The hospitals/residents problem with ties

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 1851, Issue , 2000, Pages 259-271

  Irving, Robert W ^a   Manlove, David F ^a   Scott, Sandy ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPLICATION PROGRAMS; CLUSTERING ALGORITHMS; HOSPITALS; STABILITY CRITERIA;

A-STABLE; LINEAR-TIME ALGORITHMS; MATCHING SCHEME; NEW RESULTS; PREFERENCE LISTS; STABLE MATCHING PROBLEM; SUPERSTABILITY;

ALGORITHMS;

EID: 84956869818     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-44985-X     Document Type: Conference Paper

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