maintain their intermediary status between the state and the citizenry.
97. Zhongguo Zuojia Xiehui Huiyuan Cidian Bianji Shi, Zhongguo Zuojia Xiehui Huiyuan Cidian [Dictionary of Chinese Writers Association] (Beijing: Zuojia Chubanshe, 2009).
98. Interview with Ms Zeng Yizhi in Harbin on 20 June 2012.
99. Also see Cao Bingwu and Liu Yuqing, Ren Yu Yichan: 2008 Niandu Zhongguo Wenhua Yichan Baohu Jiechu Renwu Jishi [Man and Heritage: Outstanding Figures for China’s Heritage Preservation in 2008] (Beijing: Xueyuan Chubanshe, 2008)
100. Zeng Yizhi, Cheng Yu Ren: Harbin Gushi [City and Man: Stories of Harbin] (Harbin: Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 2003).
101. Beijing Municipal Commission of Urban Planning, ‘Wei bangongshi huo shidangwei xitong xinxi gongzuo biaobing danwei quanwei duoge xiangmu bei pingwei youxiu chengban jian’ [‘The Commission Office named Information Work Model Unit by Beijing Municipal Party Committee and multiple projects rated as excellent’], available at: http://olympic.bjghw.gov.cn/web/static/articles/catalog_19/2009-05-13/article_9288/9288.html (accessed 10 February 2014).